

The "Order of the Day" statement as issued to the soldiers, sailors and airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force on June 6, 1944

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE



Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen of the Allied Expeditionary Force!

You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The eyes of the world are upon you. The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you. In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.

Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped and battle-hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944 ! Much has happened since the Nazi triumphs of 1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats, in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously reduced their strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground. Our Home Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained fighting men. The tide has turned ! The free men of the world are marching together to Victory !

I have full confidence in your courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full Victory !

Good Luck ! And let us all beseech the blessing of Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.



Dwight D. Eisenhower

In Case of the Failure of the D-Day Operation

Following the decision for the cross channel invasion, Eisenhower wrote a press release on a pad of paper, to be used if necessary. The handwritten message by General Eisenhower, the In Case of Failure message is mistakenly dated "July" 5 instead of "June" 5.

Our landings in the
Cherbourg - Have now
have failed to gain a
satisfactory foothold and
~~I have with me~~
~~the troops have been~~
~~withdrawn.~~ | ~~This particular~~
~~operation~~ | my decision to
attack at this time and place
was based upon the best
information available, ~~and~~
the troops, the air and the
Navy did all that ~~was~~
Bravery and devotion to duty
could do. If any blame
or fault attaches to the attempt
it is mine alone.

July 5

The Trident Conference May 1943

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MAY 1943

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AND

MINUTES OF MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED

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By ARK

NLE DATE 12/29/73

Regrading Memo 52-73

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1943



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~~BRITISH MOST SECRET~~

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Authority JCA Regarding memo 52-73

By ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TRIDENT

MINUTES

1ST MEETING, THE WHITE HOUSE, 2:30 P.M., 12 MAY 1943

PRESENT

British

The Prime Minister
Field Marshal Sir John Dill
General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles F. A. Portal
Lt. Gen. Sir Hastings L. Ismay

U. S.

The President
Admiral Wm. D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

SECRETARIES

Brig. General J. R. Deane
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

THE PRESIDENT welcomed Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff. He recalled that it was less than a year ago when they had all met in the White House, and had set on foot the moves leading up to *TORCH*. It was very appropriate that they should meet again just as that operation was coming to a satisfactory conclusion. The meeting at Casablanca had set on foot operation *HUSKY*, and he hoped that this would meet with similar good fortune. He thought that the keynote of our plans at the present time should be an intention to employ every resource of men and munitions against the enemy. Nothing that could be brought to bear should be allowed to stand idle.

He then asked the Prime Minister to open the discussion.

THE PRIME MINISTER recalled the striking change which had taken place in the situation since he had last sat by the President's desk, and had heard the news of the fall of Tobruk. He could never forget the manner in which the President had sustained him at that time, and the Shermans which had been handed over so generously had made their reputation in Africa. The British came to the present meeting adhering to the Casablanca decisions. There might have to be adjustments made necessary by our success, which also enabled us to take a longer forward view. *TORCH* was over, *HUSKY* was near, what should come next? He would put forward some views which had been formed by careful study. These would not be in the shape of fixed plans, but rather of ideas for the common stock. We had been able by taking thought together to produce a succession of brilliant events which had altered the whole course of the war. We had the authority and prestige of victory. It was our duty to redouble our efforts, and to grasp the fruits of our success. The only questions outstanding between the two Staffs were questions of emphasis and priority. He felt sure that these could be solved by mutual agreement.

He did not propose to deal with the U-boat war, and the aerial bombardment of Germany. There were no differences of opinion on these subjects, though there might be a few points of detail to be cleared up between the two Staffs. He would like to put forward for consideration a number of objectives, and questions which might focus subsequent

study. The first objective was in the Mediterranean. The great prize there was to get Italy out of the war by whatever means might be the best. He recalled how in 1918, when Germany might have retreated to the Meuse or the Rhine and continued the fight, the defection of Bulgaria brought the whole of the enemy structure crashing to the ground. The collapse of Italy would cause a chill of loneliness over the German people, and might be the beginning of their doom. But even if not immediately fatal to Germany, the effects of Italy coming out of the war would be very great, first of all on Turkey, who had always measured herself with Italy in the Mediterranean. The moment would come when a Joint American-Russian-British request might be made to Turkey for permission to use bases in her territory from which to bomb Ploesti and clear the Aegean. Such a request could hardly fail to be successful if Italy were out of the war, and the moment were chosen when Germany could take no powerful action against Turkey. Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities were with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included 25 or more Italian Divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either that Germany would have to give up the Balkans, or else that she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian Front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian Front on so large a scale this year. The third effect would be the elimination of the Italian fleet. This would immediately release a considerable British squadron of battle-ships and aircraft carriers to proceed either to the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific to fight Japan.

Certain questions presented themselves in relation to the Mediterranean. Need we invade the soil of Italy, or could we crush her by air attack? Would Germany defend Italy? Would Italy be an economic burden to us? He did not think so. Would arguments against a general conquest of Italy apply equally against a *toe and heel* operation to establish contact with Yugoslavia? Finally, there was a large political question for the British and United States Governments. What sort of life after the war should we be willing to accord to Italy if she placed herself unreservedly in our hands? He might observe that if Italy made

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a separate peace, we should have the use of Sardinia and the Dodecanese without having to fight for them.

The second objective was the taking of weight off Russia. He was much impressed by Stalin's attitude, in spite of the stopping of the Arctic convoys. For the first time, in his recent speech, Stalin had acknowledged the efforts and victories of his Allies. But we should never forget that there were 185 German Divisions on the Russian Front. We had destroyed the German Army in Africa, but soon we would not be in contact with them anywhere. The Russian effort was prodigious, and placed us in their debt - a position from which he would like to emerge. As he had already mentioned, the best way of taking the weight off the Russian Front in 1943 would be to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans.

The third objective had already been mentioned by the President in his opening remarks. It was to apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air forces, and munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test. We had a large Army, and the Metropolitan Fighter Air Force in Great Britain. We had our finest and most experienced troops in the Mediterranean. The British alone had 13 Divisions in that theater. Supposing that *HUSKY* were completed by the end of August, what should these troops do between that time and the date 7 or 8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who was bearing such a disproportionate weight.

The objectives he had so far mentioned all led up to *BOLERO*, *SLEDGEHAMMER*, and *ROUNDUP*. By *BOLERO*, he meant the administration arrangements necessary for the movement and reception of large American forces in the United Kingdom. He could not pretend that the problem of landing on the Channel coast had been solved. The difficult beaches, with the great rise and fall of tide, the strength of the enemy's defenses, the number of his reserves, and the ease of his communications,

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all made the task one which must not be underrated. Much, however, would be learned from *HUSKY*. The question arose whether anything could be done this year before the weather broke in August or September. All the British landing craft had gone from the United Kingdom to *HUSKY*, and owing to priority having been rightly given to *SICKLE*, only one U. S. Division was so far available in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, plans were being made for an operation to provoke an air battle, and we were standing ready to exploit a German collapse, should this by any chance take place. He wished to make it absolutely clear that H. M. Government earnestly desired to undertake a full-scale invasion of the Continent from the United Kingdom as soon as possible. They certainly did not disdain the idea if a plan offering reasonable prospects of success could be made.

The fifth objective was aid to China. As a result of Casablanca, Field Marshal Wavell had prepared the best plan he could for operation *ANAKIM*, and he thought that it had some prospect of success. The difficulties of fighting in Burma were apparent. The jungle prevented the use of our modern weapons. The monsoon strictly limited the length of the campaigning season, and there was no means of bringing sea power to bear. Should, however, *ANAKIM* be successfully carried out, he was advised that it would not be till 1945 that the Burma Road could be reopened, and even then its capacity would not be more than 20,000 tons a month. Nevertheless, he had not gone back on the status of *ANAKIM*. He attached the same degree of importance as before to activity in the Indian Ocean theater of war. Was there any means by which China could be helped in 1943 other than the air route? How could this be improved? The British readily shouldered their responsibility to establish and guard the air facilities required in Assam. If further study showed that it would be better to by-pass Burma, he was anxious that another means should be found of utilizing the large forces standing in India. He thought that this alternative might well be found in an operation against the tip of Sumatra and the waist of Malaya at Penang. He was most anxious that we should find in that theater some means of making use of those advantages which had been so valuable in *TORCH*. In that operation, sea power had played its full part; complete surprise had

been possible; we had been able to seize a territory of importance which not only brought in a new Army on our side, but forced the enemy to fight in a place most disadvantageous to him. These conditions might apply to an attack on the area he had described. The fleet to cover the operation would come from the Mediterranean after the elimination of Italy. This meant that the operation could not be launched before March, 1944, which would, however, be a suitable moment from the point of view of weather.

He felt that the time had now come to study the long-term plan for the defeat of Japan. He would like once more to state the British determination to carry the struggle home to Japan. The only question was how best to do it. He thought that the United States Chiefs of Staff should lead in a joint study, on the assumption that Germany would be out of the war in 1944, and that we could concentrate on the great campaign against Japan in 1945. If the underlying strategic conception was agreed, then operations could be planned to fit in, and the requisite specialized apparatus could be got ready in time.

If, of course, Russia could be brought in against Japan, that would prove the best solution of all. Stalin had shown plain indications that Russia would want to be in at the death, but the timing of Russian action must obviously depend upon what happened to Hitler, and when.

In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he hoped his remarks would be of use in framing an Agenda for Combined Chiefs of Staff Conferences, and would be some guide as to the emphasis and priorities which should be assigned to the various theaters of operation as well as to their relationship and reciprocal reactions.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his gratitude to the Prime Minister for the open manner in which he had presented his views. He said that the Combined Staffs must approach their problems with open minds, giving full consideration to the priorities and relative importance of the many problems which they would consider in the course of the conferences.

The Quadrant Conference August 1943

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FC & Degradation Memo 52-73

By

ARK

NLE DATE

10/29/73

QUADRANT CONFERENCE

AUGUST 1943

PAPERS AND MINUTES OF MEETINGS

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE
OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY
OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

1943



C.C.S. 304

10 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

WAR CABINET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OPERATION "OVERLORD" — OUTLINE PLAN

Covering Note by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. We have examined carefully the outline plan for operation *OVERLORD* which General Morgan has submitted. We have the following observations:—

a. It will be observed that General Morgan lays down three main conditions which must be created if the operation is to have a reasonable prospect of success. These are:—

(1) There must be an overall reduction in the strength of the German Fighter forces between now and the time of the assault.

(2) German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding Divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions, and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault 12 full strength, first quality, divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than 15 first quality divisions from Russia during the first two months.

(3) The problem of beach maintenance over a prolonged period in the Channel must be overcome.

We entirely agree with General Morgan that these conditions are essential, and we shall have certain proposals to make during the *QUADRANT* discussions with a view to their fulfillment.

b. The annexed table (Annex "A") shows:—

(1) The Allied rate of build-up as planned by General Morgan.

(2) The maximum rate of German build-up which General Morgan considers acceptable.

From this table it will be seen that our margin of superiority over the maximum acceptable rate of German build-up, particularly during the first two critical days, is small. Moreover, the figures in the Table do not sufficiently reflect the handicap under which our newly-landed divisions must suffer when engaging the enemy's divisions which have all along been established on land. We think it important, therefore, that the scale of German reserves should be reduced by some means below the maximum specified by General Morgan in his second condition. Otherwise, the operation may not succeed.

c. We think the general rate of advance planned by General Morgan is optimistic. Recent experience in Sicily shows that if the enemy is resisting fiercely, and if the country lends itself to defense, the advance is bound to be slow. The country south of the Caen beaches is in many respects admirable for delaying actions. We think that this part of General Morgan's plan should be carefully re-examined.

2. Subject to the above observations, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should approve General Morgan's outline plan and authorize him to proceed with detailed planning, and with full preparations. We gave instructions to this effect before leaving England, in order that no time should be lost, and we ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to endorse our action.

S. S. QUEEN MARY,
10TH AUGUST, 1943.

COMPARISON OF OUR OWN BUILD UP WITH THE GERMAN RATE OF
REINFORCEMENT, WHICH C.O.S.S.A.C. STATES CAN BE ACCEPTED.

ANNEX A

DAY	COSAC'S BUILD-UP Detail	GERMAN RATE OF REINFORCEMENT THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED	TOTALS, (equivalent divs.) Allied German		COMMENTS
(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)
0 Day	Three assault divs. One bde. gp. Three tk. bdes. 2/3 airborne div.	One def. div. (constant) Three divs. (one armd.)	5	4	
0+1	Three assault divs. One follow-up div. Three tk. bdes. 1-1/3 airborne div.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	6 1/3	6	There will be one additional British follow-up div. actually landed but not operational until D+2.
0+2	Three assault divs. Two follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Five divs. (two armd.)	8	6	There will be one additional British follow-up div. and one build-up div. actually landed but not operational until D+3.
0+3	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. One build-up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	10	8	There will be one and one-third additional British build-up divs. in addition, actually landed, but not operational until D+4.
0+4	Three assault divs. Three follow-up divs. Three tk. bdes. Two-third build-up div. Two airborne divs.	One def. div. Seven divs. (four armd.)	11 2/3	8	There will be two tk. bdes. and two-third British build-up div. in addition, actually landed but not operational until D+5.

C.O.S.S.A.C. (43) 28.

ANNEX B

OPERATION "OVERLORD."

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Offices of the War Cabinet.

15th July, 1943

1. In my original Directive (C.O.S. (43) 215 (O)) I was charged with the duty of preparing a plan for a full scale assault against the Continent in 1944 as early as possible.

2. This part of my Directive was subsequently amplified (see C.O.S. (43) 113th Meeting (O), Item 4), in that I was ordered to submit an outline plan for an assault, with certain specified forces, on a target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out. It was indicated to me, in the course of this amplification, that the lodgement area should include ports that, suitably developed, could be used by ocean-going ships for the build-up of the initial assault forces from the United Kingdom, and for their further build-up with additional divisions and supporting units that might be shipped from the United States or elsewhere.

3. I have the honour now to report that, in my opinion, it is possible to undertake the operation described, on or about the target date named, with the sea, land and air forces specified, given a certain set of circumstances in existence at that time.

4. These governing circumstances are partly within our direct control and partly without. Those within our control relate first to the problem of beach maintenance, and secondly to the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft. Wherever we may attempt to land, and however many ports we capture, we cannot escape the fact that we shall be forced to maintain a high proportion of our forces over the beaches for the first two or three months while port facilities are being restored; and that, in view of the variability of the weather in the Channel, this will not be feasible unless we are able rapidly to improvise sheltered anchorages off the beaches. New methods of overcoming this problem are now being examined. There is no reason to suppose that these methods will be ineffective, but I feel it my duty to point out that this operation is not to be contemplated unless this problem of prolonged cross-beach maintenance and the provision of artificial anchorages shall have been solved.

5. As regards the supply of shipping, naval landing craft and transport aircraft, increased resources in these would permit of the elaboration of alternative plans designed to meet more than one set of extraneous conditions, whereas the state of provision herein taken into account dictates the adoption of one course only, or none at all. In proportion as additional shipping, landing craft and transport aircraft can be made available, so the chances of success in the operation will be increased. It seems feasible to contemplate additions as a result either of stepped-up production, of strategical re-allotment or, in the last resort, of postponement of the date of assault.

6 I have come to the conclusion that, in view of the limitations in resources imposed by my directives, we may be assured of a reasonable chance of success on the 1st May, 1944, only if we concentrate our efforts on an assault across the Norman beaches about Bayeux.

7. As regards circumstances that we can control only indirectly, it is, in my opinion, necessary to stipulate that the state of affairs existing at the time, both on land in France and in the air above it, shall be such as to render the assault as little hazardous as may be so far as it is humanly possible to calculate. The essential discrepancy in value between the enemy's troops, highly organised, armed and battle-trained, who await us in their much vaunted impregnable defences, and our troops, who must of necessity launch their assault at the end of a cross-Channel voyage with all its attendant risks, must be reduced to the narrowest possible margin. Though much can be done to this end by the means available and likely to become available to us in the United Kingdom to influence these factors, we are largely dependent upon events that will take place on other war fronts, principally on the Russian front, between now and the date of the assault.

8. I therefore suggest to the Chiefs of Staff that it is necessary, if my plan be approved, to adopt the outlook that Operation "Overlord" is even now in progress, and to take all possible steps to see that all agencies that can be brought to bear are, from now on, co-ordinated in their action as herein below described, so as to bring about the state of affairs that we would have exist on the chosen day of assault.

9. Finally, I venture to draw attention to the danger of making direct comparisons between operation "Husky" and operation "Overlord." No doubt the experience now being gained in the Mediterranean will prove invaluable when the detailed planning stage for "Overlord" is reached, but viewed as a whole the two operations could hardly be more dissimilar. In "Husky," the bases of an extended continental coastline were used for a converging assault

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against an island, whereas in "Overlord" it is necessary to launch an assault from an island against an extended continental mainland coastline. Furthermore, while in the Mediterranean the tidal range is negligible and the weather reasonably reliable, in the English Channel the tidal range is considerable and the weather capricious.

10. Attached hereto are papers setting forth the plan that I recommend for adoption.

F. E. MORGAN, Lieutenant-General,
Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate).

*H.Q., C.O.S.S.A.C.,
Norfolk House,
St. James's Square, S.W. 1.*

U.S. SECRET BRITISH MOST SECRET FRANCE AND THE LOW COUNTRIESBEACHES AND THEORETICAL BEACH CAPACITIES AND MAJOR PORT CAPACITIES

BEACH CAPACITY FIGURES ARE GIVEN PURELY FOR PURPOSES OF COMPARISON AND ARE NOT ASSESSMENTS OF WHAT ACTUALLY CAN BE ACHIEVED.

BEACH SECTORS
Intelligence adequate
Intelligence not complete

BEACHES
Continuous
Small and isolated

SAND DUNES
HIGH GROUND AND CLIFFS OVERLOOKING BEACHES

WATERS SHELTERED FROM PREVAILING WINDS

PORT GROUPS - TOTAL GROUP CAPACITIES (Major Ports only)

DUTCH-BELGIAN GROUP
A Force of 37 Divisions

90 days after all ports have been captured
(Expressed in terms of divisions which can be maintained, or 600 tons per division per day.)

INDIVIDUAL PORT CAPACITIES (Major Ports only)
(Expressed in terms of divisions which can be maintained, or 600 tons per division per day.)

RECOGNITION
6 3 3
On capture
30 days after capture
90 days after capture

NOTE: TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITIES ARE NOW UNDER RE-EXAMINATION, AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL BE INCREASED, ON THE AVERAGE, BY NOT LESS THAN 25 PERCENT.

BRETON NORTHWEST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 14,000
(b) Assault
(c) Developed
(d) Weather 70-88%

BRETON NORTHEAST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 25,000
(b) Assault 12,000
(c) Developed 37,000
(d) Weather 70-88%

COTENTIN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 23,000
(b) Assault 12,000
(c) Developed 34,000
(d) Weather East 89-94% West 70-85%

CAEN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 43,000
(b) Assault 32,000
(c) Developed 65,000
(d) Weather 88-90%

NORTH SEINE SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 18,000
(b) Assault 9,000
(c) Developed 27,000
(d) Weather 75-80%

PAS DE CALAIS SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 36,000
(b) Assault 20,000
(c) Developed 54,000
(d) Weather 75-84%

BELGIAN SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 20,000
(b) Assault 15,000
(c) Developed 30,000
(d) Weather 75-80%

DUTCH SECTOR
Capacity limited by small tide range

PAS DE CALAIS-BELGIAN GROUP
(HOLLAND-ANTWERP)
A Force of 37 Divisions

DUTCH-BELGIAN GROUP
(BRUSSELS-ROTTERDAM)
A Force of 37 Divisions

SEINE-PAS DE CALAIS GROUP
(HAVRE & ROUEN-CALAIS)
A Force of 32 Divisions

CHERBOURG-SEINE GROUP
(CHERBOURG-ROUEN)
A Force of 32 Divisions

BRITANNY-CHERBOURG GROUP
(NANTES-CAEN)
A Force of 32 Divisions

BISCAY-BRITANNY GROUP
(BORNEUX-BREST)
A Force of 32 Divisions

BRETON SOUTHWEST SECTOR
Daily Capacity not known

BRETON SOUTHEAST SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 11,000
(b) Assault
(c) Developed
(d) Weather

BISCAY NORTH SECTOR
Daily Capacity
(a) Natural 10,000
(b) Assault
(c) Developed
(d) Weather

THEORETICAL DAILY CAPACITY

NOTE ON TOTAL PORT GROUP CAPACITIES


For capacities of each group including minor ports see appendix 'A'. The BRITANNY-CHERBOURG group has a higher capacity in minor ports than any other group.

(a) Natural The estimated number of vehicles or tons of stores that could be landed over the beaches in the whole sector, working eight hours a day (four hours per tide), assuming perfect conditions and good weather, but no development of air.

(b) Assault The maximum capacity of the whole group on D Day if all worthwhile beaches are attacked. "Natural" capacity less an arbitrary 25% to allow for enemy opposition and less a further percentage variable according to the area to allow for beach frontage not worth assaulting on account of their low capacity or other reasons.

(c) Developed The estimated capacity after improvement of beach area. This is taken on an arbitrary average of 150% of the natural capacity.

The average percentage of days on which beaches could be worked between May and September. One low and one high figure are given. The value and trend of the weather factor indicate the value of the group for beach maintenance over a period. The value for April is generally lower and for October much lower than for May to September.



(031423)

GEO-TOPOGRAPHICAL AND AIRFIELD MAP

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(For use in selecting sites for rapid airfield construction)



AIRFIELD LEGEND

- AIRFIELD (Runways and/or Full Facilities)
- ⊙ LANDING GROUND (Limited Facilities)
- E.L.G. (Emergency use only)
- × SITE (Former Airfield, Landing Ground or E.L.G.)

NOTE: Airfields, L.G.s. and E.L.G.s. in GERMANY are NOT shown

COLORS (horizontal) refer to density of possible sites in an area, judged on levelness and closeness of country.
LINE AND DOT PATTERNS (vertical) refer to soil types which govern permeability and drainage.

Granular Soils Loam Soils Clay Soils Marsh, etc.




- 1 Twelve Divs. plus overheads landed.
- 2 One Airborne Div. still in action but relieved of the major portion of its original task.

- 4 Estimated number of enemy Divisions shown in BLUE.

★ U.S. FORMATIONS 🍁 CANADIAN FORMATIONS

 BRITISH FORMATIONS

5. Air Situation Six airfields & Two single landing strips available, one, degradable. Operating about Seventeen Squadrons, (Fighter type).



**Harry Butcher, Naval Aid to General Eisenhower Diary Entry
October 1, 1943**

SECRET

October 5, 1943.

A-831

Algiers, Tuesday, October 5, 1943 -- The last time I dictated for the diary was September 25 at Amilcar. On less than a half hour's notice I was aboard a plane with Beetle en route to Algiers to be Ike's representative to meet the Secretary of the Navy, Colonel Knox. He arrived in Algiers Monday morning and was the house guest of Admiral Hall. I attended dinner there that evening and the next evening accompanied the Secretary and his party aboard H.M.S. Euryalius for Bizerte. Unfavorable weather for flying meant taking to the cruiser which the Secretary regarded with a somewhat skeptical eye, because while on a recent trip to Scapa Flow he had become violently seasick. The Mediterranean was still rolling from a heavy storm.

We changed from the cruiser to the Secretary's C-47 at Bizerte, flew to Palermo where the party was met by Admiral Hewitt whose command ship, the Ancon, was in the harbor, and by General Patton. We proceeded that evening to the Gulf of Salerno, Admiral Hewitt, the Secretary and his aide, Captain "Pop" Perry aboard the U.S.S. Nicholson, and Captains Leland Lovette, von Heimburg of Admiral Hall's staff, and I, aboard the U.S.S. Mayo.

Both the destroyers had been recalled from Salerno where they had aided in the landings and since had been on escort and patrol duty. The Mayo had "smelled" a sub en route to Palermo and had dropped all its depth charges but had no proof of a kill. However, an American ^{mine sweeper} destroyer, the Skill, had been torpedoed and sunk in Salerno Bay the previous day. Not a very healthy place to take the Secretary.

The Secretary's party went ashore at Salerno where we were met by General Wayne Clark who took us to his 5th Army Headquarters and for a visit to Battipaglio where the Secretary could see the effect of naval gunfire as well as of bombings. The town was well beaten up. Later the Secretary told me his only regret was that General Clark had not taken him closer to the front. The X Corps had just broken

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through the defiles and occupied high ground and were passing to the northward of Vesuvius, while Rangers and Commandoes were following the coast road toward Naples south and ^{west} east of Vesuvius.

We lunched aboard the British command ship "Hileary" formerly in service on the Amazon river, one of the few remaining coal burners.

Went to the Isle of Capri on PT boats and spent a couple of pleasant hours. The island seems untouched by war. Like all American tourists I bought liberally of the usual wares. We were guests of Admiral Morse, R.N., formerly port commander at Algiers. His billet was the Villa of Edda Ciano, daughter of Mussolini. It was said that she and her children spend their summers at this villa. It was magnificent, particularly her bedroom which had a bed 8 ft. wide. Her bath was tiled with modern copies of old Roman porcelain showing all of the fish of the sea. I thought it hideous but the remainder of the house and its furnishings was most attractive.

Captain von Heimburg and I separated from the party and engaged a driver with horse and buggy to take us the mile or so to the port. The destroyers put us in at Palermo Friday morning, October 1. The Secretary's C-47 took us to El Aouina where I had arranged for the Secretary and party to lunch with Ike. I was burning with desire to tell Ike the big, if disappointing news disclosed to me by Col. Knox: it was true General Marshall had been named supreme commander and it was "probable" that Ike would be recalled to Washington to be Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army.

I had expected to stay at Amilcar but as Ike had General Alexander and aide, Sir Rupert Clark as house guests, he had given away my room. So he suggested I continue with the Secretary's party back to Algiers to make certain that all courtesies were rendered him. I got the Secretary off en route to America at 8 o'clock Saturday morning with an Army fife and drum corps playing everything

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except "Anchors Aweigh" and they would have played this if they had the necessary instruments.

The Secretary had a press conference shortly after his return to Algiers in which he spoke highly of the benefits of cooperation and coordination in the Allied Command but I don't think there was enough new in it to impress the newspapermen. I also arranged for Army Pictorial Service to develop the film of the sailor-photographer who accompanied the party and for radio-transmission to U.S. The Secretary said during the press conference he had heard the sound of battle while at Salerno but I am afraid I missed those sounds. While flying from Tunis to Algiers we saw a burning vessel off Philippeville which I later learned had been torpedoed.

As Donald Nelson, the War Production chief was arriving with a special letter from the President to Ike, my next orders were to render honors to him and to arrange for his meeting with Ike. It worked out that Ike returned from Amilcar Monday forenoon, October 4th and Donald Nelson, as well as his travelling companion, Jim Landis, one-time Security Exchange Commissioner, Dean of the Law School at Harvard and Civilian Defense Administrator.

Nelson was optimistic of an early end of the war. He said information given him in England showed that morale of German civilians was very low because of the concentrated bombings of their cities and industrial plants. He said there had been one stretch of six days of good weather during which Germany got hell from the air. There was so much turmoil within the country that if weather had permitted continuation of the bombings two more days the Germans would have given in. Both Ike and I counselled that this was over-optimistic; that our troops are in contact with the German soldiers and we will be the first to know when morale really has cracked, although it is possible the German home front may become very wobbly. However, judging from all the information we have taken from prisoners,

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the Germans are still living in a world of their own created by their propaganda. Nelson was en route to Moscow to confer on production matters. Landis is going to Cairo to be the American opposite number to Minister Robert Casey.

Lord Louis was passing through en route to his new theater with directive to fight the Japs in Burma and Sumatra and other places in that area which will require some study of the map.

He had spent Sunday evening with Ike at Amilcar after a hectic series of misadventures by arriving at the wrong airdrome, causing Ike to drive three and a half hours from one place to another trying to locate his guest.

When Ike mentioned to Lord Louis that Secretary Knox had told him of General Marshall's appointment and had indicated that Ike would be recalled to Washington, Lord Louis then "let down his hair". He said he had been cautioned by the Prime Minister not to raise with Ike the question of the new command set-up but since the American Secretary of the Navy had already disclosed it, he could tell his story. This was to the effect that Harry Hopkins had insisted that General Marshall be the supreme commander for the cross channel operation even after it had been tacitly agreed that Sir Alan Brooke, the C.I.G.S. would be "it" and had in fact worked two or three months on the plan. Nevertheless the British had acceded through Harry Hopkins influence on the President, although they felt badly hurt. Sensing this situation Hopkins had offered the Allied Command in the Mediterranean to the British --apparently having in mind that Ike would be complimented by some other offer, presumably that of Chief of Staff.

Ike would much prefer to stay in the Mediterranean and pursue the Germans in Italy hoping to engage their twenty divisions in a major "Battle of the Po" about Christmas when we will have moved past Rome and created a buildup preparatory to the major battle. Lord Louis had said that in order not to make Ike's change of

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command appear degrading it was to be announced shortly after some outstanding victory. It could have happened after Naples but now, according to Lord Louis, would be upon capture of Rome.

Ike has absolutely no official information as to his future. Today he sent Beetle back to Washington with General Spaatz to consult on official matters but naturally hoped that Beetle would find the lay of the land. We received yesterday clippings from America reflecting the tempest which was raised when the Army and Navy Journal said that General Marshall was being kicked upstairs because of powerful interests. Just what is meant by the latter we can't figure, although the stories indicate a suspicion that Harry Hopkins and a New Deal clique are seeking to have appointed a new Chief of Staff who will utilize the War Department with its 12 billion dollars in contracts to aid in the President's election next year. This is the "opposition press" talking but such distraction makes no contribution to the winning of the war.

We have tried to figure just what the President will do with Ike under the new set up. The job of Chief of Staff does not appeal to Ike and he believes he would be a failure in it because he is not a politician. I have told him he would be either the best or the worst Chief of Staff the Army ever had. His forthrightness and abomination of politics could make him so respected even by politicians that he would be a great success. On the other hand he does not have the patience and diplomacy which made General Marshall such a success in it. Ike would prefer most of all to remain Allied Commander in the Mediterranean and to exploit our victory because there is a real probability that with bombing from our forward airfields and coordinated efforts in this area we can contribute immeasurably to an early end of the war. He wants to remain a field commander. He has suggested to Beetle that if the question is raised at home -- and Beetle is not to raise it -- Beetle is to express his opinion that if Ike is to be supplanted

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by a Britisher in this Allied Command, then he would much prefer to have command of an American group of armies under General Marshall in the cross channel push.

Meantime our Intelligence indicates that with the Russians keeping red hot after the Germans, our victory in the Mediterranean and the heavy bombing of German cities, the Germans may be forced to withdraw from France, in which event the cross channel attack would be merely to occupy France and to pursue the enemy into Germany. In other words, the great plum which General Marshall has been given may not be as attractive as it seems, particularly if the war is practically won before General Marshall gets on the job in Europe.

On Wednesday, September 29 Ike and staff conferred with Badoglio and party aboard H.M.S. Nelson in Valletta Harbor at Malta. Ike specified Malta as the meeting place because he wanted the Italians to see the damage they had caused. Bob Murphy kept notes on the meeting which I am inserting in the diary.

General MacFarlane cabled a summary of an interview given the press by Badoglio in Italy on October 2.

"Following is summary press interview Badoglio somewhere in Italy today. Badoglio began express pleasure his first interview press coincided Anglo-American victory Naples. Said delighted Italy who was traditionally friend Britain America once again on right road. Recalled British Americans fighting alongside Italians against Germans last war and expressed conviction their cooperation now would produce same result.

"Replying question how did Mussolini fall, Badoglio confirmed this was brought about by action Fascist Grand Council at meeting July 24. Vote inviting Mussolini resign was sponsored by Grandi, Ciano, Bottai carried by 19 votes to 5 after violent debate. Mussolini reported result next day to King who ordered Badoglio to take over government. Mussolini was taken into protective custody for his own safety and wrote letter thanking Badoglio.

"Badoglio likened fall Fascism to that of over-ripe pear. Said during last few months anti-Fascist talk became open and nothing done prevent it. Nobody put up fight to save Fascism and not one Fascist badge seen day after Mussolini's fall. Greatest rejoicing streets Rome and all Italian cities. About same time rumor circulated Rome, Hitler assassinated, whereupon German soldiers went mad with joy embracing population and tearing down Hitler's picture. German reaction fall Mussolini was send many divisions Italy and requisition petrol coalstocks. Possible their intention said Badoglio was

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clearly to throttle Italy.

"Regarding last meeting Hitler, Mussolini, Badoglio said Mussolini's intention tell Hitler Italy could not continue war but Hitler talked two hours without stop and Mussolini lacked courage interrupt.

"Mussolini now in Germany, wrote recently to sister saying he was taking to religion.

"Replying question how he and Royal Family left Rome, Badoglio said party left morning September 9 several motor cars without attempt concealment passing German armored division on road as Italian German troops then fighting outskirts Rome. Party embarked on Italian cruiser at Italian port and were taken to Southern Italy.

"In conclusion Badoglio stated that as soon as government returned Rome he intended give it widest political basis. Badoglio added he intended to retain 3 Bervie (?) Ministers at present with him, namely General Ambrosio, Admiral De Roorten and General Sandalli.

"Badoglio dressed loose fitting khaki colonial uniform with 4 start; 4 brown ribbons, received journalists terrace villa. His simplicity, friendliness and willingness answer questions made excellent impression."

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**Papers and Minutes of The Sextant and Eureka Conferences
November - December 1943**

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Authority JCS Regrading Memo 52-73
By ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73

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SEXTANT AND EUREKA CONFERENCES

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By ARK NLE DATE 10/29/73

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY THE

OFFICE, U. S. SECRETARY
OFFICE OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

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C.C.S. 410

25 November 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE EFFECT OF WEATHER ON OPERATION "OVERLORD"

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

1. The following examination has been made regarding the limitations imposed by weather conditions on the postponement of Operation OVERLORD.

2. Suitable weather conditions are required for two phases of the operation, firstly, the assault for which a four-day fine weather period is required; secondly, the maintenance and build-up period for which suitable weather for a decreasing degree of beach maintenance is required for about three months.

THE ASSAULT

3. In order to launch the assault a quiet spell of four days with winds of force 3 or less is desirable. Over ten consecutive years there were quiet spells for four or more consecutive days on the following number of occasions:

April	18 times
May	21 times
June	19 times
July	16 times
August	23 times
September	17 times
October	14 times

It will be seen that there is no serious deterioration in the chances of launching the assault between the months of May and September with the exception of July, where the incidence of a fine spell is only slightly less than in the month of June. It is therefore considered that, purely from the assault aspect, the operation could be postponed up to the month of September.

4. For tidal reasons the assault is limited in each lunar month to two periods of five or six days, which occur at times of full and new moon. The air lift can only be carried out in the full moon period. It therefore follows that if the full moon period is missed on account of the weather conditions being unsuitable, the assault must be postponed for 24 days. By sacrificing the air lift this postponement could be reduced to 10 days.

AIR FACTORS AFFECTING THE ASSAULT

5. a. For fully effective operation of air forces the following conditions must be satisfied:

	Night	Day
Minimum horizontal visibility	5 miles	5 miles
Minimum cloud base above ground level	3,000 feet	11,500 feet
Maximum cloud	6/10	10/10
Maximum wind at ground level	20 m.p.h.	20 m.p.h. (if air-borne forces are used by day)
Minimum moon	5 days each side of full. Moon 20° above horizon.	

b. If high level bombing is abandoned, the cloud conditions by day are then limited by the requirements of the fighter cover over shipping and beaches. These are 10/10 at not less than 5,000 feet.

c. The chances of obtaining these conditions are not yet available, but it is evident that they will lengthen the odds against launching the assault to some extent, although settled summer weather suitable for the landing will most probably be suitable for the air operations.

MAINTENANCE AND BUILD-UP PERIOD

6. COSSAC has stated that, making full use of every captured port, large and small, 18 divisions must be maintained over the beaches during the first month of the operations, 12 divisions during the second month, and a number rapidly diminishing to nil during the third month. It is believed that the use of *MULBERRIES* will approximately halve this commitment for beach maintenance. Therefore, during this period there will be at first a considerable, and later a gradually dwindling dependence on fine weather conditions. In assessing suitable weather for carrying out beach maintenance any day with wind of not more than Force 3 on shore and not more than Force 4 off shore has been accepted. In the *OVERLORD* area the average number of suitable days per month is as follows:

April	21
May	23
June	25
July	25
August	24½

September	23½
October	18½
November	20
December	20

It is apparent from the above figures that a marked deterioration does not occur until October. Although the months of October, November, and December appear to provide a reasonable number of quiet days, it is considered that this proportion cannot be fully relied on owing to the severe weather which may occur during unsuitable days, thereby producing conditions of sea or swell which will render beach maintenance impracticable on the subsequent quiet day or days.

7. It is impossible to calculate what loss in expectation of suitable maintenance days can be accepted by COSSAC during the second and third months of the beach maintenance period without a very intimate knowledge of his maintenance and build-up plan; but it would appear that weather should be suitable for sufficient beach maintenance at least up to the end of September and possibly, in view of the dwindling commitment in this respect, up to the middle or end of October.

CONCLUSION

8. It is not possible to submit a firm recommendation on this subject, but from the limited facts available for this brief examination, there does not appear to be any overriding reason why the assault could not be carried out up to about the middle of July.

9. This means that the target date should be in the middle of June to allow for a postponement of 24 days in case weather conditions are unsuitable.

10. Thus if the target date is mid-June and the air lift is not sacrificed, only two periods of four or five days when Moon and Tide conditions are suitable will occur in 1944; and these must coincide with a four day spell of fine weather.

C.C.S. 424

5 December 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a report by the Combined Staff Planners prepared with the collaboration of the Combined Administrative Committee.

H. REDMAN,

F. B. ROYAL,

Combined Secretariat.

E N C L O S U R E

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION AGAINST THE SOUTH OF FRANCE

Reference: CCS Memo Directive
1 December 1943

1. In accordance with the instructions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we have examined the agreed operations against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions.

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of *OVERLORD*.

2. We have in addition assumed:

- a. That operation *ANVIL* will approximately coincide with *OVERLORD*.
- b. In Italy we have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and thereafter as strong pressure as possible is maintained consistent with the provision of forces for *ANVIL*.
- c. The Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

3. We have made tentative estimates, in the absence of any detailed operational plan, of the resources which will be required for the operation under two hypotheses where these apply:

- a. That the assault is carried out within range of shore-based fighter aircraft.
- b. That the assault is carried out beyond the range of shore-based fighter aircraft.

4. It appears that the following cannot be found from the resources which under present agreements will be available to General Eisenhower in the Mediterranean at the time of the operation:

A. Naval Forces

On the assumption that adequate shore-based, short-range fighter cover is provided:

- (1) Additional escorts, probably 10 to 20.
- (2) 2 AA fighter direction ships.
- (3) In the event that the build-up exceeds one division before D plus 8, nine A/S A/A escorts will be required for each extra division.

This indicates that if a rapid build-up is necessary, more escorts will be required.

In the event that adequate shore-based short-range air cover can not be provided the following will be needed in addition to those above.

(1) 9 to 12 escort carriers with fighters.

(2) 6 AA cruisers.

(3) 18 screening vessels.

To meet these deficiencies, we must draw on other theaters, most probably from the Atlantic. It might prove possible for four CVE and six escorts which are taking part in *BUCCANEER* to return to the Mediterranean in time. This, however, will be conditioned by the availability of fighters for reequipping these escort carriers. We have assumed that port parties will be provided from within the Mediterranean.

B. Land Forces

Certain service forces, the number and type of which cannot be determined without careful study by AFHQ.

On the assumption that French divisions will participate, the requirement will be lessened if, as recommended by General Eisenhower, some of the French divisions scheduled for activation are not formed but are converted to service forces.

C. Air Forces

The troop carrier resources in the Mediterranean will only be sufficient to lift one brigade and if the detailed plan requires a second brigade lift, this will have to be provided.

D. Shipping

(1) Personnel Shipping.

The *QUADRANT* allotment of personnel shipping for 80,000 troop lift in the Mediterranean expires on 31 March. Initially, personnel shipping for 32,000 will be required until after the assault, and during the period of build-up, a total personnel lift for 15,000 will be necessary. It is proposed to use cargo ships for personnel lift to the maximum extent possible.

(2) MT/Stores Shipping.

The following sailings within the Mediterranean will be required in addition to those required for the maintenance of the remainder of the theater:

First month	—	128
Second month	—	90
Third month	—	75
Fourth and subsequent months	—	40

This can obviously be provided but until the present shipping examination is completed, we cannot assess the cost.

E. Assault Shipping and Craft

Assault lift for two divisions can be provided. Methods of providing this are shown in Appendix "A."

5. We consider that General Eisenhower should be directed to prepare an outline plan for the agreed operation against the South of France as a matter of urgency. We have accordingly prepared a directive to General Eisenhower, and this is attached at Appendix "B."

RECOMMENDATION

6. That the directive in Appendix "B" be sent to General Eisenhower.

APPENDIX "A"

1. We have examined the resources available for the agreed operation against the South of France on the following premises:

a. That this operation should be carried out with a minimum of two assault divisions, and;

b. That the necessary resources shall not be found at the expense of OVERLORD.

2. The assault shipping and craft which we estimate will be available and serviceable in the Mediterranean for an assault on Southern France at about the time of OVERLORD is as follows:

	Assault Shipping Craft			Lift	
	British	U.S.	Total	Personnel	Vehicles
L.S.I.(L)	3	—	3	3,600	—
L.S.T.	10	22	32	10,000	1,920
L.C.T.	30	30	60	1,800	600
L.C.I.(L)	45	55	100	20,000	—
L.S.I.(M)	1	—	1	400	—
L.S.I.(H)	1 (a)	—	1		2,000 (by using the
M.T. Ships	16	—	16)		LCT for unloading
L.S.C.	1	—	1)	3,200	other ships after the
L.S.G.	1	—	1)		LCT have discharged
L.C.M.	85*	—	85)		their original lift as
					shown above.)
* U.S. and British				39,000	4,520

(a) Fitted as a brigade headquarters ship. The British state that its allocation is not firm.

3. The above lift in terms of divisions is estimated to be as follows:

a. U.S. - A task force to include one division in the assault and 2/3 of a division embarked as a follow-up or the equivalent thereof;

OR

b. British - 3 assault and 2 follow-up Brigades.

4. It is estimated that, to meet the full requirements of a minimum of two assault divisions, a total force of 45,500 personnel and 7,740 vehicles should be provided. The lift available is short by 6,500 personnel and 3,220 vehicles.

5. The above deficit can be overcome by the provision of 3 combat loaders, 12 MT ships, 26 LST and 31 LCT so that all required vehicles are available on D-day. If required, these 26 LST's can bring with them 12 to 15 sets of pontoon strips.

6. We find that from U.S. resources 26 LST and 26 LCT can be supplied from early spring production previously allocated Pacific and arrive in the Mediterranean by 15 April. The remaining 5 LCT can be supplied from U.S. LCT's now in the Mediterranean and scheduled for *OVERLORD*. The United States is sending 24 additional LCT's to *OVERLORD* beyond the *QUADRANT* commitment, hence these 5 LCT's are not materially at the expense of that operation. The United States can supply 3 XAP's. We consider that the additional MT ships can be supplied from the shipping of that category now pooled in the Mediterranean under AFHQ.

7. The above LST's and LCT's sent from the United States represent a one month's allocation to the Pacific the majority of which were due to be available for the *TRUK* operation in July. It may be possible by withdrawing some of these craft from the South Pacific to make up the *TRUK* deficiency thus created, otherwise the operation may be delayed.

8. The requirement for LSH (AGC) are 2 ; *OVERLORD* requires 3. There are 2 British* and 3 U.S.** available which can be allocated to meet these requirements.

* H.M.S. LARGS

H.M.S. HILARY

** U.S.S. ANCON

U.S.S. BISCAYNE

U.S.S. COTOCTIN

9. Special landing craft types for the assault support must come from those now available in the Mediterranean. Since these are few, the naval forces must be arranged to properly provide close support for the assault.

APPENDIX "B"

DRAFT DIRECTIVE TO GENERAL EISENHOWER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that an operation is to take place in conjunction with *OVERLORD*, with the object of establishing a bridge-head on the South Coast of France and subsequently to exploit in support of *OVERLORD*.

2. You will prepare in consultation with *COSSAC* and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of urgency, an outline plan for the operation.

3. The exact date for *OVERLORD* has not yet been decided upon, but it is to take place at the most suitable date during May 1944. You will be informed of the date once this has been decided, and operation *ANVIL* will be timed approximately to coincide with operation *OVERLORD* — the exact date to be determined in consultation with *COSSAC*.

4. You will be given the assault shipping and craft for a lift for at least two divisions (each with two brigades in the assault).

5. You will inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of your requirements which cannot be met from the resources which will be at your disposal in the Mediterranean on that date. In assessing your resources you should assume that your forces have reached the Pisa-Rimini line and that as strong pressure as possible is maintained, consistent with the forces required for *ANVIL*; also that Mediterranean forces will not be engaged in offensive operations elsewhere.

Handwritten note from President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin appointing Dwight Eisenhower to command Operation Overlord. General George Marshall added a note to Eisenhower on December 7, 1943.

From the President to Marshal Stahin

The ^{immediate} appointment of General
Eschenhour to command of
Overland operation has been
decided upon.

Roosevelt.

Cairo, Dec. 7. 43

Dear Eschenhour, I thought you
might like to have this as a memento.
It was written very hurriedly by me as the
final meeting broke up yesterday, the
President signing it immediately.
L. C. W.

Overlord - Anvil Papers December 1943 - April 1944 Part 1

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OVERLORD-ANVIL [papers]

Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters.
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Authority J.C.S. MEMO
Date 1/17/73 by 1/4/74
By [signature], NARS Date 3/25/74

COPY NO - 1

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HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND

COPY

COPY NO. _____

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Date: JAN 232300 A TOO

From: SHAEF

Originator: COS

To : AGWAR (B-33)

Info: British Chiefs of Staff London (M-37)

U R G E N T

U.S. SECRET - BIGOT

"BIGOT"

E

"Edited Literal Text"

DECLASSIFIED

To : AGWAR and TROOPERS
For : Combined Chiefs of Staff rptd British Authority
From : SC, AEF
Signed: Eisenhower

J.C.S. MEMO
Date 7/5/72
By DJH, NARS Date 11/19/73

1. I have now had an opportunity of discussing the 'OVERLORD' plan with my Commanders-in-Chief. We are convinced that in all discussions full weight must be given to the fact that this operation marks the crisis of the European war. Every obstacle must be overcome, every inconvenience suffered and every risk run to ensure that our blow is decisive. We cannot afford to fail.

2. In this light we have reviewed the 'OVERLORD' plan and we are fully convinced that it is, as the Chiefs of Staff have already asserted, on a narrow margin. The present plan is limited to a three divisional assault. To ensure success we consider it essential to increase the assault force to five divisions. Nothing less will give us an adequate margin to ensure success.

3. Our reasons for this view are that an operation of this type must be designed to obtain an adequate bridgehead quickly and to retain the initiative. Three divisions are insufficient for this. The present frontage of assault is consequently too narrow. It will be essential to extend the front to give us a greater opportunity of finding a weak spot through which to exploit success. Moreover, the chances of success of the operation will be greatly increased and the capture of a port speeded up if we could extend our assault to the EASTERN beaches of the COTENTIN PENINSULA WEST of the barrier formed by the RIVER VIRE and its marshy estuary. Further, the securing of the EASTERN flank, and the early capture of the important focal point of CAEN with the vital airfields in its vicinity will be facilitated by the extension of the assault to the beaches just WEST of OUISTREHAM.

4. With five divisions we should carry out our assault as follows. We should land one US and two BRITISH assault divisions on the CAEN beaches each on a two brigade front as already planned. We should land one additional BRITISH division with one brigade up on the beach just WEST of OUISTREHAM and a US division with one brigade up at the SOUTHERN end of the EAST COTENTIN beaches. The whole assault would thus be made by five divisions with eight brigades up. These would be followed on the second tide of D day by the equivalent of two divisions in landing ships and craft

~~SECRET~~
(MOST SECRET)

"BIGOT"

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as in the original plan. To assist the assault on the COTENTIN an airborne division would be landed on D day to seize the exits from the beaches; followed probably by a second airborne division in approximately twenty-four hours.

5. I understand that COSSAC has previously stated that additional craft becoming available for 'OVERLORD' should be used to strengthen the follow-up on D plus 1 by embarking in landing craft units at present carried in ships. While I agree as to the desirability of this, I am convinced that the first necessity, as stated above, is to widen the frontage of the assault in order to obtain a larger initial bridge-head.

6. I have had examined the additional resources required to fulfill these proposals. By cutting down the scales of vehicles carried in the assault and follow-up I can find enough craft from within those already assigned to me to provide lift for one more assault brigade in reserve. The balance required will have to come from resources outside my control.

7. To carry out the revised plan will require an addition of the following:

1 L.S.H.
6 L.S.I. (L) or A.P.A.
1 L.S.I. (H)

(All with full complement of L.C.A. or L.C.T.)

72 L.C.I. (L)
47 L.S.T.
144 L.C.T. (see paragraph 16 below)

8. The following additional naval forces will be required above those already requested:

(a) ESCORTS:

24 destroyers
28 motor launches

(b) MINESWEEPERS:

4 flotillas

(c) BOMBARDMENT FORCE:

5 cruisers
12 destroyers
1 or 2 monitors or old battleships.

9. The majority of the naval forces, including the assault shipping and craft, must be formed in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 42, the last ships and craft joining their naval forces by D minus 28 at the latest.

10. The following additional BRITISH land forces will be required to start training in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 42:

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- 2 beach groups
- 1 beach sub-area headquarters
- 2 dock operating companies.



11. An additional eight fighter squadrons will be required to ensure the necessary cover over the extended assault area and wider shipping lanes, and two hundred troop carrier aircraft to ensure reasonable provision for the dropping of two airborne divisions within approximately twenty-four hours. These air forces must be available in the UNITED KINGDOM by D minus 60.

12. To allow an increase in the rate of follow-up and build-up proportionate to the increase in the assault, an additional 64 MT/Stores ships will be required for the first month.

13. The problem that must be faced at once is the provision of these additional forces.

14. I regard 'ANVIL' as an important contribution to 'OVERLORD' as I feel that an assault will contain more enemy forces in SOUTHERN FRANCE than a threat. The forces both US and FRENCH are in any case available; and the actual landing of these forces will increase the cooperation from resistance elements in FRANCE.

15. 'OVERLORD' and 'ANVIL' must be viewed as one whole. If sufficient forces could be made available the ideal would be a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a three divisional 'ANVIL' or, at worst, a two divisional 'ANVIL'. If insufficient forces are available for this, however, I am driven to the conclusion that we should adopt a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a one divisional 'ANVIL', the latter being maintained as a threat until enemy weakness justifies its active employment. This solution should be adopted only as a last resort and after all other means and alternatives have failed to provide the necessary strength by the end of May for a five divisional 'OVERLORD' and a two divisional 'ANVIL'.

16. As regards the target date, it is preferable from the army point of view that the early-May date should be adhered to if possible in order to obtain the longest campaigning season. I should prefer, therefore, to adhere to the existing date if it were possible. Rather, however, than risk failure with reduced forces on the earlier date, I would accept a postponement of a month if I were assured of then obtaining the strength required. Such a postponement would give an additional month of good weather for preparatory air operations and for training the additional troop carrier aircraft crews. It would also make available an extra month's production in the UNITED KINGDOM of about 96 L.C.T.

17. An immediate decision on the plan to be worked to and the date is a vital necessity. I request this decision at the earliest possible moment in order to allow time for the transfer of the additional resources to this theater and to enable planning and training to be completed in the limited time still available. The recommendations contained in this message have been made after consultation with my commanders and my own staff, but with no outside agencies.

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DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1. - General Eisenhower
2. - A.C.M. Tedder
3. - A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory
4. - Admiral Ramsay
5. - Maj. Gen. Bull
6. - Maj. Gen. Whitefoord
7. - Lt. Gen. Morgan
8. - General Montgomery
9. - Lt. Gen. Bradley
10. - Maj. Gen. Brownjohn
11. - Maj. Gen. J.C.H. Lee
12. - Lt. Gen. Spaatz
13. - Maj. Gen. Barker
General Ismay
Adm Creasy

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INCOMING MESSAGE
C O S S A C

COPY

From: WAR

Ref. No.: 29

To : SHAEF

Dated: JAN 252249Z Precedence: URGENT

Rec'd: JAN 260115A Security: ~~SECRET~~

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

Interior Addresses: For : EISENHOWER
From : THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF



Joint Staff Planners are working on your B-33 as a matter of urgency. In order to obtain a complete solution to the problem, we must have the basis you used in arriving at the additional resources required in order to make certain we are using the same assumptions. Request that you furnish immediately information on the following.

a. Your estimate of craft and ships which you will have according to present allocations, broken down to show availability, service-ability, and explanation of landing craft which you consider will be on station but not available for use in the operation.

b. Whether or not you consider as already available to you all or part of the 92 LCT's and 25 LCI(L)'s shown as non-operational in appendix "B" to annex 5 of CCS 428 (Revised), and comments on their serviceability.

c. Data on which you have based your outline plan for loading to include:

(1) Capacities of different types of craft

(2) Vehicles you plan to lift per RCT and per Division in the assault

(3) Assault shipping and craft which you plan to use in the assault for other purposes than lifting men and vehicles

d. Can you use LCT in place of LST and if so, at what ratio?

e. Confirmation of statement in Para 16 of your message that an extra month's UK production would give 96 LCT's. Available information here does not check this estimate of UK monthly production.

f. Could you accept any other type of personnel-carrying ship or craft as a substitute for part of the additional LCI(L)'s listed in your Para. 7.

g. Reference request for 8 additional fighter squadrons - has consideration been given to the employment of units now assigned to the Strategic Air Force in UK during the critical states of OVERLORD. Information is desired as to what US and British fighters you already consider will be available for OVERLORD. Was consideration given our A-5249 to Eaker of 5 January?

h. Reference your request for 200 additional Troop Carrier aircraft, what British and US units have you already considered will be available for OVERLORD including reserve planes and combat crews. Do you intend to operate them with single or with double tow? What

Ref. No. 29
DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 52009, Sept. 27, 1958

~~SECRET~~

(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

Authority J.C.S. Memo 116

Date 1/4/74

By DSH

NARS Date 3/25/74

NE by WGL Date 1-16-69

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(EQUALS BRITISH ~~MOST SECRET~~)

COPY

PAGE TWO CONT'D: Cable from WAR, dated Jan 252249Z, Ref. No. 29

What are your recommendations concerning using bombers as tugs?
Are crews to be included with the 200 additional transports?

i. With reference to your requirement for additional MT/Store ships in your Para 12, please furnish the number you now estimate will be available under present allocations and their sources. We understand that any additional requirement is the total to be furnished on a combined basis by the WSA and the BMWT.

j. Your estimate of the total Naval combatant forces broken down to show British and US types required.

DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION:

1-3 Maj Gen Bull

INFO;

4 Gen Eisenhower
5 A.C.M. Tedder
6 A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory
7 Admiral Ramsay
8 Maj Gen Whitefoord
9 Lt Gen Morgan

10. Lt Gen Smith
11. Gen Montgomery
12. Lt Gen Bradley
13. Maj Gen Brownjohn
14. Maj Gen J.C.H. Lee
15. Maj Gen Spaatz
16. Maj Gen Barker
17/18. S/GS
Gen Ismay
Adm Creasy

Ref. No. 29

116



~~SECRET~~

(EQUALS BRITISH ~~MOST SECRET~~)

O U T G O I N G M E S S A G E

C O S S A C

Action to : AGWAR Date JAN 280030A Ref. No.: B-55
Information To: Originated by G-3 (WBS) Precedence: URGENT
Subject : Security: ~~SECRET~~

Approved for transmission by E.E. Beach

Reference: WAR 29, 25 Jan (Same Distribution)

"EDITED LITERAL TEXT"

Interior Addresses: To : MARSHALL
For : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
From : EISENHOWER
Sgd : EISENHOWER



The replies to your questionnaire are given below. But I would emphasise that there is one main question to which an answer is required now. Will the additional lift asked for OVERLORD be provided? All plans and training considerations hang on the answer to this one question. Moreover a considerable degree of re-organization of our forces is entailed in changing from a three to a five divisional assault and first steps must be taken now and are, indeed, already overdue.

Your paragraph a.

CRAFT	AVAILABLE	SERVICEABLE
LSI (various sizes)	42	42
LST	192	173
LCT	636	540
LCI (L)	133	113

We have gone into this matter carefully and as far as we know every serviceable landing craft that is worth having is allocated to OVERLORD.

Your paragraph b.

Admiral Cunningham says that if he had been approached through the proper channels he would have answered the question as follows:- "The 92 LCT and 25 LCI (L) shown as non-operational are the percentage of the total number of these types of landing craft which at any one time will from past experience be out of action due to one cause or another. This is the agreed QUADRANT percentage un-serviceability figure. Any of the above craft which prove in fact to be operational on the day will of course be used in the operation." You will note that the same percentage figure is used in my reply to your paragraph a.

Your paragraph c. (1)

LST	60 vehicles - 300 men
LCT	11 vehicles - 55 men
LCI (L)	-- vehicles - 200

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Authority J.C.S. MEMO

Date 7/5/72

By DJH, NARS Date 11/19/73

Ref No: B-55

000105

Your paragraph c. (2)

It is planned to lift in assault 2,530 vehicles per assault division whether assault is made on a one or two-regimental front and 550 vehicles per assault RCT. You must note that these figures allow for the vehicles of four field regiments and one tank brigade per division as both British and American assault divisions will be reinforced to this strength. In the Commanders opinion this composition of assault divisions is essential to success.

Your paragraph c. (3)

48 LCT (5) armoured) Support craft each carrying specially
21 LCT (5) unarmoured) mounted 17 pdr and 25 pdr guns.

36 LCT converted to rocket ships

9 LCI (L) converted to headquarters ships.

3 LST (2) converted to fighter direction ships.



Your paragraph d.

Yes, up to a limit of about 100 LCT in place of about 17 LST. But if we do this they must be included in the follow-up forces, as berthing precluded using additional LCT's in the assault force area. As follow-up forces have a longer sea passage, any increase in the number of their LCT, although possible, is undesirable. Furthermore LCT are less efficient than LST in the build-up.

Your paragraph e.

The figure of 96 in paragraph 16 of my B-33 referred to an estimated monthly production of 25 LCT (4) and to a specific order for 71 LCT (3), petrol driven, scheduled for delivery during April. Delivery of the later was expected to be late, but it is estimated that they will be available for a target date in early June and every possible effort is being made to ensure this.

Your paragraph f.

32 LCI (L) are at present planned to carry personnel in the follow-up force. Personnel ships could be substituted for these but would entail the following disadvantages:-

(i) Added escort commitment.

(ii) Large size of ships involved and hence vulnerability. No more small personnel ships available in this theatre.

However, if necessary, we are prepared to accept any reasonable substitution or expedient that will provide us with extra lift.

Your paragraph g.

Our air plan envisages the fullest possible use of all available air resources in the United Kingdom in support of Operation OVERLORD. Fighters at present assigned to Strategic Air Force will be used in the general fighter pool, the employment of which will include escort for strategic bombers. Our Order of Battle therefore, includes all US and British fighters estimated to be operationally available in the United Kingdom on 1st May, 1944. Availability given in your A-5249 to EAKER of 5th January was noted. Our Order of Battle, however, includes the three strategic air force fighter groups expected to be transferred from North Africa. Total US and British fighters included in our Order of Battle as follows:-

- (1) Eighth US Air Force
Fighter day 45 squadrons.
- (ii) Ninth US Air Force
Fighter day 63 squadrons (includes above-mentioned 3 groups
(9 squadrons) expected from North Africa)
- (iii) British.
Fighter night 3 squadrons.
Fighter/recce 4 squadrons.
- Fighter day 42 squadrons.)
Fighter/bomber 16 squadrons) (to be reinforced by maximum
of 9 fighter and 2 fighter/
bomber squadrons from ADGB)
- Fighter night 6 squadrons (with 2 ADGB night fighter squad-
rons in reserve)
- Fighter/recce 5 squadrons (with 2 squadrons of Hurricane IV's,
and 1 Spitfire V squadron in
reserve)

Your paragraph h.

Aircraft and trained crews available for airborne operations made
up as follows:-

US:	12 Groups (52) plus reserves (10) equals	744
British:	No 38 Group (190) plus reserves (48) equals	238
British:	Transport Command (150) equals	150
TOTAL:		1132

The thirteenth US Group (No 442) has not been included in above,
as under present arrangements it is not due in United Kingdom until
latter half of April.

It is not planned to use double tow with glider tugs. Both US
and British troop carrier experts consider that under operational
conditions envisaged here double tow is unwise. In view of this
opinion I do not consider it advisable to take the risk.

In regard to bombers as tugs. Crews cannot be trained, or air-
craft modified in time without excessive diminution of bombing effort
and all available bomber effort is required in bomber role to give
full support to OVERLORD. Excessive wear of engines would also be
involved.

The 200 troop carrier aircraft are required as formed operational
units, complete with crews fully troop carrier trained. They should,
as nearly as practicable, arrive in the United Kingdom by D minus 60
to complete operational training for this operation. The three re-
maining US Troop Carrier Groups in Mediterranean are a possible source
plus additional separate aircraft with crews to complete total.

The additional eight fighter squadrons are required under the
changed plan to meet increased fighter commitments involved in ex-
tended frontage of assault, wider shipping lanes, extra spotting
requirements for naval bombardment, and longer hours of daylight for
later target date. It must be borne in mind also that certain
fighter types included in our total available are not operationally
interchangeable.

The additional troop carrier aircraft are required to provide the necessary margin to meet the increased airborne operation commitment involved in lifting one airborne division simultaneously followed by a second in about twenty-four hours, and probably followed later by a third and fourth; also for additional commitments such as the dropping of SAS Brigade, probably at the same time as the first airborne division.

Your paragraph i.

Existing allocation of shipping is that authorized at SEXTANT. This was a total of 160 ships to be provided on a fifty-fifty basis by WSA and BMWT after making allowance for British coaster contribution. The additional requirement of 64 ships is an estimate, and as no formal demand for these ships has been made on WSA or BMWT we cannot give the exact allocation as between these two agencies nor the sources from which the shipping will be drawn.

Your paragraph j.

An estimate of the total Naval Combatant forces required has been given to the Admiralty, who now have it under consideration.



DISTRIBUTION: (EEB)

- | | |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. General Eisenhower | 9. General Montgomery |
| 2. General Bull | 10. Lt. Gen Bradley |
| 3. A.C.M. Tedder | 11. Maj Gen Brownjohn |
| 4. A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory | 12. Maj Gen J.C.H. Lee |
| 5. Admiral Ramsey | 13. Lt Gen Spaatz |
| 6. Maj Gen Whitefoord | 14. Maj Gen Barker |
| 7. Lt Gen Morgan | 15-16. S/GS |
| 8. Lt Gen Smith | |

Overlord - Anvil Papers December 1943 - April 1944 Part 2

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BIGOT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Copy No. _____

From: SHAEF

COPY

Ref. No. B 320

TO : AGWAR

Dated: 211530A Mar

Precedence : URGENT

Security : ~~TOP SECRET~~

Personal For: Marshall

From : Eisenhower

Cite : SHCOS

Authority JCS MEMOS
Date 4/17/73 S 4/4/74
By DJH, NARS Date 3/28/74



I will be asked to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff tomorrow on the final question of ANVIL. I have been giving constant thought to this subject together with the Staff and several Commanders during the past month. While I have no recent appreciation from General WILSON, yet I intend to present the following based on our own careful study and earnest conviction.

"To the Secretary, British Chiefs of Staff.

1. At the Conference on February 23rd, it was recommended and agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the decision with respect to operation ANVIL would be made on or about March 20.

2. It is now the firm opinion of the Supreme Commander that ANVIL, as originally visualized, is no longer a possibility, either from the standpoint of time in which to make the necessary preparations, or in probable availability of fresh and effective troops at the required date.

3. Accordingly, the Supreme Commander desires to bring to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff the fact that during the past month detailed planning confirms that the landing ships and craft at present allocated to OVERLORD are barely sufficient to carry out the operation, even assuming the ships and craft arrive at planned dates, thereafter suffer no losses through enemy or other action, and the planned serviceability percentages are attained. The present allocation allows no margin of any sort, and, indeed, in the case of LSTs, is four short of the minimum on which we have been planning. Moreover, it entails an undesirable rigidity of tactical plan.

4. This fact has been constantly realized, and the Supreme Commander has been willing to accept the situation only so long as he felt reasonably sure of a strong and simultaneous ANVIL. With cancellation of a simultaneous ANVIL he considers it essential to strengthen OVERLORD and also to increase the flexibility of the buildup during the early critical days. *Our present loading schedule utilizes all allocated LSTs on the first three tides, and since the average LST turn-around is three days, we will have no LSTs reaching the beaches after the morning of D plus 1 until the morning of D plus 2.

5. The Supreme Commander, accordingly, is of the opinion that all serviceable landing ships and craft presently allocated to the Mediterranean and above those necessary to furnish ship to shore lift for one division should be re-allocated to OVERLORD.

* Original cable was corrected by Top Secret Cable Ref. No. S 50009 to read as indicated.

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6. Although convinced that ANVIL as at present conceived is no longer possible, the Supreme Commander feels that the abandonment of this project must not lessen our intention of operating offensively in the MEDITERRANEAN, initially in ITALY and extending from there into FRANCE as rapidly as we can. He believes that the forces in the MEDITERRANEAN must constantly look for every expedient, including threat and feint, to contain the maximum possible enemy forces in that region.

7. The Supreme Commander accordingly recommends:

a. That the decision be made to abandon ANVIL in its present conception of a two division assault building up to ten divisions, and that a directive for operations in lieu thereof, similar to the attached, be transmitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theater.

b. That there be withdrawn from the MEDITERRANEAN the following craft and ships for re-allocation to operation OVERLORD: 26 LST, 40 LCI(L), 1 LSH (the BULOLO), 1 LSE, 1 LSD. The above ships and craft to arrive in the U. K. by 30 April."

Following is directive referred to in paragraph 7 a. SHAEF/17101/Ops. Proposed Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater.

GENERAL

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have previously directed that the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, shall coordinate operations from the Mediterranean Theater designed to assist OVERLORD.

OBJECT

2. To give the greatest possible assistance to OVERLORD by containing the maximum enemy forces away from the OVERLORD lodgement area.

METHOD

3. The highest possible tempo of offensive action must be maintained. Your plans will include the mounting of a positive threat against the SOUTH of FRANCE or the LIGURIAN COAST with provisions for taking immediate advantage of RANKIN conditions should they occur.

TIMING OF A THREAT

4. The positive threat should be fully developed by OVERLORD D-5 and fully maintained for as long as possible after D Day. The process of building up the threat should not start before D-31.

COMMAND AND CONTROL RANKIN

5. Subject to general direction by Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, you will continue to exercise operational control over your forces after landing until Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, can assume this responsibility.

6. You should recommend an area in which you wish to assume operational, administrative and civil affairs responsibility in the SHAEF sphere.

7. You should make recommendations if you wish the area of your responsibility for SOE/SO responsibilities altered.

8. On receipt of your recommendations referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 preceding, instructions in respect to SHAEF coordination of operational, administrative, civil affairs and SOE/SO matters will be transmitted to you.

Annex ends

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COPY NO _____

SCAEF 12th MEETING

BIGOT

27 MARCH 1944Supreme HeadquartersALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Minutes of Meeting Held in Conference
Room, Widewing, 1430 hours, 27 March 1944.

PRESENT

General Dwight D. Eisenhower

Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder

Marshal of the Royal Air Force,
Sir Charles F. A. Portal

Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay

Admiral of the Fleet,
Sir Andrew B. Cunningham

Lt. General W.B. Smith

Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

SECRETARY

Lt. Commander J. E. Reid

I. U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF PROPOSALS ON MEDITERRANEAN OPERATIONS (COS(W)1229)

The Committee had before them for consideration a recent signal which had been received from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff (COS (W) 1229), containing proposals relative to future operations in the Mediterranean in support of OVERLORD.

With reference to these proposals General EISENHOWER said that the main question was whether or not it was possible to launch ANVIL on the new target date, July 10th, and at the same time keep up pressure in Italy. He believed the Germans would continue to maintain strong forces in Italy for the purpose of holding Rome. After a brief summary of the contents of the message he said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff are so concerned in keeping ANVIL alive that they were prepared to withdraw certain landing craft now scheduled for Pacific operations.

Sir Alan BROOKE, after commenting on the proposals said that he was not entirely clear as to the meaning of paragraph 3 (a) of the text, which provided; that after joining the bridgehead with the main line "we should then consolidate this line and maintain pressure to contain the maximum number of German divisions." To maintain pressure you have to attack with sufficient forces, and this, he said, is quite different from consolidation, which means going on the defensive. He felt that from a military point of view there was an inconsistency in consolidating the line and at the same time attempting to maintain pressure.

His principle objection to the proposals related to the conditional assurances, contained in paragraph 4, which he characterised as the "pointing of a pistol". With regard to these assurances he said he was not prepared to accept firm commitments at this time regarding the precise location of a diversionary attack to be made four months hence.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority J.C.S. memo
Date 1/4/74
By DJH, NARS Date 3/28/74

-1-

~~SECRET~~
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NWD by _____ date _____

~~TOP SECRET~~**BIGOT**

BIGOT

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Sir Alan BROOKE then drew attention to the point that if our basic strategy, which was to defeat Germany first, had been adhered to, the landing craft required for ANVIL would now be available and they would not be in the Pacific, as was the case. He considered that the failure to adhere strictly to the basic strategy had already resulted in a set-back of approximately six months in the defeat of Germany. Furthermore, he said the lack of sufficient landing craft and other resources in the Mediterranean resulted in our failure to take full advantage of the fall of Italy.

General EISENHOWER replied that he had been pleading for the past two years the transcending importance of whipping Germany first. He considered that in view of the opposing factors General MARSHALL had gone a long way in finally obtaining agreement for allocation of certain Pacific resources for use in the Mediterranean operations. He drew attention to the fact that public opinion in the United States, as regards the Pacific war, had to be reckoned with. He pointed out that only recently certain members of Congress had initiated proposals for an immediate all-out Pacific offensive and allocation of sufficient U.S. resources in support thereof.

Sir Charles PORTAL took the view that we should welcome the offer of additional resources for operations in support of OVERLORD. He did not feel that it was necessary at this time to enter into controversial discussions regarding the proposed strategy to be followed in the employment of these resources. He suggested that in reply to the subject signal, we should point out that between now and July 10th there may arise an opportunity of employing these forces elsewhere to a far greater advantage than now envisioned in the proposed ANVIL operation.

General EISENHOWER emphasised the fact that our main objective is to contain and defeat the greatest possible number of German divisions in the Mediterranean theater. It appeared to him that the main issue centred around the question as to which approach would accomplish this objective - ANVIL, as against an offensive for the capture of Rome. The capture of Rome, in his opinion, was not an unmitigated blessing, though he realized the political implications arising out of continued German occupation. What we are aiming to do is to contain and defeat the greatest possible German forces in the Mediterranean.

Sir Alan BROOKE agreed that our major objective in the Mediterranean was to divert the greatest possible number of German forces from OVERLORD. He thought that an offensive for the capture of Rome was the best method of containing the maximum number of German forces. It was pointed out that our strength in the Mediterranean at the present time, was in the decline, due, among other things, to the necessity of cannibalizing certain divisions. He said that in order to launch an effective ANVIL it would require at least ten divisions and this would result in dividing our forces in the Mediterranean. The consequence of this would be that both forces would have to remain on the defensive.

General EISENHOWER indicated that inasmuch as there was general agreement as to the main objective he did not envision any difficulty in framing a reply which would be acceptable to both the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The main concern of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, he said, was that they wanted assurances that preparations for a delayed ANVIL would be vigorously pressed with the intention of mounting the operation in support of OVERLORD. He said the Chiefs of Staff were more concerned about preparing for an ANVIL operation and they were not, in his opinion, firm as to the exact geographical point of attack. The point of attack would depend on accepting the most favourable conditions which would accomplish the major objective.

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General SMITH said that he had participated in the Planners' discussion of the subject matter. He pointed out that ANVIL was generally viewed, not as a Second Front, but as an operation in support of OVERLORD. This diversion, he said, would take the pressure off OVERLORD. If we accept the proposed allocation of additional landing craft, it would be possible to launch a two divisional assault with French troops. He estimated that there are sufficient French divisions in the Mediterranean to continue the follow-up until the middle of August, by which time OVERLORD should be firmly established. An American division could be added to lend support. The net result would be that by taking full advantage of utilising all available French forces for the ANVIL operation, it would be possible to achieve an effective diversionary assistance to OVERLORD and at the same time other forces available for the MEDITERRANEAN could be employed to maintain a strong position in Italy.

Sir Alan BROOKE, referring to paragraph 4 of the text of the subject signal, said that he was not prepared to give firm assurances or accept a commitment at this time for operations to be conducted 4 to 5 months hence. He said that it was not militarily sound to run a war on a lawyer's agreement by making commitments ahead of time, thereby losing the necessary and desired flexibility to meet the ever changing conditions and circumstances.

General EISENHOWER said that it was quite natural that we could not at this time foresee what the conditions would be in the future. With regard to the most advantageous area of launching a diversionary attack in the Mediterranean, it may be possible, he said, that in July the Germans may be deploying large forces in the Rome area, and if that were the case, it might be advisable to direct an amphibious operation toward northern Italy rather than the south coast of France.

General SMITH, in referring to the text of the subject signal, said that what the Chiefs of Staff had in mind when they proposed to consolidate the line in Italy and maintain pressure to contain the maximum number of German divisions was the establishment of a line from which we could not be driven back.

Sir Charles PORTAL, after reading a suggested draft, said that operations for the capture of Rome should be conducted if it proved to be the best possible way to contain the maximum number of German forces.

General EISENHOWER suggested that we ought to present the problem in three steps. First, no operation would be conducted in the Mediterranean which would be contrary to General WILSON's directive to contain the maximum number of German forces. Secondly, there must be sufficient lift in the Mediterranean by July 10th. Thirdly, that in accomplishing the objective the best possible place to strike would be determined at a later date. He explained that in other communications General MARSHALL had expressed the view that "some operation in the nature of ANVIL" should be conducted. He did not consider that General MARSHALL had crystallized the exact geographical location for this operation.

General EISENHOWER said that in any event we must reserve the right to determine the best place to attack at the time. We should make it known to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that we cannot, at this time, say whether or not in the future an attack on the Toulon area will or will not be the best place to strike.

General SMITH said that what we would like to do is to hold every division now in southern France.

Sir Alan BROOKE said that we ought to at least have 10 divisions to contain the German forces now in southern France. He reiterated his convictions regarding the undesirability of present commitments relative to establishing a precise geographical location for an attack in the future. With regard to this, he pointed out that on other occasions he had subsequently been confronted with previous commitments which entailed considerable argument.

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General SMITH suggested we might reap the fruits of the additional landing craft at the expense of facing arguments in the future.

General EISENHOWER emphasized the fact that there was no question in his mind that a two divisional assault in July would contribute substantially to the success of OVERLORD.

Sir Andrew CUMMINGHAM inquired as to whether or not it would be in harmony with the U.S. Chiefs of Staff's proposals, if the Supreme Commander, at a later date, should recommend that the capture of Rome was the best means of containing the maximum number of German forces. He wondered whether or not that would constitute the breaking of our engagements.

General SMITH said that it was only his guess, but he thought the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would consider it a breach of commitment if an attack were made south of Pisa. However, on the other hand, if the attack were to the north, it might not be considered as such.



General EISENHOWER believed that a reply could be framed in such a manner as to harmonize the views of the respective Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that we should point out that it would be for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to determine at the time which was the most advantageous area for attack.

Air Chief Marshal TEDDER inquired as to whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in submitting these proposals, had in mind the opening of a "fresh front".

General SMITH said that in his conversations with General HANDY, he had received the impression that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had envisioned the operation as a direct assistance to OVERLORD and that they did not consider it as an opening of a new front. It was their view that if ANVIL was not conducted, there would be serious regrets at a later date. General HANDY had expressed the view that it was desirable to employ French divisions now in the Mediterranean.

General SMITH said that if the responsibility of a decision rested in his hands, he would employ, under the command of General GIRAUD, all French divisions, together with possibly one American division. He would provide the necessary landing craft and air support. He considered that such an operation in the Mediterranean, utilizing French forces, would constitute a diversion fully equal to that of ANVIL.

Sir Alan BROOKE said that on the basis of the discussions on the subject matter, it would be possible to prepare a carefully worded answer to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff's proposals.

General EISENHOWER said that he would communicate with General MARSHALL and explain to him in detail the expression of the views which resulted from this conference. He was confident that an understanding could be reached.

After further discussion, the COMMITTEE took note that:

- (a) The British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a reply to COS(W) 1229.
- (b) The Supreme Commander would communicate with General MARSHALL and inform him in detail of views expressed during the course of this meeting.

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INCOMING MESSAGE
COSSAC

Copy No. _____

From: AGWAR
To : SHAEF

Dated: 310053Z
Rec'd: 311705A

Ref. No. : W16455
Precedence : PRIORITY
Security : TOP SECRET

FOR : GENERAL EISENHOWER'S PERSONAL ATTENTION.

FROM : GENERAL HANDY SIGNED GENERAL MARSHALL.

REF : Your S-50068, 27 March.
AFHQ MEDCOS 76, 28 March.

British Chiefs of Staff replied to the U.S. proposal regarding ANVIL and OVERLORD substantially as reported by you as their views in your S-50068. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have now dispatched their reply which is summarized below:

It points out that we cannot accept a diversion of landing craft from the Pacific operations unless it is the firm intention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff now to mount ANVIL on a 2-division basis, target date, 10 July, in time to support OVERLORD. We state that we are firm in our conviction that a decision must be taken to launch ANVIL on a specific date. Such a decision and preparations for the operation in no way preclude changing our plans should an undeniably better course of action be indicated by changing circumstances. In our opinion, the proposal of the British Chiefs of Staff that we postpone the issuance of a directive to General WILSON to proceed all-out along the line of a specific course of action amounts to admitting that the decision as to what happens next in the MEDITERRANEAN will continue to rest with the Germans. It is our conviction that we should adopt a plan which will reverse this situation so that the decision as to our course of action will rest with us. Further, we are convinced that if we launch an offensive to relieve the bridgehead at the earliest possible moment, thereafter maintain pressure to contain the maximum number of German divisions in ITALY, develop a positive amphibious threat against the MEDITERRANEAN coast of FRANCE at the time of OVERLORD, and are prepared to launch an ANVIL by 10 July, we will have placed ourselves in the best position to divert the maximum forces from OVERLORD no matter what the Germans may do in the MEDITERRANEAN. We point out that it is perhaps not clear to the British Chiefs of Staff that the decision as to the action on movement of U. S. troops and supplies is now being held up pending a decision on ANVIL. We cannot afford to provide resources sufficient to support OVERLORD and, at the same time, to reinforce the MEDITERRANEAN when there exists no firm decision and clear-cut plan for operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

Our view is that there should be no delay in providing the Allied Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, with a firm directive. We state that we are not satisfied with ALEXANDER's estimate reported by WILSON in MEDCOS 76 that an operation to unite the main front and the bridgehead cannot be launched until 14 May. We are not satisfied that there is a necessity in the long delay before launching the attack and we state that in our opinion, General ALEXANDER's estimate may have been colored by his plans for subsequent operations in ITALY pursuant to the existing directive. The situation in the MEDITERRANEAN at present indicates that existing directives no longer fit the situation and that the new directive is urgently required. We have proposed that the message to you and the Allied Commander-in-Chief, MEDITERRANEAN, formerly proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, be dispatched at once. In this directive, the three U.S. fighter groups remain in the MEDITERRANEAN and we have allowed for the British Chiefs of Staff to make adjustments in the matter of total LST's withdrawn from the MEDITERRANEAN to support OVERLORD.

S-50068, originated by SUPREME COMMANDER, 27 March 1944.
MEDCOS 76, 28 March, British Chiefs of Staff (ACTION)

DISTRIBUTION:

1. SUPREME COMMANDER
2. CHIEF OF STAFF
3. SGS
4. GEN. MORGAN
5. G-3, ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
Authority J.C.S. Memo
Date 1/4/74
By DJH, NARS Date 3/28/74

~~SECRET~~
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958
NWD by _____ date _____

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Operation Policy Memoranda January 29, 1944

**Minutes of the Supreme Commanders Allied Expeditionary Forces
(SCAEF) 10th Meeting March 20, 1944**

Supreme Commander
one copy

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VPA
HCA

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
G-3 (Ops) Division

SHAEP/2997/Ops

29 January 1944

SUBJECT: Operation Policy Memoranda

TO : Distribution G-3A

Reference SHAEP/2297/Ops dated 16 December 1943.

1. There are attached herewith:

a. The first Operation Policy Memorandum to be issued by this Headquarters. BEACH MARKINGS.

b. The complete distribution for all Operation Memoranda. This distribution list, G-3A, will not accompany subsequent issues of Memoranda as it is visualized that addressees will attach it to the cover of their new file on this subject for easy reference.

2. In connection with a. above, The Admiralty will issue, shortly, colored panoramas illustrating the Beach Markings described therein. This issue will be made to all ships and craft engaging in proposed operations.

3. Covering letters normally will not accompany subsequently issued Operation Memoranda.

4. Commanders desiring extra copies of any Operation Policy Memorandum for direct distribution to lower formations will apply to the AC of S, G-3, this Headquarters.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

H. R. Bull

H. R. BULL,
Major General, G-3.C.,
A.C. of S., G-3

Inclosures (2)

- 1 - OP MEMO NO 1 (Beach Markings)
- 2 - Distribution List

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Authority Guidelines for Com Hdqrs. 7/5/73
By ARK NLE DATE 10/25/73

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

29 January 1944

OPERATION MEMORANDUM)

NUMBER 1)

BEACH MARKINGS

1. OBJECT

The object of this memorandum is to coordinate the use on beaches of all markings, signs and lights whose purpose is to aid the navigation of ships and craft.

2. DEFINITIONS

a. Sector. A sector is a part of an enemy coastline. The entire coastline, whatever its nature, beach, cliff, rock, esplanade, etc., is divided into sectors. Sector limits are geographical features which can easily be identified either from charts, maps, or air photographs. In very long sectors where no convenient feature can be found, a landmark just inland may have to be used. The length of sectors cannot be specified; they may vary from less than 100 yards to over 2000 yards, but they will seldom exceed 3000 yards.

Sectors are referred to by the Anglo-American phonetically pronounced letters of the alphabet as:-

ABLE, BAKER, CHARLIE, etc.

These letters are assigned from RIGHT to LEFT facing shoreward, and are in alphabetical sequence.

b. Beaches. A beach is a definite part of a sector chosen as appropriate for landing. No sector will contain more than three beaches. Beaches will be coloured GREEN-WHITE-RED from RIGHT to LEFT facing shoreward. If only two beaches per sector are required for landings, WHITE beach will be omitted. If only one beach is used it will be coloured GREEN. Beaches will be referred to by sector letter, colour and the word "Beach". Example: FOX GREEN BEACH.

3. BEACH MARKING SIGNS (Numbers underlined below refer to Appendix 'A').

a. Day beach signs.

- (1) Left limit, facing shoreward: All left limits for GREEN, WHITE and RED beaches will be marked by a WHITE canvas rectangle twelve by four feet on sixteen foot poles, supported by guys and displayed horizontally. In addition, GREEN and RED beaches only will be marked by an additional horizontal rectangle similar to the WHITE one just specified, but of the same colour as the beach. This second rectangle will be placed alongside the WHITE one and on the side toward the center of the beach (1).

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By ARK NLE DATE 10/25/73

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Authority Guidelines for Com. Hdgr. 7/5/73

By ARK NLE DATE 10/25/73




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APPENDIX 'A'

to OP MEMO NO 1

dated 29 January, 1944

Illustrations of Beach Markings and Lights



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APPENDIX 'B'

to OP MEMO NO 1

dated 29 January 1944

HYDROGRAPHICAL MARKINGS AND DANGER SIGNALS

1. WRECKS OR OBSTRUCTIONS

a. Wrecks or obstructions will be marked:

(1) By day, by a cross plank buoy with 5 foot wooden upright painted in green and white horizontal bands (each 1 ft. in length) and carrying a green square flag. The buoy will be fitted with a mooring of 8 fathom of $1\frac{1}{2}$ " hemp.

(2) By night, by a green fixed or flashing light fixed to the upright.

b. All landing craft will be permanently fitted with one of the buoys referred to in sub-paragraph (1) above. It will be so placed that it will "watch" automatically should the craft sink.

c. Wrecked landing craft which are uncovered by the tide will be marked by lashing upright to the hull a 15 foot pole painted, flagged and lighted as in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) above. Two poles may be lashed together to obtain the requisite height, if necessary. All major landing craft will carry two spare painted 15 ft poles fitted with green square flags to be landed if required for use by the Beach Parties.

d. Shoals or obstructions located by Hydrographic Craft off the beach will be marked by these craft using the buoy described in sub-paragraph (1) above, moored with a hundred-pound sinker.

e. The buoys and marks referred to above must be given a wide berth, the craft passing to leeward (or downstream) where possible.

2. PORT HAND BUOYS

These will be a cross plank buoy with a 5 foot black wooden upright and black pennant exhibiting a white fixed or flashing light by night, moored with a $1\frac{1}{2}$ " hemp to a hundred-pound sinker.

3. STARBOARD HAND BUOYS

These will be a cross plank buoy with a 5 foot red wooden upright and red and yellow diagonal square flag, exhibiting a red fixed or flashing light by night, moored with a $1\frac{1}{2}$ " hemp to a hundred-pound sinker.

4. SURVEYING MARKS

a. Hydrographic Units may use marks, buoys and lights of any shape or colour, provided they cannot be confused in any way with the marks, buoys and lights laid down above, nor with the standard system of Beach signs and lights.

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Authority Guidelines for Com Hdqrs. 7/5/73

By ARK NLE DATE 10/25/73

b. The following day markings are strongly recommended:-

(1) Ashore.

Yellow poles marked with white and/or yellow Burgee.

(2) Afloat.

Cross plank buoy with white upright, carrying a white, yellow or blue (or any desired combination of these colours) Burgee.

c. Should it be necessary for survey work to be carried out at night it is considered that the colour and use of lights must rest with the Commander.

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
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SCAF 10th MEETING

20 MARCH 1944

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Office of AG of S, G-3



Minutes of Meeting Held in the Conference Room
(C4 - Room 8), at WIDEWING at 1100 hours, 20th March, 1944.

PRESENT

General Dwight D. Eisenhower ✓
Air Chief Marshal Sir A. Tedder
Admiral Sir B.H. Ramsay
General Sir B.L. Montgomery
Air Chief Marshal Sir T.L. Leigh-Mallory
Lt. General G.B. Smith
Lt. General F.E. Morgan
Lt. General Sir H.M. Gale
Rear Admiral J.L. Creasy
Major General H.R. Bull
Major General J.F.M. Whiteley
Air Vice Marshal H.E.P. Wigglesworth
Air Commodore S.C. Strafford
Brig. General A.S. Nevins



I. REPLY TO CABLE FROM GENERAL MARSHALL

Discussion was had on a draft cable in reply to Cable No. 314 from General Marshall to the Supreme Commander which requested General Eisenhower's views on matters bearing on the 'ANVIL' decision and also requested data on landing ships and craft for 'OVERLORD'.

The Supreme Commander approved the draft reply with certain modifications to provide for a statement of SHAEF full requirements in additional landing ships and craft based on a cancellation of 'ANVIL'.

II. DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

A draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, MEDITERRANEAN, based on the assumption that the 'ANVIL' assault is impossible of execution, was discussed.

The Supreme Commander directed that the draft directive be changed in respect to the method for assisting 'OVERLORD' to provide for maintenance of the highest possible tempo of offensive action, including the mounting of a positive threat against the SOUTH of FRANCE and the LIGURIAN coast and provision for taking immediate advantage of 'RAMM' conditions should they occur.

III. 'OVERLORD' AIR REQUIREMENTS

General Montgomery presented a paper (attached at Appendix 'A') on the subject: " 'OVERLORD': Air Requirements as viewed by the Army".

This paper was agreed by the Commanders-in-Chief and approved by the Supreme Commander.

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Authority Guidelines for Com Hqgr. 7/5/72

By ARK NLE DATE 11/5/73

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APPENDIX 'A'

'OVERLORD': Air Requirements as viewed by the Army

1. Pre-D day

Air efforts in order to:

- (a) Destroy the enemy air forces.
- (b) Destroy and disrupt communications so as to impose delay on enemy movement toward the lodgement area.
- (c) Mislead the enemy as to the real point of attack.
- (d) Attack certain targets such as coastal batteries, oil installations, etc.

2. D day

- (a) The Army must be got on shore.

Therefore the first task must be such air action as will ensure this. Direct air assistance to the assault will be vital, and must be laid on up to the extent required by the Navy and Army.

- (b) Protection of the ships against air attack - also vital.
- (c) Action as in para 1 above.



(Signed) B.L. MONTGOMERY

H.Q. 21 Army Group,
20 Mar 44.

General,
Commander-in-Chief.

Downgraded to SECRET per DoD
Dir. 5200.9, 9-27-58.

WGL 7-18-67

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IV. NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

Discussion was had regarding a draft cable, not circulated, to the War Department confirming telephonic conversation, Chief of Staff with General Handy, and explaining fully the position taken in respect to increased gunfire support for 'OVERLORD' by additional battleships and cruisers.

V. BOMBING OF ENEMY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Air Chief Marshal Tedder commented briefly on a JIC paper (JIC (44) 106 (0) Final, 18th March, 1944), which had been produced in response to a request for answers to certain questions on enemy rail requirements at the time of 'OVERLORD' pertinent to the subject of the planned air attacks on the enemy railway transportation system.

VI. INVITATION TO MEMBERS OF THE WAR CABINET

The meeting took note of the fact that it was not intended to invite members of the War Cabinet to attend the SCAEF conference on Monday, March 27th, but that the invitation extended would be for a luncheon after the regular meeting had been concluded.

VII. NEXT REGULARLY-SCHEDULED MEETING

The next regularly-scheduled Commanders-in-Chief Meeting will be held at 1100 hours on Monday, 27th March, in the Conference Room at WIDEWING.



**Correspondence from OSS Director William J. Donovan to
President Roosevelt March 9, 1944**

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9 March 1944

REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATIONS
WITH FRENCH RESISTANCE LEADER

Today I had two long talks with one of the important leaders of the French Resistance Movement. He is motivated by determination to drive German forces from French soil and is not, unlike many others, occupied with details of internal French politics. He crossed the Pyrenees the first week in February and is in Spain clandestinely en route to Algiers. The heads of the French Mission here and the French Red Cross both vouch for him. I shall refer to him as "Delphi". The following facts were brought out in conversation, principally in answer to specific questions:

Attitude of members of French Resistance Movement toward Americans:

All branches, particularly those in the Maquis, are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the British and Americans. This feeling is being replaced by growing admiration for the Russians, who are considered alone to be bearing the brunt of military operations against the German Army. There is disappointment over the lag in Italy, and Allied generalship is criticized as "No better than the French that lost the Battle of France." Delphi believes this feeling will vanish as soon as a successful invasion of France is begun from the West and that the Allied Armies will meet with support from a unified France beyond anything that was either promised or

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imaginable in 1940.

Delphi warned against additional "insulting" explanatory propaganda, which only provokes the reaction "Words, words, more words! When are they coming?" There was bitter reaction against the recent "alerte"* from London and Algiers, which was interpreted by patriots to indicate Allied military operations for approximately February 15. French patriots, particularly in the Alps and in Northern and Southern section of the Atlantic Coast area, responded at once. The German police and their Vichy-French allies were watching for such activity, and numerous resistance leaders were arrested. Many Resistance Organizations have had to be reorganized under new leaders. Delphi urged unequivocally that no further calls-to-arms be made until time is ripe for action under a carefully prepared strategic plan. He is going to Algiers and then to London to bring this matter to the attention of the proper authorities.

Needs of Resistance Groups

The essential needs now are arms accompanied by instructions for their use. Only one-fourth of the enlisted strength of the Maquis is armed. Its members are strong, fairly well-fed and adequately clothed, but need pre D-Day training in use of such small arms as will be made available to them. Earlier reports about insufficient food and clothing were dismissed by Delphi as pre-1941, before the underground had discovered how to secure

*Comment: This was not an announcement, but a call to prepare for D-Day.

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supplies from the Vichy Police, Army and Youth Organization stocks. He cited instances of raids on warehouses to obtain blankets which were made into uniforms, how Youth Organization leaders of the "Compagnon de France" turned over shoes to the Maquis; how cattle was slaughtered for food and stocks of fuel destroyed after removing that needed by the Maquis. The only real need is arms, ammunition and radios for communication.

I told Delphi that I had heard there was sentiment against arming the Resistance Movement due to acts of banditry committed by common criminals under the guise of membership in the Maquis, and that these acts had aroused antagonism of the average Frenchman against the Resistance movement. He attributed these statements to HENRIOT, Vichy Minister of Propaganda, and DARNAND, the new Police Chief, as a means of discrediting the Maquis. Delphi stated that in regions where the Maquis was dominant, it maintained law and order. He cited the punishment of individuals for clandestine slaughter of beef cattle for sale on the Black Market. He cited other instances reminiscent of the activities of the Night Riders in the South during the Reconstruction Period.

French Estimate of American Attitude, and Reaction of Different French Groups.

Delphi stated that the average intelligent Frenchman believed the American Government still had some sympathy for Vichy,

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and did not have a "violent aversion" to Vichy or even to LAVAL. Only on this basis could they explain our reticence in dealing officially with DE GAULLE. It was widely rumored in France that the United States had planned to unite all Frenchmen by persuading MARSHAL PETAIN to proceed to North Africa to set up his Government there at the time of the invasion of Algeria. Delphi said that would have been the best solution for France and that DE GAULLE would then have joined forces with the MARSHAL. However, PETAIN was either too old, too cowardly or too closely held a prisoner by his entourage and the Germans to take this one logical and patriotic step. PETAIN now has no political importance in the active sense.

Since the plan to effect an understanding between PETAIN and DE GAULLE did not succeed, it is believed in France that the State Department, with the approval of PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, is seeking a new intermediary solution between DE GAULLE and what is left of Vichy. CRAUTEMPS in America is supposed to have access to PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT and to be urging a deal with ex-leaders of the French Parliament who are still in France, such as ANATOLE DE MONTE and HERRIOT, if the latter is not too old. With these are usually grouped (in present French opinion) certain Synarchiste industrialists and bankers, particularly of the Banque d'Indo-Chine group, such as BAUDOUIN and LAURENT. These politicians, industrialists

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and bankers are supposed to be the chosen group for the transitional government of a liberated France. These rumors still persisted at the end of January.

Although I told Delphi I was convinced the facts were different from the plan he reported, he thought it would be of value to outline the reactions of various sections of French opinion to any such plan. He stated that apart from the bankers, industrialists and politicians mentioned, there exists no group in France which would accept with approval any such program.

The important political groups (other than underground) are collaborationist, and represent only 40,000 individuals. These collaborationist groups are:

1. The PPF (Partie Populaire Francaise), led by DORIOT.
2. The RNP (Rassemblement Nationale Populaire), led by DEAT.
3. The police and armed "Milice", now controlled by DARNAND with active German support.
4. The organized press, directed by JEAN LUCHAIRE.

Until September 1943 these groups struggled among themselves for privileges under German protection. The overwhelming opposition of the people and the growing power of organized resistance forced these groups to present a program in Paris to the

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Germans. This program included (1) introduction of their leaders into the Vichy Government; (2) Cleansing (epuration) of the French administration to make room for a nuclei of their supporters and (3) the arming of the "Milice" and its integration into a single, armed, repressive force.

It is believed that the Germans accepted this plan, but insisted that LAVAL be kept as an indispensable political leader. None of the leaders of these groups has had sufficient political experience to govern, even as a puppet. If LAVAL is not kept, the Germans would have to impose a Gauleiter on France, and all French collaborationism would disappear.

The first result of German acceptance was to make DARNAND head of the State Police. He was entrusted with repression of patriot activities. HENRIOT, the active spokesman of this group, was placed in charge of French propaganda and radio activities, and the "Milice" has been organized in the Northern Zone, hitherto closed to French police forces.

DARNAND was a great French patriot. He served brilliantly in both wars, as a non-com and Lieutenant in World War I (where he won every French decoration for bravery) and was one of the outstanding leaders of the Corps Francs, and in the present war. He apparently has become an opportunist upon whose vanity LAVAL and others have been able to play. Today there is no more convinced and dangerous a pro-German leader in France.

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Opposed to these collaborationist elements are the great mass of French people. The group of greatest importance is the large group of intelligent men and women, mostly professional people, between 30 and 40, who make up the intellectual elite. Prior to 1939 their interest in politics was negative; now they lead the resistance. While opposed to Synarchism on the one hand, they are equally opposed to the return of the pre-war form of parliamentary government. They favor State Socialism for all industries of national importance (railways, electrical power, insurance companies, mines, etc.) Their platform appeals to the laborer. It gives organized labor a large part in the future French State, with self-chosen representatives. The group is studying a plan for a new constitution patterned on that of the United States. They want none of the Third Republic, and laugh when reminded by the parliamentarian "has-beens" of Algiers that PRESIDENT LE BRUN is still President of France.

The major criticism Resistance Groups in France level at Algiers is that too much time is given to minor political debates among representatives of a defunct Parliament.

People inside France will believe in the French Army only when it has proven victorious in battle in continental Europe. Great disappointment has been felt over the part played by French troops in Italy. Many Resistance leaders regret this attitude

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towards the army, pointing to the equally slow progress of Anglo-American Armies in Italy. All end on the note that only the Russians have proved their military value.

The rank and file members of the resistance organizations are recruited from the peasant and worker masses.

The peasantry is anti-German but non-suffering. Their position is guided by material considerations. They have, however, proved helpful to resistance groups. (The Maquis survive due to their support.) They fear post-war political disorders and want a strong government to maintain order. They have an affectionate regard for PETAIN as a fatherly leader who has tried to save France by minor tricks and opposition tactics after the Army's collapse. This support is only sentimental.

The workers have suffered most under occupation. They oppose both Germany and Vichy. Food and necessities are lacking in the cities. Suffering is great. If internal disorder is to be avoided, food should be on hand for distribution to the working classes in the cities when the Germans are defeated. Delphi is certain that if this is not done, there will be a Communist uprising and a resultant reign of terror. The worker thinks and speaks only of the adequate food and normal living conditions the Americans alone can bring. It is important that we not fail them. Although there are few militant Communists and almost no Communist

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leaders, there is among workers and peasants a latent sympathy for Communism, in theory and as applied to the other fellow, and this is enhanced by Russian military success.

The workers want government reform with properly organized trade unions a part of the governing authority. This demand is second only to adequate wage levels. They have urged such of their number as reach safety to plead with Algiers, London and Washington for food for the cities if order is to be maintained.

A serious internal problem is German demoralization of civilians in the north and east. In Alsace the children have been taught only Nazi tenets. Girls have been encouraged to accept German advances to the point that a whole new generation of Germans is being born and it is rare to see a girl or woman over 14 who is not with child. The more determined elements of the resistance movements come from Alsace and Lorraine. They operate in central France in preparation for their return to their homeland.

Summary

France overwhelmingly wants DE GAULLE. He has promised on his return to surround himself with a truly French government representative of those who stayed in France and resisted the invader. Parliament has lost its prestige and won't regain it. The French do not want a return of the Third Republic. A French Army must land in France, and the resistance groups must be assured

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they are not being asked to risk their lives without being integrated in the general strategy of the invasion. They want concrete acts, not propaganda. The first step must be to give them arms.

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13 March 1944

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT FROM ARGUS TO REGIS ON CONVERSATION
WITH FRENCH RESISTANCE LEADER

In further conversation with Delphi, he made two further points:

One is that the reign of terror is gaining momentum. The unspeakable tortures used against members of the Resistance Groups and their families, where even women and children are subjected to the most fiendish cruelties, have provoked the anger of the French people. Savagery is re-appearing everywhere, and there is an iron determination on the part of these people to fight against their oppressors. The French "Milice" from Haute-Savoie indicates that the Germans and the "Milice" are now executing patriots without trial.

The other point of interest is the constant collaboration of the French movement known as "Compagnons de France" with the Resistance Groups. This organization, which had the blessing of Vichy, was long used as a cloak for obtaining supplies and equipment for the Resistance Movement but was abolished early in January. Its members and leaders have in many instances joined the Resistance Underground.

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British Assault Area - Naval Operation Orders May 15, 1944

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TOP SECRET

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BRITISH ASSAULT AREA

BIGOT

NAVAL OPERATION ORDERS

(Short Title: ONBA)

*009 X Short Title ONBA
X 300.4
+0451*

SGS-SHAEF File No.

6 - 5/65
7,8 G-3
9 G-4
10 AG RECORDS

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
Authority *JCS memo 1/17/73*
By *RUM* *1/10/74*

Office of Flag Officer,
British Assault Area.

The enclosed orders will be brought into force by signal when Flag Officer, British Assault Area, assumes command. They are to be referred to in signals and correspondence as "ONBA - ".

2. They will supersede previous orders for the British Assault Area, relevant extracts from which have been reprinted herein.

3. When necessary to correct these orders by signal, a general signal will be made in the "YO" (British Assault Area) Operational signal series.



J. W. RIVETT-CARNAC,

Rear-Admiral.

CONTENTS

ONBA's allocated

Section I	-	General	1 - 50
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Section VI	-	Summary of Signals	211 - 300

TOP SECRET

DIAGRAM NO 1.

TO ACCOMPANY ONBA. NOS 1. TO 4.

LONG. 00° 40' W

LAT. 49° 40' N

00° 00'

49° 40'

U.S.
NAVAL AREA

BRITISH

SEAWARD

AREA

'PIKE'

'TUNNY'

AREA

AREA

SCALLOPS
PLUS

SCALLOPS

SCALLOPS
MINUS

LE HAVRE

River Seine

BRITISH

HARBOUR

AREA

GOLD

JUNO

SWORD

PORT EN BESSIN

N.O.I.C. "G."

N.O.I.C. "J."

N.O.I.C. "S."

MERVILLE
REDOUBT

1st. U.S. ARMY



2nd. ARMY

104 sub area. 102 sub area. 101 sub area.

MULBERRY "B" AND
GOOSEBERIES 3, 4 & 5
shown in red

APPROX. SCALE : SEA MILES.

0 5 miles 10 m.



British Assault Area - Naval Operation Orders

SECTION I - GENERAL

1. LIMITS OF BRITISH ASSAULT AREA.

NORTH Lat. $49^{\circ} 40' N.$

SOUTH)
EAST) North Coast of FRANCE.

WEST Line 025° (true) from the root of Western breakwater at PORT-EN-BESSIN ($49^{\circ} 21' N.$, $00^{\circ} 45' W.$ approx.) to longitude $00^{\circ} 40' W.$, thence 000° (true). (U.S./BRITISH dividing line).

2. DIVISION OF BRITISH ASSAULT AREA (See Diag. No. 1).

Reference Points.

POINTE DE VER LIGHT		$49^{\circ} 20' N.$	$00^{\circ} 31' W.$	(approx.)
ST. AUBIN LIGHT		$49^{\circ} 20' N.$	$00^{\circ} 24' W.$	"
MERVILLE REDOUBT		$49^{\circ} 17' N.$	$00^{\circ} 13' W.$	"
CAP D'ANTIFER LIGHT		$49^{\circ} 41' N.$	$00^{\circ} 10' E.$	"

(1) Special British mined areas in the vicinity of HAVRE.

SCALLOPS The waters East of longitude $00^{\circ} 05' W.$ between latitudes $49^{\circ} 32' N.$ and $49^{\circ} 26' N.$

SCALLOPS PLUS The waters North of SCALLOPS and East of a line drawn from position $49^{\circ} 32' N.$ $00^{\circ} 05' W.$ in a direction 047° (true) to CAP D'ANTIFER LIGHT.

SCALLOPS MINUS The waters South of SCALLOPS and East of a line drawn from position $49^{\circ} 26' N.$ $00^{\circ} 05' W.$ in direction 145° (true) to the Coast.

(These areas are identical with those formerly established by N.C.E.T.F.'s BAADO. No. 1).

(2) BRITISH HARBOUR AREA - Waters within the following limits.

NORTH and	A line drawn from position 318° POINTE
EAST	DE VER Light 9.5 (on the U.S./British dividing line) in a direction 095° to position 000° ST. AUBIN Light 6'.5 thence 110° to position 000° MERVILLE REDOUBT 7'.0, thence 180° to MERVILLE REDOUBT.

/SOUTH

British Assault Area - Naval Operation Orders

SECTION I - GENERAL (Continued)

2. DIVISION OF BRITISH ASSAULT AREA (See Diag. No. 1) (Continued).

SOUTH The North Coast of FRANCE.

WEST The U.S./British dividing line.

(The limits of this area are identical with those containing the areas GOLD, JUNO and SWORD previously established by N.C.E.T.F.'s BAADO No. 1).

(3) Seaward Areas.

PIKE Boundaries:-

North 49° 40' N.

South Northern boundary of harbour area.

East Longitude of ST. AUBIN Light.

West U.S./British dividing lines.

TUNNY Boundaries:-

North 49° 40' N.

South Coast of FRANCE.

East SCALLOPS areas.

West PIKE and "Harbour" Areas.

TUNNY NORTH) dividing line Lat. 49° 32' N.
TUNNY SOUTH)

(These areas are identical with those formerly established by N.C.E.T.F.'s B.A.A.D.O. No. 1.)

3. SUB-DIVISION OF BRITISH "HARBOUR AREA" (See Diag. NO. 1)

(a) 3 Sub areas.

Dividing Line

GOLD (West) 000° (true) from POINTE DE VER LT.
JUNO (Centre) 000° (true) from ST. AUBIN LT.
SWORD (East)

(b) Inner and Outer Anchorages.

Further sub-dividing each Sub area. Inner anchorage will extend about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles off shore as laid down by signal to suit the circumstances found to obtain (See ONBA No. 5, para. 7).

/ (c) GOLD

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Page 3(a)
15.5.44.

British Assault Area - Naval Operation Orders

SECTION I - GENERAL (continued)

3. SUB-DIVISION OF BRITISH "HARBOUR AREA" (See Diag.No.1) (continued).

- (c) GOLD Sub area inner anchorages will be further sub-divided as follows :-

PORT EN BESSIN

sub area inner anchorage

..... 000° (true) from Semaphore
Tower, position
(49°20.9'N. 00°42.8'W.)

MULBERRY "B"

sub area inner anchorage

..... 000° (true) from
49°20.6'N. 00°34.9'W.

GOLD AREA

sub area inner anchorage

/4. ESTABLISHED BERTHS ...

British Assault Area - Naval Operation Orders

SECTION I - GENERAL (Continued)

4. ESTABLISHED BERTHS - SYSTEM OF INDICATING POSITIONS, LINES OR AREAS WITHIN THE "HARBOUR" AREA. (See Diag. No. 1).

- (1) Reference point:- ST. AUBIN Light House ($49^{\circ} 20' N.$, $00^{\circ} 24' W.$ approx.)

Lines:-

A -- Northern boundary of Harbour area.

B to - Lines parallel to A, 5 cables apart
P as follows:-

(incl.)

Line B	through position	000°	(true)	ST. AUBIN LT.	6.0'
" C	"	"	"	"	5.5'
" D	"	"	"	"	5.0'
" E	"	"	"	"	4.5'
" F	"	"	"	"	4.0'
" G	"	"	"	"	3.5'
" H	"	"	"	"	3.0'
" J	"	"	"	"	2.5'
" K	"	"	"	"	2.0'
" L	"	"	"	"	1.5'
" M	"	"	"	"	1.0'
" N	"	"	"	"	0.5'

" P through the chartered position of ST. AUBIN Lighthouse.

(2) Berths.

Are established 3 cables apart along each line and numbered consecutively from East to West with No. 1 on the Eastern boundary of the "Harbour area".

(3) Describing Berths or Positions.

Berth or position should be indicated by the letter of the line followed by the number of the berth in that line, e.g. C.24. Also E 44.5 (written) or E.44 FI 5 (hoisted) (indicating berth mid-way between E 44 and E 45).

More accurate positions may be given with reference to a berth, thus, 045° 1.7 cables from C 24.

(4) Small areas within the Harbour area should be indicated by the above system, e.g. Area F 41, F 43, G 43, J 40.

Memo on conditions in Normandy, June 3, 1944

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3 June, 1944

Memorandum:



1. Subjects:

- a. Proper coordination with the French.
- b. Weather.
- c. Beach and undersea obstacles.
- d. Future success of the air in breaking up effectiveness of hostile ground units.
- e. Future organization.

2. The matter of coordination with the French has been highly complicated because of lack of crystallization in ideas involving both the political and military fields. Specifically, the President desires that coordination be effected with the French on the basis of dealing with any group or groups that can effectively fight the Germans. His Directive apparently recognizes the influence of the National Committee of Liberation in France but he is unwilling to promise any exclusive dealing with the group since that, he apparently believes, would be tantamount to recognizing the Committee as a provisional government of France, set up from the outside.

We have our direct means of communication with the Resistance Groups of France but all our information leads us to believe that the only authority these Resistance Groups desire to recognize is that of DeGaulle and his Committee. However, since DeGaulle is apparently willing to cooperate only on the basis of our dealing with him exclusively, the whole thing falls into a rather sorry mess. DeGaulle is, of course, now controlling the only French military forces than can take part in this operation. Consequently, from the purely military viewpoint we must, at least until the time that other French forces might conceivably be organized completely independent of his movement, deal with him alone. He, however, takes the attitude that military and political matters go hand in hand and will not cooperate militarily unless political recognition of some kind is accorded him. We do not seem to be able, in advance of D-day, to straighten the matter at all. I have just learned that DeGaulle has failed to accept the Prime Minister's invitation to come to England, saying that he would make his decision this afternoon.

The rapid sorting out of all the conflicting ideas is quite necessary if we are to secure the maximum help from the French both inside and outside the country.

3. The weather in this country is practically unpredictable. For some days our experts have been meeting almost hourly and I have been holding Commander-in-Chief meetings once or twice a day to consider the reports and tentative predictions. While at this moment, the morning of June 3rd, it appears that the weather will not be so bad as to

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preclude landings and will possibly even permit reasonably effective gunfire support from the Navy, the picture from the air viewpoint is not so good.

Probably no one that does not have to bear the specific and direct responsibility of making the final decision as to what to do, can understand the intensity of these burdens. The Supreme Commander, much more than any of his subordinates, is kept informed of the political issues involved, particularly the anticipated effect of delay upon the Russians. He likewise is in close touch with all the advice from his military subordinates and must face the issue even when technical advice as to weather is not unanimous from the several experts. Success or failure might easily hinge upon the effectiveness, for example, of airborne operations. If the weather is suitable for everything else, but unsuitable for airborne operations, the question becomes whether to risk the airborne movement anyway or to defer the whole affair in the hopes of getting weather that is a bit better.

My tentative thought is that the desirability for getting started on the next favorable tide is so great and the uncertainty of the weather is such that we could never anticipate really perfect weather coincident with proper tidal conditions, that we must go unless there is a real and very serious deterioration in the weather.

4. Since last February the enemy has been consistently busy in placing obstacles of various types on all European beaches suitable for landing operations. Most of these are also mined. Under ordinary circumstances of land attack these would not be particularly serious but because they must be handled quickly and effectively before the major portion of our troops can begin unloading, they present a hazard that is a very considerable one. It is because of their existence that we must land earlier on the tide than we had originally intended. This gives us a chance to go after them while they are still on dry land because if their bases were under water they would be practically impossible to handle. If our gun support of the operation and the DD tanks during this period are both highly effective, we should be all right.

The under-water obstacles, that is, the sea mines, force us to sweep every foot of water over which we operate and this adds immeasurably to the difficulties in restricted waters in which we are operating. The combination of under-sea and beach obstacles is serious but we believe we have it whipped.

5. Because the enemy in great strength is occupying a country that is interlaced with fine communication system, our attack can be looked upon as reasonable only if our tremendous air force is able to impede his concentrations against us and to help destroy the effectiveness of any of his counter attacks. Weather again comes into this problem, because it is my own belief that with reasonably good weather during the first two or three weeks of the operation, our air superiority and domination will see us through to success.

6. Lately we have been studying earnestly the question of future organization, assuming that we have established a beachhead so firmly that we

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no longer need fear being kicked into the sea. All British land forces will quickly be in and I personally doubt that the British will be able to maintain more than fifteen or sixteen Divisions in active warfare in this theater. This means that the bulk of the land forces must come from the United States. Logically, also, there should come about eventually the desirability of undertaking offensive operations in fairly distinct zones of advance, with each of the ground groupments supported by its own distinct air force at least so far as fighter and fighter bombers are concerned. When this comes about every factor of simplicity in organization, national pride, efficiency in administration, etc., indicates the further desirability of having two principal ground commanders, one operating to the Northeast, one to the East. (I believe, however, that the British formation will probably have to be reinforced by an American Army or at least a Corps.) Pending this particular development it will still be necessary to begin the establishment in Europe of an American Army Group Headquarters. I plan to have Bradley command this new headquarters during the transition period, that is, until we are completely established and ready to undertake operations in distinct zones of advance. He will operate during the transition period under Montgomery. Finally, Bradley and Montgomery will each report directly to me.

At that time a certain portion of the so-called "tactical" air force, that is, medium bombers and possibly some of the long range fighters, will remain under the C-in-C, A.E.F. This portion of the tactical air force will be available to assist either Army Group.

I have already issued a tentative Directive to plan for future organization of ground and air forces along the lines indicated in this paragraph.



- 3 -
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Report of the Eighth Air Force Normandy Invasion
June 2 - 17, 1944

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OO
AF
8-AF
TO

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S0004128

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

IN SUPPORT OF

ALLIED LANDINGS IN NORMANDY

2ND JUNE - 17 TH JUNE

1944

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) of (C)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By Rwm NARS Date 1/22/74

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S E C R E T



DAILY OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

for period

2 June - 17 June

S E C R E T

SECRET



2 JUNE OPERATION

(D minus 3 at time of operation; became D minus 4 when D-Day was postponed.)

Operation No. 384

First Mission

Field Order 709

1. DECISION: Operations on this day were specified for D minus 3 by the Overall Air Plan as modified by Headquarters A.E.A.F. All objectives were located in the Pas de Calais (Fortitude) area, the attacks having as their purpose deception of the enemy as to the actual assault area. (Cover Plan.) It was provided that in these operations immediately preceding D-Day only one-half of the available heavy bombers were to be employed in order to conserve the force for an all-out assault in direct support of the troop landings.

2. PLANNING.

a. The weather forecast for the Pas de Calais area indicated 8/10-10/10 stratocumulus with bases 800-1500 feet and tops 7000-9000 feet.

b. In view of predicted cloud conditions, plans were made to employ through the overcast bombing technique in this operation which would utilize approximately one-half of the available heavy bombers. The following allocation of targets among the three Bomb Divisions was made, the nature and size of the objective determining the strength of the attacking force:

Chart Ref. No.	Target	Force Assigned
-------------------	--------	-------------------

Force I - 3rd Bomb Division (Tactical Unit - Group of 18 B-17's with 1 H2X Pathfinder)

*1. Boulogne Area	Medium Battery	3 Groups
*3. Equihen Area	Medium Battery	3 Groups
*4. Boulogne Area	Medium Coastal Battery	3 Groups
16. Wimereux Area	Field Battery	3 Groups
17. Wimereux Area	Heavy Coastal Battery	3 Groups

Force II - 1st Bomb Division (Tactical Unit - Group of 18 B-17's with 1 H2X Pathfinder)

*1. Boulogne Area	Medium Battery	2 Groups
2. Neufchatel Area	Medium Battery	2 Groups
*3. Equihen Area	Medium Battery	2 Groups
*4. Boulogne Area	Medium Coastal Battery	2 Groups
5. Hardelot Area	Medium Coastal Battery	2 Groups
6. Dannes Area	Defended Locality	2 Groups
7. St. Cecily Area	Medium Coastal Battery	3 Groups

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Chart
Ref. No.

Target

Force
Assigned

Force III - 2nd Bomb Division
(Tactical Unit - Squadron of 12 B-24's with 1 H2X Pathfinder)

8. St. Aubin Area	Medium Coastal Battery	3 Squadrons
9. Stella Plage Area	Medium Coastal Battery	2 Squadrons
10. Berck sur Mer Area	Field Battery	3 Squadrons
11. Berck sur Mer Area	Medium Coastal Battery	3 Squadrons
12. Berck sur Mer Area	Radar Installation	2 Squadrons
13. Berck sur Mer Area	Light Coastal Battery	2 Squadrons
14. Berck sur Mer Area	Defended Locality	1 Squadron
15. Stella Plage Area	Defended Locality	2 Squadrons
18. Beauvoir Crossbow Installation (Dump)		6 Squadrons

* Units from more than one Force assigned to these targets.

H2X Pathfinder aircraft utilizing GEE fixes for navigation were to be used for target location except in the case of the units attacking the Crossbow installation at Beauvoir. GH bombing equipment was to be used in this instance.

c. The general plan for routing of the bomber forces followed a pattern similar to that employed on previous large scale Crossbow operations, the problem being to avoid interference among the large number of units attacking 18 different targets located within a relatively small area and at the same time concentrate the attacks so that a minimum of anti-aircraft fire could be brought to bear against the bombers as a whole. Penetration and withdrawal corridors were assigned to each force as well as specified periods of attack which were 1200-1210 hours for Force I, 1220-1230 hours for Force II, and 1240-1250 hours for Force III. As a further measure to improve maneuverability, it was specified that each force would fly as three formations of equal size. The units of Force III assigned to the Crossbow Installation at Beauvoir were not included in the aforementioned plan of attack. The six Squadrons detailed to this target were to be divided into two waves, the first to attack at 1310, the second at 1335. These timings were set to avoid interference with bombers returning from their attacks on the coastal installations and the interval between the waves was to permit the GH ground station to change transmitter settings for the Aiming Point of the later wave. The routing to this target afforded the long, straight approach required by the GH equipment and due consideration was given to avoidance of the strongest anti-aircraft defenses on both the penetration and withdrawal.

d. In determining the strength and disposition of the fighter support, it was considered unlikely that enemy aircraft would react to a very limited penetration of the coastal area. Accordingly, area support by three P-47 Groups and one P-38 Group was deemed adequate for the bombers operating along the Pas de Calais. For the units assigned to Beauvoir, which would make a somewhat deeper penetration, one P-51 Group was assigned as close escort. In addition, one P-47 Group and two P-51 Groups were designated to patrol the Tournai, Compiègne and Evreux areas under Ground (type 16) control for the purpose of intercepting enemy aircraft which might be assembling as a precautionary measure against a possible deep penetration by the heavy bombers.

S E C R E T

3. EXECUTION.

a. Eight hundred and sixty-two heavy bombers were dispatched in the three forces participating in this operation. Despite the presence of some cloud layers at assembly levels, units formed without difficulty and flew their missions essentially as planned.

b. Bombing through 10/10 cloud was accomplished on H2X Pathfinders supplemented by GEE fixes except in the case of the units directed against Beauvoir which utilized GH Pathfinders. Three units of the Force I were unable to attack due to failure of Pathfinder equipment and two Squadrons of the Force III attacked assigned targets of other units when their respective lead Pathfinder became inoperative. A total of 776 bombers dropped 2322 tons, all except 23 aircraft dropping on assigned targets. Strike photographs were unrevealing but subsequent reconnaissance cover was obtained. Bombing results are summarized as follows:

Force I - 3rd Bomb Division

<u>Chart</u> <u>Ref.No.</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>A/C Disp.</u> <u>Includes</u>	<u>A/C Att.</u> <u>() PFF</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>Bombs Dropped</u>	<u>Results</u>
*1.	Boulogne	58 (5)	38 (3)	438x500 HE	Nil
16.	Wimereux	56 (3)	18 (1)	210x500	Good
*3.	Equihen	58 (3)	56 (3)	651x500	Nil
*4.	Boulogne	54 (3)	52 (3)	600x500	Nil
17.	Wimereux	57 (3)	54 (3)	625x500	Nil
		283 (17)	218 (13)	2524x500	

Force II - 1st Bomb Division

*1.	Boulogne	38 (2)	38 (2)	444x500	Nil
*3.	Equihen	37 (2)	35 (2)	372x500	Nil
*4.	Boulogne	37 (2)	37 (2)	394x500	Nil
5.	Hardelot	38 (2)	37 (2)	406x500	Nil
2.	Neufchatel	43 (2)	42 (2)	500x500	Nil
6.	Dannes	38 (2)	38 (2)	415x500	Nil
7.	St. Cecily	55 (3)	52 (3)	610x500	Nil
		286 (15)	279 (15)	3141x500	

Force III - 2nd Bomb Division

9.	Stella Plage	24 (2)	23 (2)	4x1000 84x2000	Fair
15.	Stella Plage	24 (2)	24 (2)	4x1000 88x2000	Nil
12.	Berck sur Mer Other Targets	24 (1)	23 (0)	92x2000	Nil
13.	Berck sur Mer	24 (2)	24 (2)	275x500	Nil
14.	Berck sur Mer	12 (1)	12 (1)	138x500	Nil



Chart Ref. No.	Target	A/C Disp. Includes	A/C Att. () PFF	Total Bombs Dropped	Results
11.	Bereck sur Mer	37 (3)	36 (3)	402x500	Good
10.	Bereck sur Mer	37 (3)	36 (3)	26x1000 113x2000	Nil
8.	St. Aubin	39 (3)	38 (3)	6x1000 137x2000	Nil
18.	Beauvoir	71 (6) 293 (23)	63 (5) 279 (21)	744x500 40x1000 514x2000 1559x500	Fair
Total		862 (55)	776 (49)	7224x500 40x1000 514x2000	

*Units from more than one Force assigned to these targets.

Although it is indicated that only four of the specific targets were affected by the bombing, there is evidence of damage to other installations in this heavily fortified area.

c. Fighter support was provided by 365 aircraft, 175 P-47's, 46 P-38's, 144 P-51's from the eight assigned Groups. As planned, one P-38 Group and three P-47 Groups afforded area cover, one P-51 Group gave close escort to the units assigned to Beauvoir and one P-47 and two P-51 Groups operated under Ground (type 16) control.

d. Enemy opposition was confined solely to anti-aircraft fire which varied from meager to moderate and was generally ineffective.

e. All bombers and fighters returned from this operation. Eleven of the former and one of the latter sustained battle damage, all due to anti-aircraft fire.

S E C R E T

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

First Mission

2 June 1944

	Force I (3rd B.D.) B-17's	Force II (1st B.D.) B-17's	Force III (2nd B.D.)	Mission Totals
<u>HEAVY BOMBERS</u>				
A/C Airborne	283	286	293	862
A/C Sorties	273	283	284	840
A/C Executing Assignments	218	279	279	776
Bombs Dropped (Tons)	631	785.25	923.75	2340
A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Category "E"	0	0	0	0
A/C Battle Damaged	11	0	0	11
Claims Against E/A	0	0	0	0
<u>FIGHTERS</u>	<u>P-47</u>	<u>P-38</u>	<u>P-51</u>	<u>Mission Totals</u>
A/C Airborne	175	46	144	365
A/C Sorties	171	43	139	353
A/C Executing Assignments	166	40	133	339
A/C Lost	0	0	0	0
Category "E"	0	0	0	0
A/C Battle Damaged	1	0	0	1
Claims Against E/A	0	0	0	0

S E C R E T

**Report of the Amphibious Operations Invasion of Northern France
Western Task Force United States Fleet June 1944**

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AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

INVASION OF NORTHERN FRANCE

WESTERN TASK FORCE

JUNE 1944

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By Beatrice E. Aronson, for RL

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RLM NASS Date 1/10/74

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UNITED STATES FLEET

Headquarters of the Commander In Chief

CHAPTER IV

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT - OMAHA BEACH

From: Commander Assault Force "C", (Commander Eleventh Amphibious Force).

Enemy Defenses and Opposition Including Beach Obstacles.

The terrain in the area where Force "C" landed was of great natural defensive strength, augmented by the addition of many strongly protected and cleverly concealed gun emplacements, machine gun nests, and pill boxes. Slit trenches were dug for defending riflemen, and tank traps and anti-tank ditches intervened between beaches and road exits. In addition, there had been installed in the tidal area, between high and low water, several rows of underwater obstacles consisting of hedgehogs, tetrahedron, Element "C", and pole ramps all inter-connected by barbed wire and thickly sown with mines. The obstacles actually encountered were much more numerous than Intelligence reports had indicated. The artillery and machine guns were generally sited for enfilading fire along the beaches. In some cases they were completely concealed from a direct view from seaward by concrete walls covered with earth which extended well beyond the muzzle of the gun. This acted as a blast screen and prevented them from being located by the dust raised near their muzzles, so that when used with flashless, smokeless powder and without tracer bullets, as they were in defense of OMAHA Beaches, they were exceedingly difficult to detect. These walls, of course, restricted the arc of train of the pieces, but apparently the defenders had accepted this in order to obtain concealment. As a result of this arrangement of gun positions nearly all of the defensive fire was delivered on the beaches themselves or on craft within some two thousand yards of the beach. Several officers noted the fact that craft inshore might be under heavy fire, but those further out were comparatively free from molestation and scarcely a shot fell more than four thousand yards from the beach. The presence of construction materials and more barbed wire indicated that improvement in the defenses was in progress. From prisoners captured it appeared that there were four regiments either actually manning these defenses or taking part in the defense of the beach area. One of them was a coastal defense regiment of the type rated only fair in combat efficiency. The other three, however, belonged to the 362nd Field Division of the German Army, and such troops are generally rated among the best in the world.

To overcome these defenses, plans had been made to destroy or neutralize as many of the guns, machine guns, etc., as possible, by preliminary Naval gunfire and air bombardment, to breach the underwater obstacles under cover of an assault by a single wave of infantry and tanks, and to storm the remaining defenses with succeeding waves of infantry supported by Naval gunfire, the plan included landing light artillery as soon as beach conditions permitted. Circumstances conspired to defeat or nullify the effectiveness of most of these plans. The air bombardment of the beaches was not delivered presumably because of

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OMAHA BEACH - D-DAY MORNING OF JUNE

the low cloud ceiling over the beach area just before H hour. Sea conditions caused the loss of a considerable portion of the tanks and many of those that did manage to reach the beach were soon knocked out by enemy artillery and mines. The obstacles were more numerous than had been anticipated and casualties from enemy fire were heavy - so that the demolition parties, despite a gallant effort, failed to breach the obstacles as planned. All of these reduced the assault to the most elementary form of amphibious attack; Infantry landing and attacking supported by Naval gunfire. A Deputy Assault Group Commander in his report of the operation attributed the success of the landing to three factors - the gallantry of the crews of the landing craft who took the Army personnel into the beach, the stark courage of the soldiers who worked their way shoreward through obstacles and enemy fire from artillery, mortars, machine guns, and rifles, and to the support provided by the Naval gunfire. These are the fundamental factors which will always determine whether the assault succeeds or fails against strong resistance. All the rest are "trimmings", schemes of one sort or another to make it easier for the attacking rifleman, but in the last analysis, it is he and the floating batteries supporting him who win or lose the battle.

When it first became apparent that obstacles in appreciable numbers were appearing on the OMAHA Beaches, special plans for breaching them were devised jointly by the V Corps and the Eleventh Amphibious Force and submitted to CTF-122, and the 1st U.S. Army, respectively. It was not until the latter part of April, however, nearly a month later, that approval of these plans was obtained, and troops made available for the special training necessary to their execution. Briefly the plan called for demolition teams consisting of both Army and Naval personnel landing immediately after a wave of tanks and a wave of infantry, and opening gaps through the obstacles using demolition charges and tank-dozers. The time of landing was calculated so that theoretically the demolition parties would have a minimum of twenty minutes before the rising tide reached the bases of the seaward band of obstacles; all of which were believed to be uncovered at low tide. This was decided because it was believed to be impossible to remove obstacles actually underwater in any quantity within the probable time available in an assault; this without even taking into consideration the interference from enemy fire. The Force Commander would have preferred to land at low tide or even one hour before low tide in order to have allowed the demolition parties more time to deal with the obstacles and to afford some leeway in the event that landing was delayed. Unfortunately, in this respect the requirements on the OMAHA Beaches conflicted with those on the British Force "J" Beach where it was believed necessary to have a minimum of nine or ten feet above the low water mark in order to permit the landing craft to pass over rocks offshore. To allow each Force to have attacked at its most favorable state of the tide would have meant widely staggering the time of H hour, and might possibly have required major changes in

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the plan because of the minesweeper problem and the limited period of darkness at this time of year. Therefore, a limit was placed upon the difference between the earliest and latest time of landing of the several assault forces and the time chosen for Force "O" was the earliest permitted. Whether or not the demolition parties could have breached the obstacles as planned had the landing been made at or before low water instead of on a rising tide is problematical. As it was the Naval demolition parties suffered forty-one per cent casualties, and it is understood that the Army demolition party casualties were about the same. Had they worked for a longer period exposed to enemy fire, it is possible that they might have been virtually annihilated, - - - - -

From: Naval Commander Western Task Force
(Commander Task Force 122).

H-Hour.

It is believed that an H-Hour earlier in reference to the tidal conditions would have been preferable, particularly for OMAHA Beach. On both of the American beaches the conditions at H-Hour were satisfactory for landing from low water on, as regards the quality of the beach itself; but in the British Sector there were a couple of beaches with rocks and ledges offshore which made a landing prior to about half-tide undesirable.

The military authorities did not consider it desirable that the time for landing should vary more than an hour between the American and British sectors. This dictated an H-Hour for OMAHA and UTAH Beaches which it was estimated would allow about thirty to forty minutes of dry landing on the beach before the water reached the first row of obstacles.

One of the reasons against an H-Hour longer after daylight was that the amount of remaining daylight would not then permit, on D-Day, a second high water period available for unloading. It is not believed that this reason is of great importance and certainly not sufficient to alter the desirability of greater time for working on the beach obstacles.

While the Naval Commander, Western Task Force, cannot pass upon the importance of the Army requirement for not over one hour difference between H-Hour on the various beaches, it appears desirable to point out that for a landing conducted with a large tidal range and with considerable obstacles on the beach, it would be most desirable to have the H-Hour provide as much time as can be made available to work on the obstacles and to clear the beach before the small landing craft, such as LCTs and LCIs, come in to land.

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It is still my opinion, first formulated in the Sicily Operation, that broad daylight is the time to land, where our own naval and air superiority is preponderant. In the Normandy Operation our greatest factors of strength were our naval guns and our air force. Each of these offensive components is at its best in broad daylight, when precision in its use can best be obtained. In half-light, neither is fully effective; and for both a longer time-period in which to function in good visibility will increase materially the advantages to be gained.

When we are not in overwhelming strength on the sea and in the air, then landing in darkness is preferred.


From: Commander Assault Force "O".

The order of landing of the first four waves on all beaches was - DD tanks between H - 10 and H - 5 minutes; LCT(A)s carrying tanks and tank dozers for obstacle clearance at H hour; a wave of infantry at H + 1 minute; and demolition parties at H + 3 minutes. DD tanks were to be launched from the LCTs in which they were embarked approximately six thousand yards off shore unless weather conditions prohibited, and were to proceed in to their assigned beaches from that point under their own power. The decision whether to launch at 6000 yards or to close the beaches was left to the senior Army tank officer and senior Naval officer in the LCTs of the two assault groups. Those on the left flank in Assault Group O-1, preceding the 16th RCT, were launched as planned. The sea conditions, however, were such that all but two or three of them foundered before they reached the shore. The responsible officers on the right gauged the sea conditions more accurately and took their LCTs in to a point where the DD tanks grounded as soon as they were launched. Therefore, all the DD tanks preceding the assault troops of the 116th RCT reached the shore. Information is not available as to the exact time of landing or the order of landing waves on all of the beaches. The first landings on EASY RED and DOG GREEN were made at 0635 and it is believed that the leading waves landed on the other beaches at approximately the same time. Due to the state of the sea, the loss of the DD tanks, the absence of five (5) LCT(A)s and damage to others by enemy gunfire, the order of landing was somewhat mixed. Simultaneously with the landing and cessation of the naval gunfire bombardment, the enemy commenced firing. This fire from artillery, mortars, machine guns, and small arms was heavy and accurate, and casualties were numerous. Many of the tanks which had reached the shore line were knocked out, and losses to the infantry advancing shoreward through the obstacles, and to the demolition parties trying to clear lanes through them, were severe. A considerable portion of the equipment of the demolition parties was lost in the landing due to the surf. The limited time for working on the obstacles before they were covered by the rapidly rising tide and the devastating effect of the defensive fire further reduced the effectiveness of the demolition parties. Only five gaps were cleared all the



OMAHA BEACH

LCT Heading for the Beach.



NORTH LIMIT OF ORIGINAL UTAH BEACH

Element "C", Hedgehogs, Stakes.

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT - OMAHA BEACH

way into the beach, and three part way in, instead of the sixteen planned. Most of these were inadequately marked. The result was that during the high tide immediately following the assault the only opening through the obstacles that was in use for a considerable period was one lane on EASY RED Beach.

At the request of the Commanding General, V Corps, the Commander Assault Group O-2 was directed at H hour to land troops of the 115th RCT at H + 4 hours. Thus, all the Landing Force embarked in Force "O" were committed from the beginning of the assault. After the initial waves, landing continued throughout the forenoon and afternoon of D day. Due to the failure of the demolition parties to clear and mark gaps through the underwater obstacles, and to the heavy enemy fire, great difficulty was experienced in getting anyone or anything ashore. Some craft carrying infantry and elements of the Shore Party managed to land their personnel, but the bulk of the craft proceeding shoreward were stopped between the seaward row of obstacles and the line of departure. With the strong tide, fresh wind, and choppy sea, this soon resulted in a mass of craft in which all semblance of wave organization was lost until the Deputy Assault Group Commanders arrived on the scene, took charge of the situation, moved the craft to seaward to give them more room and reformed the waves as best they could. In the meanwhile, most of the tanks which had reached the shore had been knocked out by enemy artillery fire or by mines, or were caught in the obstacles and flooded by the rising tide, and the personnel, both the assault troops and the Shore Party, were pinned down on the beaches just above high water by enemy fire; few, if any, troops actually crossed the beach during the early hours of the forenoon. The supporting destroyers and gunfire support craft stood in as close to the beach as the depth of the water would allow and engaged all the defensive installations which they could locate. Despite this, however, little progress had been made prior to 1100 when there was still considerable machine gun fire, sniping, artillery, and mortar fire on the beaches between the exits, and opposite the exits the condition was critical. A number of enemy strongpoints in the beach were still holding out and our troops were not able to move inland. The first encouraging news came at 1100 from a message to Commander Transport Division THREE, intercepted by the Force Commander to the effect that German defenders were leaving their posts and surrendering to U.S. troops. Shortly after that another message from a member of the V Corps Staff embarked in a DUKW near the shore line stated that the troops were advancing up the western slope of the exit from Sector EASY. By 1300, COLLEVILLE was taken, and by 1330, a general advance began up slopes of EASY RED and FOX GREEN Beaches. By 1340 the beaches of Sectors EASY and DOG were clear of opposition except for artillery and mortar fire. At 1400, the Commanding Officer of the Engineer Special Brigade Group left the ANCON to set up headquarters on the beach.



OMAHA BEACH

Mortar shell explodes at the bow of LCT which has just unloaded its last tank.

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT - OMAHA BEACH

Early in the forenoon, reports had been received from the mine-sweepers stating that the sweep of the Transport Area and the channels for the Bombardment Group from the Transport Area to the 10-fathom curve had been completed with negative results. Because of this, the Force Commander felt that the transports could close the beaches if necessary. However, in view of their prospective early departure from the Assault Area, it was decided that the delay caused by the movement of the ships would result in a net loss rather than a gain, and they were left in the Transport Area until they completed unloading and departed.

Landing of personnel and vehicles from transports and LSTs continued throughout the afternoon of D day. During this time, the beaches were subject to enemy artillery and mortar fire which, while neither heavy nor sustained, was deadly accurate. The fire was obviously observed, because enemy batteries would be silent until craft beached, when there would be a few quick salvos, usually right on the target. This artillery fire caused considerable loss, and was doubly disturbing because neither enemy observers nor batteries could be located. In fact repeated requests for U.S. vessels to cease firing on the beaches were made by personnel ashore and observers to seaward, who thought that it was our own ships firing into our own troops. Actually no U. S. ships were firing at the times the requests were made, and when they did fire, they were firing at targets inland rather than on the beach. About 1430, Commander Force "B" with Convoy B-2, consisting principally of LCI(L)s and HMS OCEANWAY, stood into the Assault Area. Anchorages close to the beaches were assigned to this convoy and Commander Force "B" was directed to land the troops embarked in accordance with plan, using LCVPs as necessary to unload LCI(L)s. At the same time the Deputy Commanders of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3 were ordered to provide small landing craft to assist in landing of Force "B". Meanwhile the LSI(S)s and LSI(H)s which had carried the Ranger Battalions were sailed to the ISLE OF WIGHT, and information was received that the transports of Assault Groups O-1, O-2, and O-3 would complete unloading and be ready to sail by 1700. They sailed about 1800. By 1530, advance elements of the First Division and Twenty-ninth Division Staffs were setting up command posts ashore near the beach exits from Sectors EASY and DOG respectively, and ST. LAURENT was partially occupied in addition to the capture of COLLEVILLE. At 1540, the OCEANWAY was directed to close FOX GREEN Beach and discharge her twenty (20) LCMs carrying M-4 tanks, these tanks to be attached to the 16th RCT. This was completed by 1715. Convoy Group O-3 and B-1 arrived together about 1600. Although information as to the actual loss of landing craft was meager at this time, indications were that a considerable number were sunk or badly damaged, and at 1700, the Force Commander requested the Commander Service Force to sail ARL-4 to the OMAHA Assault Area as soon as practicable. At 1715, the Commanding General, First Division and his Staff left the ANCON to establish their headquarters on the beach.



Soldier crawling ashore on OMAHA under enemy fire, H-Hour.



Soldiers finding cover from enemy fire behind beach obstacles.



Assault infantry going ashore past stranded DD tanks, H-Hour.



Gusset plates on hedgehogs furnish cover from enemy fire.

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By 1730, except for sniping and the recurring artillery and mortar fire, hostile action against the beach area had ceased and the work of organizing the beaches for further unloading was progressing in orderly fashion.

In accordance with the request of the Commanding General, First Division, the 26th RCT was landed in the early evening. All Rifle Companies of the regiment were ashore by 2100. Between 2320 and 2340 the air attack which had been anticipated all day was finally delivered. There were no radar warnings of the approach of the hostile planes and the first information of the impending attack was the sight and sound of an enemy plane which passed over the flagship at low altitude. Only a few more planes came over, however, of which three were shot down. Several bombs were dropped in the Transport Area but caused no damage. This ended D day.

At 0045 D + 1, the Commanding General, V Corps, informed the Force Commander that his line was generally along the road from VIERVILLE through ST. LAURENT to about one mile south of COLLEVILLE, and that he intended to attack with the beachhead line as his objective. About 0235, in accordance with a request from the Officer in Command of the Combat Demolition Units, Commander Service Force was requested by dispatch to send additional explosives and demolition equipment for the NCDUs from the United Kingdom by the quickest available means. The response to this request was prompt and efficient. The material was assembled and loaded on a PT which arrived in the Assault Area about 0900 the following day. At 0550, in accordance with the request of the Commanding General, V Corps, Commander Force "B" was directed to land the 175th Infantry on Beach DOG GREEN. This was the last infantry regiment of the First and Twenty-ninth Divisions to be landed, and constituted the Corps Reserve. There was some delay in the execution of this order and the troops did not actually commence to land until between 1000 and 1100. Convoy Group O-4 stood in on the morning watch about twelve hours late. Convoy B-3 and the first of the build-up personnel convoys consisting of the transports SUSAN B. ANTHONY, GOETHALS, BORINQUEN, and SIMONDS, likewise arrived. Just to seaward of the Assault Area the SUSAN B. ANTHONY struck a mine and eventually sank about 0950. All of the personnel aboard were taken off before she went down. During the forenoon, surveys for the establishment of (the artificial harbor) were commenced. A report from the Commanding General First Army as of 1000 this date stated that the Landing Force was moving forward and now held a line through ST. HONORINE DES PERTES, GOOS LE HAMEL, LOUBIERES and GRUCHY. Unloading of the remaining LSTs and LCT(4)s of Force "O" and Force "B" and of the transports of the build-up convoy continued through the afternoon and evening of D + 1. By 2200, all personnel from the GOETHALS, BORINQUEN and SIMONDS had been landed. Except for the transports this unloading was done by LCT(5) and (6)s and Rhino Ferries. In the early evening Convoy Group

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0-5, the last of Force "O", arrived. It also was some twelve hours late. Work progressed slowly because of the obstacles which still impeded access to the beach despite the efforts of the demolition parties who were working on them whenever tidal conditions permitted. In the light of later experience it is regretted that a practice of drying out the LSTs and larger LCTs was not commenced immediately. This would have materially speeded up the unloading and would have freed the LCT(5)s and (6)s and Rhino Ferries for unloading MT ships which were beginning to arrive. ANCXF's directive stated specifically, however, that LSTs were not to be dried out except in an emergency, and at this stage of the operation it did not appear to the Force Commander that the situation could be so construed.

Between midnight and morning of D + 2 day, there were two air raid alarms; the first about 0105, and the other about 0610. Neither developed into a serious attack although it was believed at the time that some mines had been dropped in the Assault Area. Repeated sweeps, however, failed to detect them. Clearing of obstacles and unloading had continued during the night of D + 1, and by 1000 D + 2, all LSTs of Force "O" had finished discharging. About 1100 the 5th Ranger Battalion which had landed on DOG GREEN Beach with the 116th Infantry and had been fighting its way steadily westward along the shore line established contact with the survivors of the three Ranger companies which had landed on the POINTE DU HOE to knock out the enemy batteries there. The latter had accomplished their mission, but had been hermed in within a small area near the tip of the point where they had been under constant enemy attack for more than forty-eight hours. Repeated requests had been received from them for boats to evacuate wounded, additional ammunition, and reinforcements. These requests had been passed to the Commanding General, V Corps, and boats to carry the reinforcements were offered. Gunfire support ships were doing their best to help by delivering supporting fires as requested by the Liaison Officer with the Rangers, but their situation was desperate. (Further account of Rangers may be found in naval gunfire chapter). Finally, on the afternoon of D + 1, two boats from the Flagship with medical supplies landed on the POINTE DU HOE and delivered them to the group besieged there.

From: Commander Assault Force "U". (UTAH BEACH).

Order of Landing Assault Waves: Early planning provided for two waves of infantry in LCVPs, Wave 1A of DD tanks, Wave 3 of LCT(A)s, with Demolition Units in LCVPs and LCMs landing with Wave 4 at H plus 17. Because of the urgency of earliest attack upon substantial beach obstacles known to exist, a late decision was made to move up 4 LCVPs with Navy Demolition units, on each beach, from Wave 4 to Wave 2, thereby starting demolition work 12 minutes earlier. This resulted in Wave 2 totalling 15 LCVPs on each beach. It was well understood that this number of craft was more than could be effectively controlled

SHAEF Incoming Message from General Eisenhower to General Marshall concerning the first reports of the Normandy landing, June 6, 1944.

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~

SHAEF
STAFF MESSAGE CONTROL
INCOMING MESSAGE

SHAEF CP

SHAEF 83/06

Filed 060800B June

TOR 060930B June

U R G E N T

FROM : SHAEF COMMAND POST, PERSONAL FROM GENERAL EISENHOWER
TO : AGWAR-TO GENERAL MARSHALL FOR HIS **EYES ONLY**; SHAEF FOR INFORMATION
REF NO : 90016, 6 June 1944

Local time is now 8 in the morning.

I have as yet no information concerning the actual landings nor of our progress through beach obstacles. Communique will not be issued until we have word that leading ground troops are actually ashore.

All preliminary reports are satisfactory. Airborne formations apparently landed in good order with losses out of approximately 1250 airplanes participating about 30. Preliminary bombings by air went off as scheduled. Navy reports sweeping some mines, but so far as is known channels are clear and operation proceeding as planned. In early morning hours reaction from shore batteries was sufficiently light that some of the naval spotting planes have returned awaiting call.

The weather yesterday which was original date selected was impossible all along the target coast. Today conditions are vastly improved both by sea and air and we have the prospect of at least reasonably favorable weather for the next several days.

Yesterday, I visited British troops about to embark and last night saw a great portion of a United States airborne division just prior to its takeoff. The enthusiasm, toughness and obvious fitness of every single man were high and the light of battle was in their eyes.

I will keep you informed.

DISTRIBUTION:

1. SUPREME COMMANDER ✓

2. CHIEF OF STAFF

3. SGS

4. *Gen. Strong (6-2)*5. *Gen. Bu1 (6-3)*

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DOD DIR. 5200.10, June 29, 1960

NE by *WGL* date *6-29-67*~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NO 1

SUPREME COMMANDER

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Journal entries from the 16th Infantry Regiment journal, June 6-17, 1944.

6 June 44

- 0630 - First wave lands on schedule on beach of Normandie France (see Field Order #5, Hq CT 16) and meets fierce resistance on beaches. Beach is under heavy machine gun and rifle fire. No advance made inland as beaches were fully covered by pill boxes and mine fields just inland from beaches.
- 0730 - Forward CP lands. Beach still under small arms and machine gun fire. No advance made inland. Casualties extremely heavy. Slight artillery fire on beach. Heavy machine gun fire covering all exits and the entire beach.
- 0805 - Rear CP lands. Beach still under heavy fire. CP established on beach and infiltration started thru right flank of area at small break thru. Mine field cleared out and all troops on beach commence moving off to flank.
- 0830 - First four prisoners all from 8th Co, 916th Regiment, 352nd Div., brought in.
- 1000 - CP established just off beach on side of hill at 684895. Battalions are moving forward, but are out of contact with regimental CP. Beach and entire territory still under heavy fire and companies are meeting heavy resistance. Several landing craft have received hits and troops still landing on the beach are receiving artillery fire, causing medium casualties. Things are becoming organized, however, and the situation is beginning to clear.
- 1055 - 1st and 2nd Bns. get contact with the Regimental CP and are moving forward slowly, hitting very heavy resistance.
- 1115 - CO to CO 2nd Bn - 2nd Bn. is to hold up at point 38. Do not move further forward until you hear from us.
- 1120 - S-3 to S-3 1st Bn - Hold up at 38. Right, and we have contact with 2nd Bn. The 5th Co. is reported to be located at Gurrain.
- 1135 - Negative report to Division by radio.
- 1145 - S-3 to EX 1st Bn-2nd Bn., 18th has landed. They will go in on your right. They will take your objective. You dig in and prepare for a counterattack. OK. A is on the right, C on the left, with B Co. following. We are still advancing slowly.
- 1145 - S-3 to CO 2nd Battalion - I talked to Capt. Smith and told him about the 18th. How soon can you move the rear part of your CP here by us up forward? We have someone on the way back now to pick them up and guide them forward.
- 1205 - EX 1st Bn to CO-Can we get any tanks up to Colleville-sur-Mer? A: No, none of them are up to here yet. They aren't off the beach. However, as soon as we can possible get anything up, we will shoot it up to you. Keep yelling for it.
- 1210 - CO Can go to S-3-We must have some tanks or artillery up here soon. Will you see what you can do about it for us? A-OK.
- 1220 - Information received that the 3rd Bn, 18th Inf., was in, but location at the present time was not given. Probably only a rumor.



6 June 44



- 1223 - Message to CO 3rd Bn-2nd Bn. has had units in Colleville-sur-Mer for some time. 1st Bn. landed on the left of E-1, and is pushing in to assist the 2nd Bn. in taking its objective.
- 1232 - Ex 1st Bn to S-2- A Co. is at 678892. Part of B Co. is with them, and the rest is in reserve. We are going over to Point 19 first, and then towards 38. C is at 681884, moving very slowly. Capt. Merendino, Co. B., said he lost about 12 men from pill boxes firing on them. He couldn't get contact with the battalion. Major Driscoll said he wanted him over on the right. Major Driscoll to S-3 - We are 100 yards NW of 20. We are still pushing.
- 1255 - In with 3rd Bn. by wire.
- 1245 - Msg. to CG 1st Div-Prisoners stated that the CP 10th Co., 726th at St. Laurent-sur-Mer. CP 12th Co., 726th at Grandcamp-les-Bains. That is in the 116th sector. 916th in sector of 16th Inf. CP, 5th Co., 916th at Surrain. The 916th relieved the 915th two weeks ago.
- 1301 - Out by wire with 2nd Bn.
- 1312 - 1st Bn., 18th Inf., lands and is passing thru the CP area, moving forward.
- 1318 - Major Lauten to 1st Bn - Lt. Kolb is trying to find your CP and will follow the wire line up.
- 1326 - S-3 to 2nd Bn Fwd- Where are you? A: CP is now moving forward. We are not in contact with them just now. They took a radio with them to keep in contact with us.
- 1327 - S-3 to 1st Bn - Are you with Major Driscoll now? A: No, he is at the forward CP and we can't contact him now. However, I can give you the dope. A Co. is pinned down by a strong point, just at the head of the draw there at E-2, over by 20, West of Colleville B Co. is going along, sending a couple of sections over to help out C Co. C Co. is 100 yards NW of Point 20. The Naval Shore Fire Control Party is out with Major Driscoll now. The 2nd Bn. is held down. We are in buildings S and E of 20. There is stuff all around. S-3: Artillery fire is coming in on the beach now. A: Well, I can't see where it is coming from up here.
- 1355 - White out by wire.
- 1422 - More prisoners brought in. Prisoners have been coming in by twos and threes since the landing.
- 1425 - Msg. 2nd Bn to CO-Co I held up at Pt 8. Co. I unable to assemble forces to advance and has enemy infiltrating his position. Co. L same situation as Co. I. Co. I and L are just beyond Pt 9. Tanks and reinforcements needed. Time: 1330.
- 1440 - 1st Bn to S-2-C Co. the same as before, and B Co. has moved up to the right of them. There is no other change.

6 June 44



- 1502 - S-2 to 2nd Bn - Have they cleaned out the town yet? A: The last report I had a half-hour ago was that they were just on the outskirts of the town. I will check by the 300 set and let you know.
- 1515 - 2nd Bn to S-2-Capt Dawson started into the town. He had a small counter-attack. He had a couple of sections as far as the church. Wozenski is trying to clean up. Dogtag is going thru the town. S-3: Halftracks are in. I am sending them up. What is your CP location? A: The CP is at 683885. We have contact with the 1st Bn only by means of passing men. The 2nd Bn., 18th, is passing through. E Co. is working up on the right, between G and Red. We received information from a civilian that there were about 150 Jerries in Colleville-Sur-Mer. We have only about 200 men left; 115 in G, 2 officers and 40 men in E, and 2 officers and 12 men in F. There are possibly 20 more around.
- 1540 - 2nd Bn. to S-2: What is the latest with Blue? A: Not so good. Part of I Co. didn't land. Very low on strength.
- 1540 - 1st Bn to S-2: C Co. is moving very slowly. B is on our Right, moving slowly, because of machine gun fire. As far as we know, A Co. is in the same spot.
- 1640 - S-2 to switchboard: Are we in with Danger Advance? A: No, sir.
- 1725 - In by wire with Decoy.
- 1800 - Capt. Smith, 1st Bn., to S-2: Major Driscoll says we need stuff up here to take out these pillboxes. If we can't get it, we will be held up. We're leaving this for your consideration.
- 1830 - 26th Infantry started landing on beach at 1830 hours. A few enemy artillery shells landed near them along the beach. Shortly after, the cruisers and artillery guns opened up for a short period of time.
- 1935 - Cruisers and ships firing heavy counter battery on guns firing on beach.
- 1940 - Enemy barrage of artillery landing along the beach where the troops are landing. Casualties light.
- 2045 - S-4 to Danger 6: Do you have an ammunition supply? A: We don't have any as yet. S-4: Do you have any transportation in yet? A: No. We are getting some in on DUKWs and as soon as they come in, we will send you one of the DUKWs with ammunition. It will come in at E-1.
- 2048 - Delight line is out.
- 2100 - Capt. Robbins to Major Heath-A German prisoner had two maps on him with 3 spots underlined. Believe they are strong points. These are at 659874, in vicinity of the road; 665874, running along road to the road junction and road north of it at 666875; and at Surrain, they had underlined around 670859. Very little change.

6 June 44



- 2115 - Col. Pickett, Div. Sig., to Mr. Wiles-What is your equipment status?
A: We are very short on our signal equipment. All the men that were carrying equipment were hit and we had to salvage what we could off the beach. Col. Pickett: OK. I will try to get you another signal crew and what equipment I can.
- 2124 - Capt. Bour, White 1, to S-1: Any improvement on the evacuation of wounded? A: If at all possible, we will send them out to the ships tonight. Send them up to us as soon as you can, and we will take care of getting them out.
- 2140 - S3 18th to S3: Williamson is located just north of goose egg on your map. One company at 702872, one at 702872, one at 695873, and one at 788875. They are advancing to the high ground and then will move toward the West. We are holding back our 1st Bn. Do you have anyone in Colleville? A: Not that we know. S3 18th: Is your 2nd Bn. at 682878 and your 1st Bn. at 679878? A: Yes, that is right.
- 2145 - Danger 2 to S2: What's the situation in front of you? A: Very vague. There is a pill box in the draw near Colleville, and it's causing us trouble. G2: Is the enemy close to the edge of Colleville? A: The 18th is at the top of the hill south of Colleville, but our right flank is still held by the enemy. There is no enemy North of the road except at E-3 exit, where there is a pill box. There's a heavy gun at Formigny and a few small ones at Russy. A few tanks were seen yesterday in Colleville. G2: What about your left company? A: They are on the edge of Lahammerroe. G2: Did you run into any tanks? A: No reports of any today. We got prisoners from 10th and 14th companies. 916th is the only company we are in contact with now. G2: There is a lot of shelling from the southeast and the Maisy area.
- 2205 - G3 to S3: Any more dope on your two units near Colleville? The General says that place must be cleaned out tonight. The 18th has two battalions in front of you. A: No, no more dope on them.
- 2242 - Danger 4 to S3: Do you know where the temporary vehicle area is? A: Yes. It is at E-1. Capt. Fish has been out there. G4: I'm setting up a temporary ammunition dump there. The ammunition will be rationed. Do you know anything about the 116? A: Yes. They are getting along OK. They are southwest of St. Laurent. ~~Capt. Toby, 7th FA to S2:~~
- 2255 - Capt Toby, 7th FA to S2: I had a report from a Medic that people in St. Laurent had 29 Jerries billeted with them. They left tonite and were to meet in Louvieres.



6 June 44

- 2257 - S2 to danger 2: Col Evans, we had a report from the 7th FA, who talked to some civilians who said that 29 officers who had been billeted at St. Laurent. They were gone tonight and the officers were to meet at Louvieres.
- 2300 - Major Tegtmeyer to Col Picchy: We are not able to evacuate any of our people. There are no evacuation facilities at the beach and something must be done. A: We will try and see that this is taken care of at once.
- 2310 - CO 2nd Bn to S2: Can you give me any dope? A: Yes. Two battalions of the 18th are on that hill by you. CO: OK. people are infiltrating. We are digging in and need reorganization. Tell the Colonel.
- 2310 - Air raid on ships, beach, and short distance inland.

SHAEF Message from General Eisenhower's reporting on the D-Day landing area, June 8, 1944.

SHAEF MESSAGE FORM

CALL CIRCUIT No. PRIORITY TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

NR

SPACES WITHIN HEAVY LINES FOR SIGNALS USE ONLY

FROM (A) SHAEF CP ORIGINATOR Supreme Commander DDE/map DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN 8 June 1944

TO FOR ACTION AGWAR

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO) , SHAEF

MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS GR 0815290 972

(REF NO.) (CLASSIFICATION) ~~TOP SECRET~~ SCAF-48



ACCOMPANIED BY ADMIRAL RAMSAY I MADE YESTERDAY A COMPLETE TOUR BY DESTROYER OF THE LANDING AREAS BEGINNING ON THE RIGHT PD PAREN TO THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FROM EISENHOWER CITE SHSAC PD THIS IS SCAF NUMBER FORTY EIGHT PD UNPAREN TO AGWAR FOR INFO SHAF THE LANDINGS ON THE COTENTIN PENINSULA APPARENTLY WENT ABOUT AS WELL AS COULD BE EXPECTED WITH THE ONE HUNDRED FIRST AIRBORNE DIVISION CARRYING OUT ITS MISSIONS IN GOOD STYLE PD INFORMATION OF THE EIGHTY SECOND AIRBORNE IS MEAGRE BUT GENERAL BRADLEY INFORMED ME THAT THE SEVENTH CORPS HAD MADE CONTACT WITH IT PD ON BEACH O REPEAT OBOE ATTACK/BY THE FIFTH CORPS OPPOSITION WAS UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY DUE TO THE PRESENCE ON THE BEACHES OF A FULL GERMAN DIVISION WHICH WAS ON MANEUVERS PD LOSSES HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE IN THIS FORCE AND LANDINGS HAVE BEEN MOST DIFFICULT DUE TO THE COVERAGE OF BEACHES BY HOSTILE ARTILLERY PD MOREOVER A LARGE PORTION OF ~~D REPEAT DOG~~ TANKS FOUNDERED ON THEIR WAY TO THE BEACHES PD DUE TO THE ROUGH WEATHER DECISION WAS MADE ON THE OTHER BEACHES NOT REPEAT NOT TO ATTEMPT TO SWIM IN THE ~~D REPEAT DOG~~ TANKS PD THESE WERE UNLOADED DIRECTLY ON THE BEACHES FROM THE LCT'S CARRYING THEM PD

DISTRIBUTION: C/S	COORDINATED WITH:		THI or TOR	Opr.
	THIS MESSAGE MUST BE SENT IN CYPHER IF LIABLE TO INTERCEPTION	Precedence URGENT		
	TOP SECRET INITIALS THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS INITIALS	ORIGINATING DIVISION SHSAC	TIME CLEARED 0816280 By Cypher	
		NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO. HARRY C. BUTCHER, Comdr.		

~~TOP SECRET~~ BSR

AT NOON ON JUNE SEVENTH GENERAL BRADLEY FELT THAT CONDITIONS WERE IMPROVING ON O BEACH AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO REPLACE ARTILLERY WHICH WAS LOST IN LANDING DUE TO HOSTILE ARTILLERY FIRE AND SINKING OF LANDING CRAFT PD BECAUSE OF THE CONFIGURATION OF THE GROUND IN THIS PARTICULAR AREA SPOTTING FOR NAVAL GUNFIRE WAS RATHER DIFFICULT AND SINCE TROUBLE CAME FROM FIELD WORKS RATHER THAN FROM FIXED BATTERIES CMA BOTH AIR BOMBARDMENT AND NAVAL GUNFIRE WERE RELATIVELY ^{PART TWO} INEFFECTIVE IN ASSISTING THE LANDING PD PARAGRAPH ON THE WHOLE U S REPEAT UNCLE SUGAR ARMY FRONT THE IMMEDIATE TACTICAL PLAN HAS BEEN ALTERED WITH THE PURPOSE NOW OF BOTH CORPS MAKING AN EARLY DRIVE TOWARD CARENTAN TO JOIN UP CMA AFTER WHICH THE ORIGINAL CONCEPTIONS WILL BE PURSUED PD PARAGRAPH ON THE FRONT OF THE FIFTIETH BRITISH DIVISION PROGRESS WAS VERY GOOD ALTHOUGH CMA AS AT EVERYWHERE ELSE CMA UNLOADING WAS INTERFERED WITH BY THE ROUGH WEATHER PD LIKEWISE ON THE FRONTS OF THE THIRD BRITISH AND THIRD CANADIAN DIVISIONS PROGRESS WAS GENERALLY SATISFACTORY ALTHOUGH ROUGH WEATHER HAD FINALLY COMPELLED THE NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER TO DIRECT THE DRYING OUT OF LST'S BECAUSE RHINO FERRIES COULD NOT WORK PD ON THIS PARTICULAR FRONT THE BEACHES WERE FLAT AND HARD AND IT WAS BELIEVED THAT NO DAMAGE WOULD RESULT TO THE LST'S PD PARAGRAPH THROUGHOUT THE FRONT WE LOST CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS OF THE SMALLER LANDING CRAFT CMA BOTH BECAUSE OF ROUGH WEATHER AND MINES IN THE TOUCHDOWN AREAS PD THESE WERE TELLER MINES WHICH BLEW SIZEABLE HOLES IN THE LANDING CRAFT BUT ~~W~~ LARGE NUMBERS OF WHICH CAN BE REPAIRED AS SOON AS MAINTENANCE GROUPS CAN BE PLACED ASHORE AND START TO WORK PD THE LOSS OF THESE CRAFT CMA ADDED TO THE ROUGH WEATHER SLOWED UP THE LANDING OF ALL SUPPLIES AND AT NOON ON D PLUS ONE WE WERE APPROXIMATELY TWENTY FOUR HOURS BEHIND OUR EXPECTED SCHEDULE OF UNLOADING PD THE WEATHER IMPROVED MARKEDLY AT NOON ON D PLUS ONE PD IF THIS

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

GOOD WEATHER STRETCH CAN BE PROLONGED FOR A FEW DAYS WE WILL DO MUCH
TOWARD CATCHING UP PD PARAGRAPH DURING ^{PART 3} THE COURSE OF THE DAY I TALKED
WITH GENERAL MONTGOMERY AND GENERAL BRADLEY AND WITH ADMIRALS KIRK CMA
VIAN CMA DOUGLAS ^{-pennant} ~~PENNY~~ AND OLIVER PD ALL WERE DISAPPOINTED IN THE
UNFAVORABLE LANDING CONDITIONS AND ALL FELT THAT IMPROVEMENT OF THE
WEATHER WOULD SEE A CORRESPONDING GREAT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR POSITION PD
PARAGRAPH UPON RETURN OF ADMIRAL RAMSAY AND MYSELF TO ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS
ABOUT TEN P M WE LEARNED THAT WE HAD APPARENTLY CAPTURED BAYEUX PD
PARAGRAPH EARLY THIS MORNING I AM INFORMED THAT A GERMAN COUNTER ATTACK
BY PARTS OF TWO PANZER DIVISIONS IS PUSHING IN ON THE RIGHT OF THE BRITISH
~~SECTOR~~ SECTOR AND HAS MADE SOME PROGRESS PD HOWEVER CMA YESTERDAY AFTERNOON
WHILE I WAS PRESENT ON THOSE BEACHES THE SEVENTH ARMORED DIVISION WAS BUSY
UNLOADING AND THIS EARLY ENEMY THREAT SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY COUNTERED PD
PARAGRAPH ON THE AMERICAN BEACHES THE SECOND AND NINETIETH DIVISIONS
WERE DUE TO BEGIN LANDING LAST NIGHT AND CMA WHILE I HAVE HAD NO REPORTS
THIS MORNING CMA I BELIEVE THAT THE GOOD WEATHER LAST NIGHT SHOULD HAVE
PERMITTED THE LANDING OF CONSIDERABLE REINFORCEMENTS IN THOSE DISTRICTS
PD PARAGRAPH DUE TO THE FLUID NATURE OF THE BATTLE IT HAS BEEN EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO GIVE LOGICAL TARGETS TO MUCH OF OUR AIR FORCES BUT I AM
CONFIDENT THAT IF WEATHER PERMITS OUR AIR WILL INTERVENE EFFECTIVELY IN ANY
ATTEMPTED COUNTER ATTACKS BY THE ENEMY



end of message

CCS, SCAF 48

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

**Correspondence from OSS Director William J. Donovan to
President Roosevelt June 14, 1944**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.2(c) and 5(D) or (E)

CIA Hr 4/27/74
By DBL Date DEC 4 1974

14 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Having just returned from the beachhead in France, I hope that you might find it of some interest to get certain conclusions based on my observations there.

I went over in the Tuscaloosa which was the flagship of Admiral Deyo, who is doing a fine job as commander of the naval bombardment forces. I feel certain of the following conclusions:

1. The success of the landing as a whole shows certain fundamental weaknesses in the basic German position. These weaknesses are not only psychological; they are material and physical. It was clear that the Germans had neither the resources nor the capabilities to meet the attack at every possible landing beach. We talked to prisoners at the Utah Beach. One

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of them, a Captain of the regular service, said that he was overwhelmed when he saw the ships coming in and then felt that he wanted to be identified with a movement that seemed so powerful and so efficient.

2. The presence of so many foreigners in the German forces was indicative of the same kind of difficulty that Napoleon had in Russia, as well as at Waterloo. Many of the Poles in the ranks of enlisted men were looking for an opportunity to escape.

3. All these various elements of disintegration, spiritual as well as physical, might result in a speedy breakup of the whole German defense if we can sustain an accelerated military pressure.

4. After the initial landing, we lost our momentum. If it is not regained and reaccentuated, there can be a reconstituting of the elements that make for disintegration.

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SECRET

5. Everything that I saw made clear that the Germans no longer have an Air Force that belongs in the Big League. They were able to have bombers over us at night and to send over some fighter bombers in bombing missions during the day, but our intelligence showed us that planes hurriedly brought in from Germany were in a very poor state of serviceability.

6. Also, the E-Boats which attacked us were, like the planes, not the operations of a great power.

7. One thing that struck me was the very slow reaction of the Germans in counter-attack. To me that seemed due to the measures of the Resistance Groups, but, more important, to the work of our Air Corps in the destruction of bridges and oil installations. Our intelligence showed that the present German needs for oil are 1.2mn. tons a month and that present monthly production is 1.0mn. tons. With active fighting in the East,

255903

their monthly consumption would rise to 1.4mn. tons. General oil shortage has not yet impaired mobility of ground forces in N. W. Europe. Constriction of mobility has been due to improved tactical bombing program - bridges, supply dumps, motor transport. However, strategic attack on oil target system could readily reduce output to 600,000 tons per month. With activity in East and West, available enemy reserves could bridge the gap for two or three months at the most. This makes oil targets almost a front line target.

Two things particularly impressed me from our side. They were the following:

A. The tremendous effect that the radar counter-measures had in giving us initial advantage. I saw for myself the effect of jamming guided missiles and the detection of attempted counter-measures by the enemy.

B. The tremendous development in precision firing of our naval guns. The navy guns performed

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
the duties not only of field guns but of railroad guns. It is in reality like corps artillery. I think it is probably true that never before has it been attempted to silence with naval gun fire so elaborate a system of coast defenses as here. After the first day the great block of firing was on targets requested by Signal Force Control Parties both to break up threatened counter-attacks and to prepare the advance of our troops. The Nevada, operating close inshore and threatened by a great number of small and medium batteries, performed with the greatest gallantry and effectiveness. She succeeded, with her fourteen inch main battery, in breaking up a serious counter-attack which was forming the night of D-day north of Carentan, consisting of armored troops and artillery.

All of this demonstrated to me the tremendous strides that have been made which are scarcely appreciated by those who have not observed closely the new equip-

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- 6 -

ment and technique of naval gun fire. With the excellent fire control and navigation equipment, not only can the naval forces be used as artillery in placing troops ashore but for protecting them from enemy artillery while expanding the beachhead and assisting them in all defenses until they are beyond range.



William J. Donovan
Director

a55906

June 6 - July 8, 1944

Report of the Eighty-Second Airborn Division, "Operation Neptune," at Normandy

The Eighty Second


AIRBORNE DIVISION



AIRBORNE



Operation "Neptune"



CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

NORMANDY

6 JUNE - 8 JULY 1944

RESTRICTED

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
ACTION IN NORMANDY, FRANCE

IN FOUR SECTIONS

- I -- PREFACE
- II -- NARRATIVE
- III -- DISTRIBUTION
- IV -- ANNEXES

* * * * *

... 35 Days of action without relief, without replacements.
Every mission accomplished. No ground gained ever relinquished.
(Report of Major General RIDGWAY.)


* * * * *

COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Excellent, short 60% Infantry, 90% Artillery.
(From G-3 report as of 062400 June 1944.)

* * * * *

MAPS: GSGS 4347, FRANCE, 1/25,000, Sheets 31/20 SE, 31/18 NE, SE,
SW, NW

GSGS 4249, FRANCE, 1/100,000, Sheets 5E, 6E, 5F, 6F.



R E S T R I C T E D

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
ACTION IN NORMANDY, FRANCE
JUNE - JULY 1944
SECTION II -- NARRATIVE

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

SECTION II - NARRATIVE

By 26 May 1944 all plans and preparations were completed for the Division to carry out the mission assigned it by First United States Army. Field and administrative orders had been published and distributed. In a series of map maneuvers on a special 1/5,000 map regimental and battalion commanders had outlined their plans in order that all commanders might be briefed thoroughly on the prospective Division operations. Divisional airborne echelons already had departed for the marshalling yards and were assembled in camps scattered along the Welsh and southern English coasts. The Division mission was to be as follows:

"Land by parachute and glider before and after dawn of D-Day west of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE: seize, clear and secure the general area ST. JACQUES DE NINOU (136985) - BESNEVILLE (157928) (both inclusive) - ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (exclusive) - ELANDAMOUR (167982) (Inclusive), and reorganize; seize and destroy the crossings of the PRAIRIES MARCAGEUSES north of LA SANGSURIERE (188998), at ST. SAUVEUR DE PIERRE FORT (145890); destroy the crossings of the OLLOMONDE River in the vicinity of ST. LO D'OURVILLE (090994) and block crossroads vicinity LE CHEMIN (102902); prevent enemy forces moving north between ST. LO D'OURVILLE and junction of DOUVE River with PRAIRIE MARCAGEUSES (228921); and protect the south flank of VII Corps north of the same line."

The mission, however, was changed by the First Army Commander on 26 May due to confirmed intelligence reports the enemy had strengthened his forces on the COTENIN, (CHERBOURG) Peninsula with the addition of the 91st Infantry Division in the general area of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE. The revised mission of the 82d Airborne Division was to be:

"Land by parachute and glider before and after dawn of D-Day astride the MERDERET River, seize, clear and secure the general area: OR (261938) - OR (263958) - OR (269975) - RJ (274982) - RJ (283992) - Bridge (309987) - NEUVILLE AU PLAIN (340985) - BARDIENVILLE (360987) within its zone; capture ST. MERE EULISE (340965); seize and secure the crossings of the MERDERET River at (315957) and (321930), and a bridgehead covering them, with HLR along the general line: OR (261938) - OR (269953) - OR (269975) - RJ (274982) - RJ (283992); seize and destroy the crossings of the DOUVE River at BEUZEVILLE LA BASTILLE (309911) and ETISEVILLE (also known as PONT L'ABBE) (269927); protect the northwest flank of VII Corps within the Division zone; and be prepared to advance west on Corps order to the line of the DOUVE north of its junction with the PRAIRIES MARCAGEUSES."

New orders and other administrative details made necessary by the new mission were worked out quickly and disseminated within four days. The change did not effect the basic plan for movement in three echelons which had been worked out as follows:

Force "A" - commanded by Brigadier General JAMES M. GAVIN, assistant Division Commander, to be committed by parachute before dawn of D-Day and to include

Planes

Det Hq & Hq Co, 82d Abn Div

4

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

Pathfinders	9
Det Hq 82d Div Arty	2
Det 82d Abn Sig Co	3
Det 456 Prcht FA Bn (atchd 505 Prcht Inf)	
Air Support Party (atchd Hq 82d Abn Div)	
505 Prcht Inf	117
507 Prcht Inf	117
508 Prcht Inf	117
Co B, 307 Abn Engr Bn	9
Naval Shore Fire Control Party (atchd 505 Prcht Inf)	
TOTAL 378	

Force "B" - Commanded by Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, Division Commander, to be committed by glider before and after dawn of D-Day and to include.

	<u>Glider</u>
Hq & Hq Co 82 Abn Div (-)	22
Hq & Hq Btry, 82d Abn Div Arty (-)	11
82d Abn Sig Co (-)	13
325 Gli Inf	172
319 Gli FA Bn	40
320 Gli FA Bn	54
Btrys A, B & C, 80 Abn AA Bn (AT)	57
Co A, 307 Abn Engr Bn	10
307 Abn Med Co (-)	20
82d Abn Rcn Plat (-)	13
Air Support Party	4
Command vehicles - Prcht Regts	12
TOTAL 428	

Force "C" - Commanded by Brigadier General GEORGE P. HOWELL, Commanding General of 2d Airborne Infantry Brigade, to be committed by sea, to land between D plus 2 and D plus 7 and to include.

456 FA Bn (-)	87 Armd FA Bn, atchd
80 Abn AA Bn (-)	899 TD Bn, atchd
307 Abn Engr Bn (-)	Tr B, 4 Cav Sqdn, atchd
782 Abn Ord Maint Co	Co C, 746 Tk Bn (M), atchd
407 Abn QM Co	3809 QM Trk Co, atchd
82 Abn MP Plat	3810 QM Trk Co, atchd
Corps Med Dets	1st Plat, 603 QM (GR) Co, atchd

Seaborne elements of units in Forces

"A" and "B"

Under the plan Force "A" in its entirety was to approach the CHERBOURG (CO-TENTIN) Peninsula from the west and to drop between 0100 and 0315 hours on the night of D-1/D-Day on three drop zones. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and its attachments were to land east of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards northwest of STE. MERE EGLISE (3397). The 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment was to land west of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards north of AMFREVILLE (3098). The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment and Force "A" Headquarters were to land west of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards north of PICAUVILLE (2995).

Fifty-two gliders of Force "B" were to approach the CHERBOURG Peninsula from the west prior to H-Hour and land on the 505th drop zone. The remainder of Force

"B" was to approach the peninsula from the east and was to land late on D-Day and early on D plus one on landing zones astride the STE. MERE EGLISE - BLOS-VILLE Road (3694). In a last-minute change of plan General RIDGEMAN parachuted with Force "A".

Aerial resupply missions were scheduled automatically for the morning of D plus one and on call thereafter if needed. The automatic mission was the only parachute mission ultimately flown but a small amount of equipment and supplies were received later by glider.

All airborne elements of the Division had closed and were sealed in special camps at the take-off fields by 24 hours before the scheduled take-off time. Parachute elements were located at seven airfields in the GRAVEHAM - COTTESMORE - LINGAR area of the British Midlands, and glider elements were at seven airfields in the LDERMASTON - RAMSBURY - MERRYFIELD area. (See Annex No. 3 A)

All men were briefed thoroughly on their missions, a recheck was made of all equipment and personnel, and planes and gliders were loaded with equipment. The Allied D-Day was postponed 24 hours because of weather conditions, and the first planes of Force "A" took off at 052315 June 1944.

The main flight was preceded by the three regimental pathfinder teams which dropped one-half hour prior to the first group. The pathfinders sustained many casualties and had difficulty in using lights, but they accomplished their mission and set up beacons to guide the incoming planes to the three designated drop zones.

The flight over the English Channel was in good formation and without incident, but between the west coast and the drop zones a heavy fog bank tended to break up the formation of the planes. Flak and some enemy night fighters activity caused some of the troop carrier planes to take up evasive action, and by the time the drop zones were reached many planes were scattered, and were flying at excessive speeds and at altitudes higher than those ideal for jumping.

The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed generally in the vicinity of its drop zone. The 507th Parachute Infantry was scattered, one element dropping in the vicinity of MONTESBOURG, another south of CARPENTAN and the remainder astride the MERDERET River east of the drop zone. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was likewise scattered widely, the bulk of its parachutists dropping east of the Drop Zone and some personnel landing as far away as nine kilometers south of CHERBOURG.

The 52 gliders containing batteries of the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion and detachments and forward parties of artillery, signal and Division Headquarters groups followed the main body of paratroopers and began landing at 0404 hours. The gliders also encountered fog and flak. They too were scattered, and many of them were damaged upon crashing into the small fields and high hedges.

Enemy reaction to the landing of the 82d Airborne Division in the NORMANDY area was prompt and severe, but from the time the first member landed until 77 days later, when the Division was finally relieved, every mission was accomplished and no ground gained was ever relinquished.

A day-by-day account of the Division's activities follows:

D-DAY, 6 JUNE 1944 (See Annexes 5 and 6)

The first element of the main body of the Division jumped at 0151 hours, having been preceded 30 minutes by the Pathfinder teams. By 0312 hours all paratroopers had landed, and at 0404 hours the first of 52 gliders in the initial glider serial crash landed. Both parachutists and gliders were scattered.

Small groups and some units attacked to secure the Division zone. Groups



R E S T R I C T E D

of men and individuals who had been scattered in the landings rejoined their units throughout the day, and by nightfall approximately 30 per cent of the Division's forces were under control.

At 2100 hours 100 gliders landed with artillery, engineers, and special troops. Seaborne elements set sail at 0645 from BRISTOL except for a task force consisting of Company C, 746th Tank Battalion; the 1st Platoon, Troop B, 4th Cavalry Squadron; and elements of Company F, 3d Battalion (originally 2d Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), 325th Glider Infantry. This task force landed on Utah Red Beach at 1400 hours and proceeded inland with the mission of contacting the Division near STE. MERE EGLISE.

At the close of the day, the Division was in the midst of severe fighting. It had captured STE. MERE EGLISE and held a general line along the MERDERET River from LA FIERE (319963) south to include the eastern end of the causeway over the MERDERET River at 321930.

Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 82d Airborne Division

Parachute elements, part of Force "A", dropped at 0214 hours near the west bank of the MERDERET River, and glider elements, leading echelon of Force "B", landed at 0204 hours. The Force "A" Command Post was set up initially at 305965, west of the MERDERET River, but at 0730 the group waded across the River to the east bank and assembled at LA FIERE (319963). A new Force "A" Command Post was established at a railroad crossing at 326944.

The Division Commander, who jumped with the 505th Parachute Infantry, established his Command Post in a hedgerow west of STE. MERE EGLISE at 332965. Elements of Headquarters and of the Defense Platoon moved south to secure the bridge west of CHEF DU FONT (321930) where it encountered severe enemy fire. This group returned to the Command Post at 1700, but part of the Defense Platoon moved to a new Force "A" Command Post at a railroad pass at 323960.

The Division Headquarters initial glider ariel, which landed in the dark at approximately 0415 hours, was scattered, and the G-2 and G-3 did not reach the command post until late afternoon. The Chief of Staff was injured in a glider crash and later evacuated. The G-1 did not reach the command post for two days.

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The first element, the 2d Battalion, dropped at 0151 hours and the entire regiment landed by 0202 hours. Most of the troops landed on or near the drop zone, but a few were widely dispersed over the countryside. Assembly was rapid, and the battalions moved off toward their objectives. The 3d Battalion entered STE. MERE EGLISE at 0400 hours, and the town was securely held and outposted within an hour. The American Flag was raised over STE. MERE EGLISE, the first French town to be liberated by the Allies. After assembling the 2d Battalion started to move out to take NEUVILLE AU PLAIN, but orders were received from the regiment to stand by. At 0600 hours the 2d Battalion moved into position north of STE. MERE EGLISE and assisted the 3d Battalion in holding the town. The 1st Battalion moved toward its objective, the bridge over the MERDERET River (314956) at LA FIERE at 0630 hours and by 0830 held the eastern end of this bridge against heavy enemy fire from the western approaches.

507th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The first element, the 1st Battalion, jumped at 0232 hours, and by 0312 hours the entire regiment was on the ground generally east of the MERDERET River and was fairly dispersed. Small groups assembled to form small task forces until such time as the regiment could assemble completely. One such force on the west bank of the MERDERET River attacked AMPREVILLE but was forced back by overwhelming superiority in enemy strength to FLAUX (303955). A patrol was sent to the western

R E S T R I C T E D

end of LA FIERE Bridge and contact was made with elements of the 505th Parachute Infantry on the eastern end at 1430 hours. The enemy recaptured FLAUX and drove this patrol from the western end of the LA FIERE Bridge. Another force of the regiment joined with Force "A" Headquarters and at 1130 attacked to secure the CHEF DU PONT Bridge (321930), meeting extremely severe resistance. The eastern end of the bridge was finally secured by nightfall. Leaving one company to hold the bridge, the remainder of this second force moved to an assembly area at 1715 hours in the vicinity of the railroad overpass at 323960. Still another group, led by the regimental commander, landed on or near the scheduled drop zone but had no contact with other elements of the Division during the day.

508th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The 3d Battalion jumped at 0208 hours and the entire regiment was on the ground by 0220 hours. Four separate groups were assembled. One group was in the vicinity of LA FIERE, fought along the railway and attacked the LA FIERE Bridge. This group was later relieved by the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of the railroad overpass (323960) to organize a defensive position. Two other groups joined forces west of the MERDERET River in the vicinity of PICAUVILLE after taking part in heavy fighting around GUETTEVILLE (300948) and north of PICAUVILLE. An officer of this group shot and killed the commanding general of the German 91st Division. The combined group then seized the high ground west of the MERDERET River south of GUETTEVILLE at 310940 during the night of June 6-7. A fourth group dropped in the vicinity of STE. MERE EGLISE, fought with the 507th Parachute Infantry to take the CHEF DU PONT Bridge (321930) and later organized a defensive position covering this bridge.

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

Company F, 3d Battalion, supporting Company C, 746th Tank Battalion, landed on Utah Red Beach at 1400, de-waterproofed vehicles and moved inland at 1600 to make contact with the Division. Heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire held up this task force at crossroads 363933. Two tanks were knocked out. The remainder of the regiment prepared to take off from airports in England.

82d Airborne Division Artillery

Parachute elements jumped at 0210 hours, joined a group from the 508th Parachute Infantry and assisted in the attack on the LA FIERE Bridge. At 1330 hours this element joined the glider element at the Division CP at 332965. Glider elements landed at 0500 hours and moved directly to the Division CP. At 2305 hours Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of Division Artillery, the 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion and the 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion glided into NORMANDY and encountered severe enemy small arms and mortar fire. Reorganization commenced immediately but was handicapped by intense enemy fire. The section of the 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion attached to 505th Parachute Infantry jumped with the 3d Battalion, but was able to assemble only one of the two 75mm pack howitzers which had been dropped.

80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (AT)

Batteries A and B landed by glider at 0405 hours. Six 57mm antitank guns had been recovered and were in position by 1730 hours. Battery C glided into the area at 2100 hours and began assembly and reorganization. The remainder of the Battalion sailed from BRISTOL, ENGLAND, at 0645 hours.

307th Airborne Engineer Battalion

Company B (less one platoon attached to the 505th Parachute Infantry)



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jumped with the 508th Parachute Infantry at 0210 hours. Some Engineer personnel took up defensive positions at LA FIERE in support of one group of the 508th, and other personnel joined the 508th group west of the MERDERET River. One "stick", which included the Battalion Commander, was dropped over ST. SAUVIEUR LE VICOMTE, and only a few escaped. Part of Headquarters and Company A landed by glider at 2300 hours and started to assemble under heavy enemy artillery and small arms fire. The remainder of the battalion prepared to take off from air-ports in ENGLAND.

307th Airborne Medical Company

Elements of the company landed by glider about 2100 and immediately began assembly, recovering by use of life rafts much equipment from gliders that had landed in shallow water near the banks of the MERDERET River. A clearing station was set up at a crossroad north of BLOSVILLE.

82d Airborne Signal Company

Parachute and glider elements of the company which landed prior to H-Hour were scattered and assembled with difficulty. Much equipment was lost. Only one of the three SCR 193 radios landed during D-Day was operative, and it was not until the night of June 6-7 that radio contact was established with the 4th Infantry Division and with the Division base in ENGLAND.

D PLUS 1, 7 JUNE 1944

The Division continued to assemble, reorganize, and secure its area against extremely severe enemy resistance which included armor. Enemy troops, identified as the 91st Infantry Division, were held along the MERDERET River to the west and were driven back to the north and northwest. Contact was established with the 4th Infantry Division during the day, and the VII Corps Commander visited the Division Command Post late in the day. The 325th Glider Infantry arrived by glider during the morning. Additional personnel which had been scattered in the original landings continued to report back to their units.

During the afternoon garbled radio messages signed "OO 507" were received at the Division Command Post, and it was finally determined that they originated with the Regimental Commander who was isolated with a group of about 300 men west of MEFREVILLE.

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

The first glider elements began landing at 0700 hours about 2,500 yards southeast of STE. MERE EGLISE. There were many crash landings, and casualties totalled approximately 7.5 per cent. Assembly was rapid, however, and by 1015 hours all battalions were reported. The 3d Battalion moved out toward CARQUEBUT at 1415 hours and reached LE PORT (328918) without encountering opposition. The remainder of the regiment proceeded to move into an assembly area northeast of CHEF DU PONT. At 1600 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to move into an assembly area east of LA FIERE in the vicinity of 325962 and later was attached to the 505th Parachute Infantry at 2100 hours. The 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to move into and to outpost the regimental assembly area. Company F, 3d Battalion in support of Company G, 746th Tank Battalion, and the 1st Platoon, Troop B, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, assisted the 8th Infantry in its attack towards STE. MERE EGLISE from the west at 0630 hours and made contact with gliderborne elements of the 325th by 0900. The 325th's regimental strength at the close of the day was approximately 85 per cent.

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The 2d and 3d Battalions continued to hold STE. MERE EGLISE against severe

June 1944
After Action Report, 115th Infantry

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AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR MONTH OF JUNE 1944

I Summary of Operations

A. Phase #1

1. Landing Operations 6 June 1944

The 115th Infantry landed at 1025 hours, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast on FOX GREEN beach, about 1000 yards east of that part of the beach on which it was intended to land. The 2nd Battalion on the right crossed the beach and started up the cliff, making slow progress due to mines. The progress of the 1st Battalion on the left was faster. It pushed inland to the south of ST. LAURENT, reaching there about dark. This battalion was subjected to heavy fire from snipers and mortar fire throughout the night. Lt. Col. Richard C. Blatt became fatally wounded by mortar fire. The 2nd Battalion attempted to capture ST. LAURENT, but was unsuccessful. It then moved to the south of the town, into the woods, about one-half mile to the west. Regimental Headquarters landed with the leading battalions, and remained on the beach under artillery fire until 1600 hours. At 1630 hours, the headquarters moved the CP inland to a trail east of ST. LAURENT.

2. Advance inland from Beach to Inundated Area.

During the night 6-7 June the 3rd Battalion moved to the outskirts of ST. LAURENT. At daybreak they attacked the town and by mid-morning had secured it. They then pushed toward LOUVIERES. The 2nd Battalion was held in the woods all through the day. The 1st Battalion moved to the woods about 1200 yards to the west of ST. LAURENT. During the morning the CP moved into ST. LAURENT amidst severe sniper fire. In the afternoon it was moved further forward, to the rear of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion was held up in front of LOUVIERES. In the later afternoon, although the battalions were widely separated, the attack was continued in the direction of LONGUEVILLE. The 2nd Battalion was the only battalion that succeeded in moving forward. The attack continued until 0300 hours. The 2nd Battalion was in the stream valley northwest of MONTIGNY and the attack was halted there daylight. The attack was then resumed, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions generally abreast. LONGUEVILLE was captured at 0900 hours by the 2nd Battalion, which assumed a defensive position west of the town. The 1st Battalion moved forward and assumed the defensive to the east of the town because TREVIERES had not been captured. Early in the morning, the 3rd Battalion had begun moving to a defensive position west of FORMIGNY to protect the left flank of the Division. Later, they were moved to a defensive position west of DEAUX-JUMEAUX, arriving there at 1800 hours. The Regimental CP, which had followed the 2nd Battalion, was established in LONGUEVILLE.

B. Phase #2

1. Crossing Inundated Area.

During the night 8-9 June, the 3rd Battalion, followed by the 2nd Battalion, moved to the vicinity of CANCHY, and started across the inundated area. The crossing was completed with the assistance of the Engineers. The 2nd Battalion moved to the vicinity of BOIS de CALETTE, the 3rd Battalion to the vicinity of COLOMBIERES, and the 1st Battalion to the vicinity of BRICQUEVILLE.

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Paragraph I, B, 1. (continued)

At noon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were ordered to continue their movement to the south. The 3rd Battalion moved against little enemy resistance, except for snipers. In the early afternoon, the 2nd Battalion encountered stubborn resistance at VESULLE. Late in the afternoon, this resistance was overcome and the battalion continued to move southward. The movement continued until dark, when the battalion assumed a defensive position about a mile southwest of LA FOIE. During the night 9-10 June, the 2nd Battalion was attacked by the Germans and suffered considerable losses, and was disorganized. Throughout the period 8-9 June, the 1st Battalion remained in a defensive position at ERICQUEVILLE, where it suffered almost continuous attack from the Germans from the vicinity of TREVIENES. As the other two battalions had moved miles south of the Germans at TREVIENES, the 1st battalion had the mission of protecting the left rear of the regiment.

2. 2nd Battalion Incident

At approximately 0245 hours, 10 June 1944, a closing force of German Armor and Infantry which had been by-passed and cut off to our rear and was attempting to retreat to its own lines stumbled on the rear of 2nd Battalion column to the surprise of both units. Opening fire with their MG's, mortars and 88's a heavy and confused action occurred in the dark with severe losses on both sides. Two enemy tanks were knocked out, plus a 150mm field piece. The 2nd Battalion was left in a dispersed and disorganized state and control was not regained until after daylight. Battalion C.O., Lt. Col. William E. Warfield was found dead, believed to have been killed at approximately 0300 hours. Replacements were received and the remainder of battalion were reorganized under command of Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe.

C. Phase #3

1. Elbe River Crossing

The regiment remained in defensive positions, and patrolled across the Elbe River. During the day, 12 June 44, the patrols could not cross the river because of heavy fire from the banks. In the afternoon, the regiment was warned that it would be required to attack across the river the next morning.

At 0245 hours, orders were received for an attack at 0500 hours 12 June 44. The 1st and 3rd Battalions attacked the river line abreast and the 1st Battalion on the right. During the preparatory fires German artillery fired into the troops forming the line of departure causing several casualties. This delayed the attack. At 0800 hours, the attack jumped off. The 1st Battalion was unsuccessful in crossing and moved south to the vicinity of LES FRESNES, where it was surrounded by the Germans. They fought in position until they were almost out of ammunition, at which time elements fought their way out and returned to a position north of the river. During the afternoon the relief of the 3rd Battalion was attempted by sending a detachment of tanks across the river at le MOULIN L'EVEQUE. While a platoon from Company G and a detachment of Engineers from Company A, 121st Engineers successfully removed the minefields from the bridge, the attack was repulsed by German SP guns on the south of the river. Late in the afternoon, after a heavy artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion renewed its attack, which was again repulsed. The 116th Infantry, at dark, forced a crossing.

2. Advance from Elbe River to defensive position.

At 0600 hours, 13 June 1944, 3rd Battalion recrossed the Elbe River against light opposition consisting mostly of artillery and mortar fire. They advanced to position northwest of GONVALES and were attached to the 116th Infantry. The 1st Battalion remained in a defensive position and the 2nd Battalion moved to the defensive line north of river previously held by 3rd Battalion. The Regiment less the 3rd Battalion went into division reserve. This position was maintained until the afternoon of 16 June 44 when the 2nd Battalion moved against a strong point of enemy resistance 300 yards north of

Paragraph I, C, 2 (continued)

HINET and west of ST. CLAIR. It cleared out this resistance and remained there in a position (defensive) overnight. The 3rd Battalion reverted to Regimental control and remained in position. During night the 1st Battalion moved north through ST. CLAIR toward LES FOULONS against slight resistance and occupied a position 200 yards east of LES FOULONS. It remained here in position until next morning. The Regimental CP followed behind the 1st Battalion to a position 700 yards northeast of LES FOULONS where it closed in at 180400Z. The next morning the 2nd Battalion was moved southeast to COUVAINS and attached to the 116th Infantry. The next afternoon the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved southeast towards COUVAINS and then west to BOIS de BRETEL. The Regimental CP followed to BOIS de BRETEL. The 1st Battalion was committed south of woods during the afternoon, and encountered heavy resistance. The 3rd Battalion was also committed to left of 1st Battalion and it did not advance against heavy resistance. The 1st and 3rd Battalions remained there overnight in defensive positions. The 2nd Battalion 115th Infantry was detached from the 116th Infantry, and under Regimental control, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry on the morning of 19 June 44, taking over positions north of La FOSSARDIERE. Early that morning the 3rd Battalion moved to defensive position in vicinity of SEBUEVILLE. The 1st Battalion set up defensive positions at BOIS de BRETEL. The Regimental CP, originally at BOIS de BRETEL, moved to rear of 2nd Battalion, and then to 657682.

D. Phase #4

1. Active defense north of ST. LO.

From the 20th to 30th of June the 115th Infantry was in active defense. There was effected a consolidation of our forces during which time replacements came to the 115th Infantry. There was active night patrolling, and considerable information of value was obtained concerning strength and disposition of enemy forces north of ST. LO.

2. 3rd Armored attack through our positions.

Infantry and tank elements of 3rd Armored Division attacked through our positions at 0900, 29 June 44, to seize high ground running east and west about 400 yards south of LA FORCE. Battalions remained in position and were subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. The following day the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 115th Infantry moved into positions of the 36th Infantry of the 3rd Armored Division, who withdrew through our lines.



II Forces Engaged

A. Phase #1

The Regiment started to engage the enemy immediately behind the beach line defenses and identified units of the 726th Infantry Regiment of the 716th Infantry Division and members of the #17 Pioneer Battalion fighting as infantry. Also, members of the #7 Company 915th Infantry Regiment of the 352nd Infantry Division and the labor battalion (Russian and Italian) attached to the 352nd Infantry were identified.

From beach defenses to the Inundated Area the enemy action consisted mainly of small delaying groups and snipers from the 1714th Artillery Battalion, #17 Pioneer Battalion, 12 Battery #IV Battalion, 352nd Infantry Division Artillery

Phase #2

Crossing of inundated area was strongly opposed by German defense at eastern end, at COLOMBIERES and at BOIS de CALET at south of causeway by units of 914th, 915th and 916th Grenadier Regiments. Snipers and small delaying units were identified as Schnelle Brigade #30.

2nd Battalion was attacked at Le CARRETOUR by units of the 352nd Division Artillery.

Phase #3

The approach to, and the crossing of the Elbe River was opposed by units of three (3) battalions of the Schnelle Brigade #30, units of the 352nd Grenadier Division and an unknown SP gun unit. Documents indicated that parts of the 5th Paratroop Regiment were in these defensive positions.

Phase #4

The following units were identified from the Elbe River to July 1st 1944.

914 Gr. Regts, 915 Gr. Regts and 916 Gr. Regts of the 352nd Infantry Division.
 II Bn 943 Gr Regt 353 Inf Div
 Eng Bn 353 of 353 Inf Div
 9th Regt of 3rd Parachute Div
 513, 517, 518 Bns of Schnelle Brigade #30
 353 Fu Bn

B. Number of Casualties

Number of Prisoners of War evacuated to July 1st

Enlisted Men	- 191
Officers	- 2
Total	- 193

Total number of enemy dead buried to July 1st
 Approximately- 100

It is assumed that at least an equal number were evacuated by the enemy due to relatively slowness of advance until the middle of July the evacuation of enemy wounded and dead by the enemy was excellent.

Important Captures - None

The highest ranking captive taken by this unit was the rank of Captain.

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III Battle Casualties for June 1944

Infantry

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	22	3	0	24	0	26	0	3	78	3	81
Men	<u>212</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>426</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1032</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>1067</u>
Totals	234	27	0	259	3	452	32	103	1110	38	1148

Medical Detachment

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Men	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>28</u>
Totals	2	1	0	8	2	11	0	4	28	1	29

115th Casualties - All Branches

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	23	3	0	24	0	26	0	3	79	3	82
Men	<u>213</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>437</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>1059</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>1095</u>
Totals	236	28	0	267	5	463	32	107	1138	39	1177

Field Grade Officers

Klatt, Richard C., Lt. Col., Commanding 1st Bn, 019277, SWA, 6 June 1944

Warfield, William E., Lt. Col., Commanding 2nd Bn, 0258123, KIA 10 June 1944



IV Awards and Decorations

1. Number of awards by type for action during June:

Silver Star Medals - 3
Bronze Star Medals - 12
Purple Heart Medals - 61

2. Special mention of outstanding incidents in each type.

Silver Star Medal

First Lieutenant Roger E. Watson, 0466065, Medical Corps, United States Army, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. During the entire period 6 June 1944 to 15 June 1944, First Lieutenant Watson's untiring efforts with his unit in immediate contact with the enemy exhibited outstanding judgment as a soldier and a surgeon. It was largely because of his excellent supervision and instructions to others in tactical situations while under enemy fire that he could leave our own forces three times to render medical aid to wounded French civilians. On one occasion eight Germans surrounded the house in which First Lieutenant Watson was attending a wounded French child. Because of his coolness and dignity of bearing, the enemy withdrew and permitted him to complete his work and return to our lines. His courage, skill, and ability reflect great credit upon himself and the Military Service. Entered Military Service from Pennsylvania.

Second Lieutenant Arthur C. Chadwick, Jr., 01300274, Infantry, United States Army, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. On 12 June 1944, Second Lieutenant Chadwick's platoon was attacking a strongly fortified enemy position. The resistance was such that it became necessary to withdraw. During this action, Second Lieutenant Chadwick was wounded, and refusing to be evacuated he participated in another attack on the same strongpoint. Although his group was held up by machine gun fire. After receiving orders to withdraw, he remained until all the wounded were carried to safety. However, upon reorganization he learned that one casualty was not accounted for, and without hesitation, he returned to the exposed area and evacuated the remaining men. Second Lieutenant Chadwick's unselfish actions show a deep regard for his men, and reflect great credit upon himself and the military service. Entered Military Service from New Hampshire.

Private First Class Robert M Moore, 20340558, Infantry, United States, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. On 10 June 1944, Private First Class Moore saw a German tank escorting several American prisoners to the enemy lines. Boldly confronting the tank, with complete disregard for his own safety, he directed the prisoners to disperse, and fired an antitank grenade at the tank. The tank returned the fire, but was compelled to withdraw when friendly support arrived. The courage displayed by Private First Class Moore, in the face of overwhelming odds, reflects great credit upon himself and the Military Service. Entered Military Service from Maryland.

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V Changes in Regimental Staff and Battalion C.O.s

Colonel Eugene N. Slappey, 05136 relieved as Regimental C.O., 1540 hours, 13 June 1944 and replaced by Colonel Godwin Ordway Jr., 016208

Captain George M. Nevius, 0406384, relieved as Regimental S-3, 1600 hours, 14 June 1944 and replaced by Captain Albert G. Warfield, 0409305

Lt. Col. Richard C. Blatt, 019277 - SWA on 6 June 1944. Major James S. Morris, 0309173 took over command until 0800 hours, 14 June 1944 at which time he was relieved and replaced by Major Glover S. Johns Jr., 0307139, as C.O. 1st Battalion 115th Infantry.

Lt. Col. William E. Warfield, 0258123, C.O. 2nd Battalion, 115th Infantry, KIA, 0300 hours, 10 June 1944 and was replaced by Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe, 0256110 who was relieved by Major Maurice G. Clift, 0354335 at 1400 hours, 23 June 1944.

Major Victor P. Gillespie, 02456110, C.O. 3rd Battalion, 115th Infantry relieved 1830 hours, 9 June 1944 by Captain Gert B. Hankins, 0407499 who was relieved (upon his own request) at 0030 hours, 17 June 1944 by Major Charles A. Custer, 0277290 who was relieved at 1500 hours, 23 June 1944 by Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe, 0256110.

ALFRED V. EDNIE
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

319.1 1st Ind
HEADQUARTERS, 29TH INFANTRY DIVISION, A.P.O. 29, U. S. ARMY, 23 July 1944

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, 25, D.C.

THRU: Commanding General, XIX Corps, A.P.O. 270, U. S. Army

Forwarded in compliance with letter, Headquarters, First United States Army, file 319.1, subject: "Action Against Enemy, Reports after/ After Action Reports, dated 13 July 1944, and letter, Headquarters, XIX Corps, same subject and file, dated 19 July 1944

For the Commanding General:

ROBERT H. ARCHER, JR.,
Lt Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

July 21, 1944

After Action Report, Headquarters, 22nd Infantry

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HEADQUARTERS, 22ND INFANTRY
APO 4, U. S. ARMY

R-85
21 July 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Channels

On 6 June 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Force landed on the coast of France. The 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, landed on Utah Beach starting at H plus 75 minutes. The Third Battalion, 22nd Infantry, initially attached to the 8th Infantry, landed in small craft with the mission of crossing the beach seawall, turning to the northwest, and reducing the fortified positions along the coast. The First and Second Battalions landed in LCI's, crossed the beach and inundated area, with the mission of attacking to the northwest, reducing the strong points at Crisbecq and Azeville, and then securing the high ground west and southwest of Quineville. The landing was made approximately 1500 yards south of the proposed beach. By nightfall, the Regiment was short of the initial objective, but had reached the general line Utah Beach-Foucarville.

On the morning 7 June, the Regiment continued the attack. The Third Battalion continued the attack on the beach strong points; the Second Battalion moved forward and launched an attack on the strong point northeast of Azeville; the First Battalion moved through Ravenoville, St Marcouf, and attacked the strong point near Crisbecq. Later in the afternoon the First and Second Battalions received counterattacks in some force and were driven back about 600 yards. During the night the First Battalion received another counterattack at about 0040 and repulsed this action without casualties.

On 8 June the First and Second Battalions attacked the strong points at Azeville and Crisbecq but were unsuccessful. The Third Battalion continued its mission of reducing the beach strong points until late in the afternoon at which time they reverted in place to the Regimental reserve with the mission of blocking an expected enemy attempt to break through the First Battalion to the beach.

A task force commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry A. Barber was formed on 9 June. The decision was made to contain the enemy at Crisbecq with "C" Company, 22nd Infantry and one company of the 899th T.D. Battalion; the remainder of the Regiment was to attack in column of Battalions in order Third, Second, First; after the Third Battalion had seized the town of Azeville and the strong point to the northeast of Azeville. The attack jumped off at approximately 1800 and was met with strong enemy defensive fires.

On 10 June, the Third Battalion moved toward the strong point at Ozeville with the Second Battalion containing the enemy at Chau de Fontenay. The First Battalion attacked the town of Fontenay Sur Mer to relieve the pressure on the Third Battalion, which was receiving flanking fire from that point.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report, Hq 22nd Inf, 21 July 44
cont'd)

The 11th of June found the Third Battalion preparing to assault the Ozeville strong point with the Second Battalion still containing the enemy at Chau de Fontenay. The First Battalion continued the attack on Fontenay Sur Mer.

On the following day the Third Battalion reduced the Ozeville strong point and by nightfall had almost completed the mopping up operation.

On 13 June, the Third Battalion seized the town of Ozeville and moved toward the high ground west of Quineville. The Second Battalion made a wide flanking movement through the 12th Infantry area to attack west along the ridge toward Quineville, and met stiff resistance the entire day. The First Battalion moved from its position near Fontenay Sur Mer to a position to the left of the Third Battalion in preparation for a coordinated Regimental attack on the following morning.

The Regiment attacked with all three battalions on the morning of 14 June, seized the high ground west of Quineville, and organized the position for defense. During the period 15-17 June the 22nd Infantry reorganized and re-equipped without other enemy interference than sporadic artillery fire. The First and Second Battalions remained in the front lines and the Third Battalion moved to the rear with Company "I" held in Division mobile reserve. Late 17 June, the Third Battalion moved to an assembly area southeast of Montebourg and began preparations for an attack on that town.

On the following morning, the Third Battalion was established in its assembly area; the First Battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry; and the Second Battalion was in mobile reserve.

On 19 June, the Third Battalion attacked and seized Montebourg and the Regiment assembled northeast of that town preparatory to an attack to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Le Theil.

Throughout 20 June the Regiment moved rapidly with little or no resistance covering some eight miles and securing the high ground near Le Theil. The enemy had withdrawn to the prepared defenses in and around Cherbourg.

The Regiment attacked early on the morning of the 21st and attained some success although resistance was much heavier. The enemy began infiltrating behind the front lines, making it necessary to supply the assault battalions by tank convey.

When the attack was resumed on 22 June, the Second Battalion attacked across the rear of the Third Battalion to clean out pockets of resistance. The First and Third Battalions made more progress toward the strong point on the high ground north of Le Theil.

On 23 June the First and Third Battalions mopped up the Regimental objective. The Second Battalion, assisted by Company "C", 4th Engineers, mopped up an abandoned village north of Ham Cauchon.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

C O N F I D E N T I A L


(Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report, Hq 22nd Inf, 21 July 1944 cont'd)

The following day the Second Battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry; the First Battalion held the high ground, patrolling vigorously; and the Third Battalion attacked south on another mopping up mission in an effort to drive the infiltrating enemy troops away from the main supply route.

On 25 June, the Second Battalion rejoined the Regiment, attacked to the north, and reached the coast. The Third Battalion seized Bretteville and the First Battalion continued to hold the high ground astride the St Pierre Eglise-Cherbourg road.

On 26 June the Regiment changed its direction of advance from west to east with the mission of destroying the enemy garrison holding the northeastern part of the Cotentin peninsula. On this and the following day (27 June) the Regiment met with some success although the enemy was a determined defender. Late on the 27th, the airport north of Gonneville fell and negotiations for the surrender of the garrison manning the coastal defenses were begun. The negotiations were completed early on the morning of the 28th and the surrender of 990 German officers and men was effected by 1330, 28 June, ending the fighting in the northeastern part of the Cotentin peninsula.

The Regiment moved to an assembly area for a short rest period prior to further operations.



C. T. LATHAM
Colonel, 22nd Infantry
Commanding

C O N F I D E N T I A L

**Debriefing Conference on D-Day, 82d Airborne Division Report,
Aug 1944**

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DEBRIEFING CONFERENCE - OPERATION NEPTUNE

On the evening of Thursday, 13 August 1944, a debriefing conference was held at the Glebe Mount House, LEICESTER. During the course of the conference each commander present who had commanded a unit the size of a battalion or larger of the 82d Airborne Division in Operation NEPTUNE, was permitted to talk for not to exceed ten minutes. Instructions were that each officer was to speak freely, without restraint, regarding any aspect of the operation during its airborne phase and to offer any criticism he saw fit in the interests of improving our operational technique in future combat. Commanders spoke in the order in which it was planned that they would land. Their statements were taken down verbatim as far as possible. At the conclusion of the conference, considerable free-for-all discussion took place of which no record was kept. However, it did have a bearing on the conclusions attached to this report.

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OF OSD Memo, May 3, 1972
BY Sonners ON February 8, 1977

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Lt Col VANDERVOORT, 2d Bn., 505th Pzcht Inf:

I feel that I have very little for posterity at the moment. The flight until we hit the French coast was quite uneventful for my Battalion. We reached FRANCE intact and in formation. As we came in across the coast we saw a little ack-ack from the ground and I thought that there were some planes from the 101st Division shot down. As we approached our DZ the pilot informed me that he could see our T. The pathfinder group had been dropped essentially where they should have been, a little further inland, and they only displayed two T's. One was lighted when we dropped. The pilot I had was extremely reluctant to come down to the correct jumping altitude. We came in at 1400 feet, and our speed was excessive. I talked to the crew chief and asked him to slow down. We went through a bit of scud as we came in and it caused the formation to break slightly. At the time I thought the Germans had smoked the area. I lost two platoons from Company "B". The green light was turned on about 45 seconds before we reached the LOUVE River. I told them to turn it off. We dropped pretty well on our DZ. I, myself, was a quarter of a mile from the DZ, and I had a little hard luck on the landing and banged up my foot. I watched the battalion come in and they were well spread out, the ships being too high and too fast. Within fifteen minutes after I got on the ground I started putting up some green flares that worked out well. We encountered no resistance from the enemy at night, only some fire from ack-ack around our DZ. Some members of the battalion were dropped in ST. MERE EGLISE and were engaged in a fire fight at once. There was movement of vehicles on the road, one of the first things I heard being vehicles moving on a road to the South. I went North to the nearest hedgerow. I think it was about 0410 in the morning when I felt I completed the assembly sufficiently so that I could move out on our mission and take the town of NEUVILLE au PLAIN. In the meantime, the regiment had told me to stand by. The news from ST. MERE EGLISE was so vague to the Regimental commander that he had me stand by. General RIDGWAY happened to be in my CP during that period and he also directed me not to move without consulting him. It was not until daylight that I received orders to move. We actually started moving at 0600. Later my mission was changed to ST. MERE EGLISE, and from there on it was essentially a ground operation. The 2d Battalion met no resistance as we went into the town. A small group of Germans attacked our left flank, but one platoon from "D" Company was enough to drive them off, and as I said, it was a ground operation thereafter. It was 0141 when I landed.

- Q. Apparently it was 0730 when you were ready to move out?
- A. We started moving at 0600. Reorganization was only partially completed, but when I reached the town I had a battalion less two platoons. In the meantime, I picked up quite a few people from the 101st Division, and some men from other regiments which I carried along for several days and then returned them to their organization.
- Q. Do you think that your lighted T was a great factor in your getting to your destination?
- A. It meant a great deal to us. I saw planes coming in from various directions, from 40 degrees to 90 degrees off course. They came in close to the T, and dropped their personnel. I think some planes from the 101st circled and dropped their people there.
- Q. Did you attempt to use your green assembly lights at all?
- A. None of my lights worked; anticipating that, I had a flashlight I had fixed up with green facing and I flashed that.
- Q. None of your lights worked. Why?
- A. I don't know, I had no opportunity to inspect them. I hid them, but later couldn't find them.

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Q. You say you had orders at 0410 to tell where you were. How did you get those orders?

A. We had radio contact with the regiment very early. Regimental S-3, after daylight, came by my CP, and as I remember, the Regimental Commander was also there at one time.

Q. What did you think of the challenging system?

A. Right at the moment, sir, I would make no essential changes. I would like to impress upon the Air Corps the necessity for coming down to the proper altitude, and flying at the proper speed. We have stories at the battalion from men who spoke to pilots later on, quoting pilots as follows: "—and the last time I looked at the air speed indicator we were going at 190 miles per hour." It was the hardest opening I ever had. I have jumped at 130 and 140 miles per hour, but this was the roughest I ever had. It tore off some of my equipment.

I made a positive identification of where I was by sending an S-2 patrol to the nearest house. The Frenchman there gave us much valuable information of the enemy.

I believe that the greatest single contribution to the assembly of the 505 was the superior job done by our pathfinder teams, Air Corps and parachute.

Lt. Col. Krause, 3rd Bn., 505th Inf:

I, too, experienced the same as Col. Vandervoort. The trip was very uneventful on the way over. As we crossed the coast of FRANCE, I talked to my pilot on the interphone, and said, "It looks like a good deal". I looked back and saw my ships behind me. Just about that time we hit the soup, (fog or cloud), and we started to see fires on the ground, a little ack-ack and we had some fighters come in on us and fire at us. An element of three ships was directly under us and not more than thirty feet below. One came up from under and passed miraculously between my ship and the left wing ship. I would say that in the next three minutes I came as close to being crashed in the air as I ever hope to. We tried to keep our formation, but ships constantly over ran each other. The pilot called for evasive action and we split up. Some went high, some went lower, others right and left. This split our formation and we were well spread. Just about two or three minutes before drop time we saw this green T. It was a Godsend and I felt that I had found the Holy Grail. I would say that I dropped from over 2,000 feet. It was the longest ride I have had in over fifty jumps, and while descending, four ships passed under me and I really sweated that out. Just after I landed, a mine bundle hit about 80 yards away from me without a parachute and exploded. We tried to orient ourselves very quickly, and ran upon a conical shaped field, which I remembered as the conical shaped field that we had studied during our preinvasion briefing. Northeast of this should be the Battalion DZ Command Post which was to be in a wooded area on the Southeast end of the DZ. Further investigation proved this to be true and then I knew exactly where we were, or thought I knew where we were, and I told the people all around me. Because we were so split up, we did not have too much organization of the units. We even had some men from the other Divisions contacting us. I composed two groups, one under Captain DeLong and the other under Lt. Isaacs and we began to form, but not too rapidly. I sent out patrols to guide in assembling groups and about that time we saw the green flares. I could not find my original signal which I was supposed to use and likewise alternate signals were gone. We had absolutely no visual signals to assemble on. Our method of assembly was to roll up on our sticks. Our sticks formed up in good shape. The next problem was that of people running through our area wanting to know where they were. Major McGinity asked where we were and I told him whereupon he put his map away and headed for the bridge with Captain Dolan and most of Company A. We were starting to get close to 200 men in about an hour and a half of assembling. One of my officers landed in the town of STE MERE Eglise. On his way out he saw a group of Germans and witnessed several chutists taken prisoner and others killed, so he headed Northeast to join us.

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On his way he picked up a slightly inebriated Frenchman, who stated that this was STE. MERE EGLISE, and we knew then exactly where we were. It was just before four when I made the decision to move out to STE. MERE EGLISE. We moved in from the Northwest on the road that the man had said the troops had departed from. It was mostly transportation and service units that had remained in the town when the bulk of the forces moved into field bivouac several days prior to D-Day because of the bombing. Captain DeLong and I went in toward the Northwest section of town. The civilian in a white coat was carrying an American mine while guiding the way. We made him go out first so that he would not lead us into any gun position. We met no opposition, but we did meet some members of the other units, and they were all heading for their missions. I would say that we arrived in town just before light and had no opposition at all, mainly due to the covered route the civilian took us by, but in the center of the town there were spasmodic shots that became ever increasing. My instructions to my men were not to fight with any other unit but to fight with me in the town. This proved worthy because all my men concentrated on getting to the town and the bulk of my Battalion was with me by mid-morning. The remaining enemy troops in the town were apparently scared out of the town. The force which we had was just a jumbled group and in order to secure the town as quickly as possible we endeavored to establish road blocks around the town as hastily as possible, which we did. One important thing we were going to do was to cut the communication lines. We thought we found it, and severed the main cable from the town. As more troops came in we put up road blocks around the whole town. We had about one fourth of the force we expected at about five O'clock. A message was sent to the Regimental CP. This message was dispatched at about five O'clock.

Q. About how many men did you have in the town?

A. We had 120 men and groups of 40 and 60 came in rapidly throughout the morning. At about 10 O'clock 350 men of the Second Battalion came in.

Q. What happened to your two artillery pieces?

A. One we never found, sir, and one was in action before noon.

Q. Did you have color assembly lights to use?

A. Yes sir. I think in the next operation for assembly we should try to get weather balloons, and stick the light up on that.

Colonel Ekman, Commanding Officer, 505th Parachute Infantry:

I have nothing much to add about the ride over, except the 1st Battalion Commander, Major Kellum, not being here, being KIA, I can give his story. Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Bn. got in the planes, and just about five or six minutes prior to taking off a huge explosion occurred. Someone had set off a Cammon Grenade which in turn set off all the ammunition. I was initiated into combat that way. I saw a lot of dead bodies lying around after the explosion. Our ride over was uneventful except for the ack-ack which came pretty close to our planes. Jumping out after going through the clouds, I baled out at about 0204 hrs. according to my watch. I had a very hard opening, because we were going at least 150 miles per hour. I do not remember the landing because I was pretty dazed. I was in the midst of a field of cattle when I landed. No other personnel was around me. It took me about ten minutes to get out of my chute. I found out later that I had landed just a few hundred yards South of FRESVILLE, which is well Northwest of STE. MERE EGLISE. I started out and the first man I met was Major Thomas of the 508th, and he was treating a few men who were injured. I wandered around still dazed for about two hours. Just before four o'clock I ran across Major Norton, and we debated about where we were. About that time we found a Frenchman and from him we got the direction to the town and found that there were a number of Germans there. We started out to our area and on the way we ran into the

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1st Bn. under Major Kellum, heading toward the bridge and his area. "A" Company had very speedily organized and was already engaging the enemy just East of the bridge near STE MERE EGLISE. Rest of the 1st Bn. continued on their mission to get on to the assembly area, they being the Regtl. Reserve. We went further towards the CP and ran into the 2nd Bn. At that time, the situation being a little obscure, we told Lt. Col Vandervoort to stand fast until further orders. At the location of the CP was Gen. Ridgway, and we speedily established the CP. It was a little after seven o'clock when I heard that the 3rd Bn. was in STE MERE EGLISE, that the 2nd Bn. was moving toward their objective, and that the 1st Bn. was well down toward the bridge. The situation was well in hand. Later on the 2nd Bn. fell back into STE MERE EGLISE and with the 3rd Bn. organized for the defense of the town against superior enemy forces which were attacking from the North, Northwest and South. When action in STE MERE EGLISE ended, these two units were all mixed up due to the speed with which they had to move to meet enemy threats.

Q. Would you recommend any changes if you were to do it over again?

A. I see no reason to change the assembly plan except to get the assembly lights where they can be seen. I also came in from a higher altitude and a greater speed than I should have, and believe the Air Corps should receive more training in dropping our units.

Q. In your area you had two lighted T's, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir. The only comment I have on the operation is about the speed, the altitude of the planes and the assembly lights. One plane load returned to the base because of some trouble. The men joined us about a week later in a C-47. When I was on the field I was sure our plane had not come in from the proper direction. I noticed planes coming in from all directions and all altitudes. The assembly lights did not work in this case. I saw some flares which I believed Col. Vandervoort put up.

Q. How long were you in the fog?

A. Right after crossing the coast and, I would say, maybe three miles from ST. SAUVIER we hit a heavy cloud bank and it was then that we lost control of the formation. Just a little ways this side of the MERDERET my plane came down under the clouds, but I could see few of the planes.

Q. What do you think of the use of flares?

A. I like the use of flares only in the event the assembly lights won't work. The flares, if not shot straight up, that is, if shot at an angle, will give the impression that they are two or three hundred yards from the actual assembly point. The "T" lights are not feasible to use for assembly except in case of extreme emergency as they cast off so much light. (Col. Vandervoort) - In regard to the flares try to pick a place where the enemy is not, then the flares will work. In regard to radios, you need 12 radios to do it right. Tie in everybody with 536 radios, we dropped our 300's in bundles, but through 536's we tied in very quickly and were able to locate men right away.

Colonel Ekman continues--I think it is better to use BAR's in leg packs in place of machine guns during the actual drop. You can move out with BAR's in place of machine guns and come back later for the guns which would be dropped in bundles. "A" Company was delayed in moving out as they couldn't find their bundles immediately. The weapons section we had contained machine guns in the squad, we jumped with some BAR'S, but would like to replace the machine guns with BAR'S, because looking for the machine guns holds us back at first.

Q. Do you want two BAR's in every squad and one machine gun?

A. In the machine gun section we would like to have for the drop two BAR's. A searching party to find the machine gun bundle and bring up guns later. Each rifle squad to have two BAR's. "A" Company could have been able to secure the bridge if they had had their bundles. We lost quite a bit of equipment. Someone can always use the BAR'S after the machine guns are found.

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C. How did you identify your bundles?

A. (Col. Vandervoort) - We didn't use any bundle lights. We daisy-chained all six bundles tied together. I lost one 60mm Mortar; I had the bulk of my machine guns. I had more radios than the rest of the Regiment put together. Tie your bundles together - it helps. We used a system of luminous paint to separate the bundles. I believe that bundles should be painted lighter colors to be seen easier. We used no vitrolite on our bundles, but we later used it for marking roads, etc. The system of challenges and responses was OK. One thing in combat people have no scruples about whose equipment they have as long as they get it. Another thing, my men were reluctant to get everything. It is important that the men are trained to get everything they have. Jumping with an M-1 mine on the individual proved beneficial.

Lt. Col. Mendz, 3rd Bn., 508th Pchth. Inf:

I was in command of the 3rd Bn. at the outset. I didn't see my Bn. for five days. We ran into a lot of trouble as soon as we hit land. The flak was terrific. We jumped from about 2100 feet, the entire serial, and were going rather fast. 2100 feet is too much of a ride, I checked my field bag and found 3 bullet holes in it. Lt. Daly was subsequently killed. I landed about 0230 in the morning and didn't see anybody for five days, with the possible exception of my messenger. I batted 1000 with my pistol, I got three Heines with three shots; two Heines with a carbine and one Heine with a hand grenade. The Germans had a very good means of communication. We seemed to run into antiparatroop groups of about 60 men and we shot back and forth. We drew the conclusion that these groups called other groups who were waiting for us. Altogether I had three men, one officer and my messenger. The most outstanding thing I learned was the accurate intelligence of the Germans. They used full name, even nicknames to confuse my company commanders. My company commanders stated that they received messages in my full name and even my nickname. It is essential that the challenging system must be known to the Air Corps as well, in case they end up on the ground. The reply to the challenge must be given very quickly or it will be too bad. Selection of words is very important. We landed about 3/4 or a mile from the DZ, Southeast. I was on the North side of the DOUVE River. In the five days that I was separated from the Bn. I walked 90 miles. I was looking for the Second Battalion and all I found was ack-ack. We never saw a T, we jumped on the green light. The pilot did not see the T light either. It would be helpful to have earphones from the jump master and the crew chief and the pilot. As a matter of fact "G" Company was dropped in the ocean and several men were drowned. Recommend the short method of challenging, bundles be daisy-chained, one light per plane load of bundles.

Lt. Col. Warren, Bn. Executive, 1st Bn., 508th Pchth. Inf:

I came in as Executive Officer, 1st Bn., Col. Batcheller, commanding. Shortly after the drop he was KIA. The mission of the 508th was to go into Force "A" reserve in the vicinity of Hill 30, West of the MERDERET River. Our flight across the channel was very uneventful, it was routine. As we hit the coast we got some flak. I checked and noted that all the planes were back there. But then we hit the clouds and it spread us a little. I could still see the leading V even in the fog. We passed over ST. SAUVEUR le VICOMTE, and got a lot of flak which spread the formation. Then we went over ETIENVILLE and got a hell of a lot of flak there. Then I looked around and there were no ships around my plane. I jumped on the green light, and just after coming out of the plane I turned around and looked over my shoulder and saw the DOUVE River behind me very close. I landed about half way between PICAUVILLE and the DOUVE. I landed in an orchard. We got a great deal of flak practically all along the entire route between SAN SAUVEUR le VICOMTE and ETIENVILLE. After coming down I only saw one plane which was towing a glider and kept on going, and another C-47 which was shot down in flames. I did have a light

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but I didn't put it up, because it was obvious it would not be seen. I toured the area in ever widening circles trying to collect as many men as I could. Daylight came approximately 0430 or 0445 in the morning and I collected some 20 odd men and ran into Captain McRoberts who had the entire 508 radar outfit. They put up no lights because their lights were lost. The hedges were high, and the orchards were practically all over the place near PICAUVILLE. I collected between 40 and 50 men and headed for GOUTEVILLE just north of Hill 30. I got up to GOUTEVILLE and found part of D and E Company and a platoon of the 505 under Lt. Medaugh. We were on the verge of attacking GOUTEVILLE with 100 men, but we had no supporting weapons - just rifles and carbines. Since there was an estimated German Battalion in GOUTEVILLE we just stayed on the hill and shot at them. About 15 truck loads of Germans went by, going in the direction of LA FIERRE. After shooting at them all afternoon I got in contact with Col. Shanley and joined forces and moved west about 500 yards of my position near Hill 30 and stayed there for five days. No lights were used in the area south of PICAUVILLE because the area was too dense. Hedges were high and orchards were all over the place.

Colonel LINDQUIST, 508th Parachute Infantry

I went out about 1200 feet near AMFREVILLE. It was a good opening and a soft landing in about 2½ feet of water. The light went up within ten minutes after hitting the ground. The area was open and marshy, and the assembly light could be seen for about 600 yards. The assembly light worked well for about twenty minutes and then went out because of water soaking into the batteries. When the light went I stayed there 30 minutes before we moved out. There was no light on the embankment, the light was in the center of the drop of Regimental Headquarters. The challenging worked fine. There was very little challenging around the lighted area at first as the men came in. The challenging system was o.k., the verbal system should be used so long as it is consistent. I would make no changes in regards to what was planned before the operation. All of our equipment went into the water and went out of sight. We stumbled upon two bundles, but it was nothing that we could use. I think we should continue using radio communication and one light per battalion for assembling. I think flares would work well. Anything in regard to light should be used to get the unit together. As time goes on I would take a greater chance in regard to lights to get my units together.

Lt. Col. OSTBERG, 1st Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

We were scheduled to drop north of AMFREVILLE. We ran into a fog. I saw my flight and it was all there for about the first three minutes. We ran into a lot of flak. Pebbles kept hitting, which I didn't have enough sense to realize what was going on. We had no T to guide on, and only one radar set of the six we dropped was set up. Don't sell the home-made lights short. They are not so bright for a great distance but do allow for good identification. We had no automatic weapons until two o'clock the next morning. Phone communication should be in the plane. Second-hand information is no good, but you can't tell the pilot what his job is. We dropped from a low altitude. I landed in a very flat field, but it was inundated. I would endorse the home-made light on the bundle. The method of assembly lights should be kept as simple as possible. A lot depends on the terrain. We had no flares. If we were to do it again I would have flares, because I consider them well worth while. It would be a good idea to have a flare to spare.

Lt. Col. KUHN, 3rd Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

Our mission was to establish a defensive position just west of AMFREVILLE. The Air Corps sold us a snow job for they changed the SOP. I was in the lead ship of my Bn. Telephonic communication should be established between crew chief and jumpmaster. We had a very uneventful trip

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until we hit the mainland, and then things popped. There was no communication with the pilot whatsoever. I never had such a hard opening in my life. I think that the flash and thunder system is best for challenging. We dropped about 0240 in the morning. We landed about one mile southeast of FRESVILLE. "H" Company recovered a good deal of their equipment, but they used their home-made lights which was one flashlight bulb and two batteries. We used no luminous tape. "G" and "I" Companies landed up about the railroad tracks, closer to the DZ than where we landed. The issue Air Corps light was not worth a damn. Short challenging is the better way of identification.

Q. What's wrong with the Air Corps issue lighting?

A. The Air Corps light breaks. A good solid jar will knock it out. The Air Corps light did not burn long enough, and you can't tell one light from another.

Lt. Col. TIMES, 2nd Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

I was in the group flown by Col. Mitchell. We got below a lot of haze and we flew at about 550 feet above the ground. We did not go too fast, and our landing was very good. We jumped at 0230, and we did not see any lights on the ground. I had a lot of difficulty in assembling. We had the mission of taking AMFREVILLE. I never did get with the Battalion until about the fifth day. As to lights, it would be a mistake to sell them short. The Executive Officer had a light, and the Regimental Commander had a light, and the Radar Section also had a light. Our flares were wet and did not work. I assembled small groups not far from the LA FIERE bridge. Most of the bundles went into the swamp. We used the knot system and lights on our bundles, but we only retrieved a few. The mistake we made was that we used wooden container lights and most of them wouldn't work. The radios were jumped right on the radio men. The radio would come in handy but we had no radio. It was tragic not to have a radio for the first five days. The challenging system of using two words is excellent. The men were getting out of the planes too slowly and this caused dispersion. Also teach the men to get out of their equipment and chutes. Men should be taught more about that. After Captain Swartzwalder came in we were going to make a night attack on the bridge at AMFREVILLE, but we didn't because the artillery fire was falling on us.

We tied our bundles together and I think it is a good practice in using the knot system. We used no luminous lights, but if we were to do it again we would use bundle lights. We would use anything to help identify the bundles. We had to send out real strong patrols to recover the bundles. I would have liked to have talked to the pilot if there was an inter-phone. (Col. Mendez: One light per daizy chain for the bundles is recommended.)

Lt. Col. Shanley, 2d Bn., 508th Prcht Inf

My original mission was to capture the town of ETIENVILLE and blow the bridge there and also the bridge at BOUZVILLE LA BASTILLE. On the flight to the drop my Bn. did not experience a great deal of flak. However, we experienced heavier flak than has just been described. A lot of jumpmasters said the planes took evasive action, and that may be the reason for the dispersion on the jump. The planes started taking evasive action due to the flak. I threw an A-4 radio bundle out, the chute on it failed, its contents were smashed; my battalion assembly light in it was also smashed. S-3 was supposed to have a light, but I did not see it. I used flashlights up in the trees when I landed. On the ground there was considerable fire which was all around us. A lot of the men who came into the assembly area had already killed a German or two. We landed just north of PICAUVILLE, and there were quite a few Germans around there. I sent several patrols out in different directions to get more men. I had only about 35 men with me at dawn. At that time I sent more patrols out and started encountering fairly heavy resistance. At approximately noon we were very heavily engaged on three sides, and I pulled out after I found that another group, larger than mine, was

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east of us. I left behind in that place about ten men, most of whom were jump casualties. Shortly after leaving the location north of PICAUVILLE I collected approximately 200 men and officers, lost members of the 508th and from all Battalions who had gotten together there, and I set up in that location, which was 1000 yards east of PICAUVILLE. With 200 men, I had two machine guns, no mortars and no other automatic weapons. We didn't have much success in getting the bundles on the ground. I did have SCR 300 radios however. By radio I got in touch with another group which was commanded by Lt. Col. Warren. Several different groups of Frenchmen informed me that there were about 500 Germans in PICAUVILLE and more than that in ETIENVILLE. Having almost no heavy weapons and with so many Germans between my group and the objective I selected the one mission that the Regiment had that I felt I could accomplish--seizing a crossing of the MERDERET River. Lt. Col. Warren's group joined mine and we set up a defensive position on Hill 30, West of the MERDERET. Eventually the remainder of the regiment joined us on the West of the MERDERET River. I wish I had had flares to use for assembly after the jump; lights were useless in that terrain. A Frenchman told us that PICAUVILLE was a German bivouac area.

Q. Would you want to use flares there?

A. If I didn't use them there, I could have moved elsewhere and used them.

Q. Didn't you have flares?

A. No sir. I thought the Germans would have them and our men would be walking into the Germans. Flares, however, are the only feasible system of assembly in that hedgerow country. We used vitrolite tubing on our bundles. All the bundles I found contained ammunition. I did not find any heavy weapons.

Q. Did you succeed in rounding up your own stick?

A. No sir. I found many bundles, but found no one around the bundle. Eventually I ran into some men, but found none from my own stick for quite awhile. The men worked the challenging system very well. I recommend that we have one system of challenging to use throughout training and combat, and not change it later on, because that causes difficulty. Changing over confuses the men. In regard to assembly lights, we couldn't get them up high enough to be seen any distance.

Q. Would you have used a light that would flash up for one-thirtieth of a second every five or six seconds, and that would light up approximately a distance of six (6) miles (Krypton light).

A. Yes, I would use a light like that if I had to, to assemble my battalion.

Lt. Col. Royd, 1st Bn., 325th Glider Inf:

We came in at D plus 1 at about 0730 in the morning. The men who flew the planes on D minus 1 scared the hell out of us by painting a bad picture. The 437 at Ramsbury was in quite a state of excitement. The landing zone was changed on us. The trip was uneventful. We were supposed to land in the Southwest part of STE MERE EGLISE, but the order was changed. We landed in the Southeast corner of STE MARIE du MONT. We came in too close together. The speed was 170 miles per hour and we were eight feet above the ground when we hit the trees. The first aid man saw us hit and they got to us immediately. The gliders should be strung out a little more to avoid collision. We had our 300 radio and all the companies checked in except "A" Company and we proceeded to the assembly area. We landed at seven o'clock in the morning. Our medical detachment came in about two PM and they took care of some casualties. Out of seven hundred men we had 600 ready to operate at 2 PM. We should have the glider pilots earlier for instruction. The Air Corps started dropping tow ropes all over us, which was wrong. Some even went over our troops. These ropes are an item of

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critical issue and should be taken home instead of being dropped in the area in FRANCE. We had no flak and plenty of air protection. We flew in column of fours, but would like to fly in a column of twos. A single column double tow, should be satisfactory, but would like to have some practice before taking it up. We were cut out at about 200 feet which was entirely too low.

Lt. Col. T. H. Sanford, Exec. 1st Bn., 325th Glider Inf:

The gliders, as a whole, came in too low. Cutting the gliders loose at 200 feet, traveling 120 miles per hour, in an area with such small fields and tall trees doesn't give the glider pilot any opportunity at all to select the field or to make the proper approach for a landing. Tug pilots had been instructed to go up to 700 feet after crossing the beach and very few, if any, of them increased their altitude. Many of the crashes of the gliders were a direct result of the failure of the tug pilots to give the glider pilot altitude enough to make a proper landing. In training it had been demonstrated that gliders can be landed safely in very small fields if the glider pilot has altitude enough to make a proper approach and come in slow. Under the conditions under which our pilots landed in NORMANDY they had no opportunity for selection of the field, or to turn to make any approach to it. It was just cut loose and land, which put a great many of our gliders into the trees and resulted in rather high casualties. Most all of this was due to the failure of the tug pilots to follow instructions and to give the glider pilots an altitude of 700 feet.

Colonel March, Division Artillery:

We use the system of tying our equipment together and we had no trouble. We got one gun going at STE MERE EGLISE. It would be a good idea to have a Battalion of parachute field artillery go with every regiment. We can get the individual guns in but to get them to work and assembled has not been very successful. This was sometimes due to landing. The landing zones of the gliders was SNAFU. LZ's were changed and the Air Corps was not informed of it. Some fire was delivered on D-Day, and much more on D plus 1, and it was built up as it went along. (At this point Col. March was interrupted and the following incident of artillery support related):

"Col. Shanley who was on the West bank of the MERDERET, Hill 30, had an SCR 300 which was in contact with the Regimental CP on the East bank of the river at CHEF du PONT. At the Regimental CP an artillery liaison party had set up the radio and wire net and was in a position to fire in direct support but did not have contact with Col. Shanley direct. Col. Shanley was being pressed by German infantry and requested through the SCR 300 artillery support, and an infantry officer adjusted fire through this medium with superior results".

Colonel March continued: If you are in a jam talk to somebody and try to get some artillery.

The gliders were coming in two and four at a time. I don't know whether I agree with that or not. Personally, I don't know how much they are briefed, but they usually go for the first field they see, particularly if someone is shooting at them. The best thing is to have a zone marked for a group.

In regard to parachute artillery, it is practical from the point of view of artillery. It will land and will be able to shoot. To get four guns together is quite difficult. In SICILY they got three together and did a nice job. (Statement made by an Infantry battalion commander present-- "Artillery coming in by parachute is good even if you can get one gun out of four".)

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Lt. Col. Singleton, 80th AT Bn:

We landed at 0420 in the morning at STE MARIE DuPONT. Everything went well until we got just between the islands of JERSEY and GUERNSEY, and then there was heavy flak. We came in a column of fours, and it was a nice formation, and we ran into a cloud bank, milky in texture, we could see very little. There was a lot of flak, small arms fire, machine gun fire and snipers. The glider pilots did a fine job. We came in 1½ hours after the last paratrooper landed. Anti-tank guns were scattered all over the area. It seems that we landed when all the Germans were awake. We landed at about four o'clock and we cut loose and glided about ten miles before landing. We landed very smoothly. We took in 16 guns in the dark and the next day we had about five out of those 16 within the Division area. Ten men are needed by a squad. The CG4s had one gun, a little ammunition and two men, or, two men and a jeep which should have a machine gun on it to protect the men. With CG-13 we could probably get guns and more personnel. The guns were OK but we did not have enough personnel.

Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin (CG task force "A"):

(This statement was dictated on August 16th at Hos., 82d A/B Division)

To begin with, the serial after leaving ENGLAND was in good shape--tight formation--all ships apparently present. The flight, as well as it could be observed from the lead plane, was excellent. Some flak came up from the channel islands--tracers were seen falling short. Shortly after crossing the West coast, the first check point was seen which I had figured would be BRICOUABEC. We then entered dense clouds. Ships which had been flying within a matter of feet of each other could not be seen anywhere. The red light went on, indicating four minutes before the drop. When it was almost time for the green light we emerged from the clouds. There were no ships in sight. A river appeared in the distance turning to the West, which I estimated to be either the DOUVE or the upper reaches of the MERDERET. The green light went on at about the instance several of the ships appeared out of the fog, closing in on us. After about a 3 second dealy we went out. Small arms fire was coming up from the ground when the chute opened--just general shooting all over the area. Off to the right of the line of flight there was considerable apparent gunfire and flak. I figured that it probably was in the vicinity of ETIENVILLE, where there was supposed to be located the only known heavy AA installations in the area. A lot of firing was seen straight in the line of flight--tracers going into the air--several miles away. I landed in an orchard, joined my aide who landed nearby (LT OLSON) and proceeded to "roll up the stick" as per plan, arriving on the edge of a wide swamp where I found the remaining men of my stick who were endeavoring to retrieve equipment bundles from the deep mud and marsh. At this time parachutists were seen descending, landing in the swamp and on the banks. After collecting my stick, I found that several men had been injured during the landing, and two hit during descent. About 20 minutes after reaching the marsh, a red assembly light showed on the far bank. A few minutes thereafter a blue assembly light showed to the South of the red light several hundred yards. I sent Lt. OLSON at once to direct all the men that he could contact to report to me in my location. As it happened, the blue light was the 508 light--the red one of the 507 lights. Close-in security was posted. The Germans took no aggressive action, despite the fact that they were obviously in the area since there had been considerable firing during the descent. The river bank was well dug with slit trenches and prepared gun positions. Men from the 507 began arriving. Within two hours, about 150 men were assembled--all 507 except my own stick, and about one plane load of 508. Lt. OLSON reported that there was a railroad embankment on the far side of the swamp, and that it was passable for foot troops. We decided that we were on the MERDERET River since it was the only river with marshes and with a railroad running North and South alongside of it. Prior to this point, I had estimat-

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ed that we must be on the DOUVE because of the depth and width of the water. Our pre-operational photo interpretation had rather clearly established the fact that the MERDERET was a narrow stream, about 20 yards wide and several feet deep. The value of the MERDERET River as an anti-tank obstacle had been carefully studied. The river bank was surrounded by marsh land, covered with grass which on the fringes was used for grazing. Actually, it developed that the grass was swamp grass several feet long, which showed above the water and concealed the wide expanse of flooded area from the photo interpreter. Heavy firing was seen in the direction of what was thought to be STE NERE EGLISE. At about 0430, Colonel MALONEY and Colonel OSTBERG, of the 507th, with about 150 men, had reported to me, and I decided to move as soon as possible to seize the West end of the LA FIERRE bridge. I considered it necessary to accomplish this before daylight because of the impracticability of fighting through the swamps, of which there were several, in the face of any German automatic weapons. Steps were taken to get the force organized for movement, but in a few minutes two gliders landed about 400 yards West of our position. By this time I had definitely decided that we were on the West bank of the MERDERET River several miles North of LA FIERRE. It had been reported to me that Colonel LINDQUIST had moved down the railroad with about 100 men towards LA FIERRE. Some individuals were still coming in. Everyone who was not on security was working at retrieving bundles from the swamp. I managed to get one bazooka and a few rounds of ammunition. All other heavy equipment and radios were then in the swamp water or impossible to get to. The glider landings appeared most fortuitous, and steps were taken to get the equipment out of them. With luck it would be a 57mm AT gun, which would come in very handy. At this time gliders were going overhead moving in the direction of STE NERE EGLISE. All indications tended to more clearly establish our estimated location as being correct. In order to retrieve the contents of the gliders, the move South was temporarily delayed while patrols were sent to the gliders. Lt. GRAHAM was placed in charge of these patrols. Lt. GRAHAM returned in about a half hour stating that he needed at least 30 men. One glider contained a "57", and one a jeep. They had landed in a marsh and it was very difficult to extricate the gun and vehicle. Some German small arms fire was being received in the vicinity of the gliders at this time. Lt. Col. MALONEY was instructed to make the men available to Lt. GRAHAM. About a half hour later Lt. GRAHAM returned and stated that he couldn't get the men, couldn't get out the equipment with the men he had, and that the German fire was increasing. I accompanied him to the hedge along the field containing the gliders where the fire was building up with considerable intensity. With some difficulty additional men were obtained and finally either the gun or jeep, I forget which now, was removed only to become impossibly bogged in the swampy bottom. At my direction Lt. GRAHAM destroyed the jeep and removed part of the breach mechanism of the "57"mm. It was just barely possible to do this, since the German Force was becoming increasingly aggressive. It was now broad daylight. It was about 6 or 6:30 AM. The degree of enemy build-up and his attitude made the possibility of moving down the West bank at this time appear impracticable, and I decided to move to the railroad embankment and move in the direction of LA FIERRE, and there pick up all who could be found from the 508, contact the 505, and attack the bridge from the East side. Orders were issued, and the movement started across the marsh. The movement started and contact was established with the 1st Battalion, 505th, under the command of Major KELLAMs at LA FIERRE. His battalion had landed as per plan, and was carrying out its prescribed mission. His point was then engaged at the LA FIERRE bridge.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Challenging.--Without exception, all agreed that the system of challenging employed was the best; that is, one word for a challenge, and one word for a response -- no further conversation being necessary. This

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further substantiates the findings as a result of the SICILIAN operation. It is important that the same challenging system be employed in training as in combat.

2. Assembly.--The assembly plan employed appeared sound and took the following steps. Each stick rolls up on the bundles. After securing the equipment, sticks join each other by sight or patrol contact, or rendezvous at a previously agreed upon terrain feature, or by radio contact. The assembly lights, one per battalion, were used and proved to be very valuable when placed in operation. Except for not being high enough, were most satisfactory for their purpose. Prior to this operation orders were issued as follows: "Each battalion commander, or one of his designated battalion staff officers, would take with him a flare which he should employ if all other assembly aids failed". It is unfortunate that this order was not carried out by all participants. It is noteworthy, however, that the flare when used, served its purpose well. It is believed that the present practice of limiting the use of flares to a battalion commander or one of his designated staff officers is sound. Too many flares create an impossible situation. One light per battalion is all that is permissible. However, the lights must be raised 40 to 50 feet above the ground. (Experiments are now being conducted in this Division with a view to the employment of large balloons capable of raising an assembly light to the proper altitude.) It is believed that the assembly could be facilitated by having more radios jumped on the individuals, and it is believed that for this purpose more radios, in addition to the present authorized number, must be obtained.

3. Equipment.--All unit commanders are in agreement that bundles must be tied together. There appears to be some disagreement as to the extent of bundle identification. As has happened in the past, if a unit uses a bundle light and they manage to recover their equipment without being shot up, it is felt that this is unquestionably the proper method, whereas a unit using lights and getting badly shot up finds it impossible to recover its equipment and feels that the use of a light is a serious mistake. All things considered, the soundest plan appears to be: First, to tie all bundles together, so arranging the jumpmaster's trip switch so they will be released simultaneously; next, identify separate bundles with vitrolite or similar luminous markings and, in addition, use the rope knot system; further, it must be emphasized in training that every weapon and round of ammunition and piece of equipment must be recovered from the DZ without delay, and that units must recover their own equipment. If a unit is unable to carry off all of its loads, then a recover detail must be put to work and a dump established. Bundles must be jettisoned in the stick and not before.

4. Individual Equipment.--The parachute must be equipped with a quick release device. Individuals whose load permits must jump with an M-1 Mine. A caliber .45 pistol should be worn by each jumper during descent so as to be available immediately upon landing. The use of the M-1 Rifle Container is not imperative. Individuals must be trained to carry their full and complete combat load, wearing all of their equipment in some training exercises and, in addition, each individual load must be checked with a view to his prompt and expeditious clearance through the door. Several serious delays occurred because individuals could not get out promptly. This was caused by faulty wearing of equipment, improper carrying of arms, etc., and must be eliminated by proper inspection and training.

5. Arms.--Because of the nature of the fighting in NORMANDY, the BAR was most desirable, being of a high rate of fire, long range, high penetrative power, light, and highly mobile. As a result of this operation, all unit commanders feel that they would like to have two BAR's jumped in every squad. This will permit a unit to engage promptly in a heavy fire fight immediately upon landing. However, LMG's must also be dropped by bundle. There is no substitute for them on many missions. Obviously, more weapons will be on the ground than parachute units can properly employ. This will necessitate the use of a salvage crew.

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Steps are being taken to jump the bazooka with a round of ammunition on an individual in future operations. The Gammon Grenade with two fragmentation grenades per man was very satisfactory.

6. Artillery.--All commanders were highly enthusiastic in their praise of the artillery support received. They also, without exception, would like to see more work done with a view to developing and perfecting the use of parachute field artillery. Even with the present small percentage of recovery of weapons, they feel that the support available to them from the weapons recovered more than justifies the loss incurred in the drop.

7. Enemy Reaction.--The enemy appeared to engage with all means at his disposal all airborne troops during their descent. It was most significant, however, that the Germans remained holed up after the parachutists landed, and attempted little aggressive action for some long time. The gliders seemed to attract particular attention, and were very vulnerable immediately upon landing.

8. Our Own Troops.--The conclusions drawn from the past operations appear after study of NEPTUNE to be sound. Every stick must assemble on its own equipment promptly upon landing, regardless of the situation at hand and the amount of fire. From there the assembly must proceed as fast as circumstances permit. All enemy communications must be destroyed immediately. All roads must be mined. Troops must stay off the roads. Use the roads to ambush the enemy. Move across country. Move promptly with all equipment, arms, and ammunition that it is possible to get without too great a delay. A unit will never assemble all of its men, so that every commander will be faced with a decision as to when to move with the strength at hand. Only he can make this decision on the spot. It is most important, however, that the hours of darkness be used for the seizure of key points and objectives. The enemy reaction becomes increasingly violent with daylight.

It is most important that every officer participating in the exercise, regardless of grade, be briefed on the mission of the Division as a whole, and understand in a general way the priority of importance of the Division's objectives, and how the subordinate units of the Division are going to seize these objectives. It is clear from both the Sicilian Campaign and the NORMANDY Campaign that this common understanding on the part of all participating officers is of the utmost importance.

9. Pathfinder Aids.--In country as heavily held as NORMANDY, setting up and operating three lighted T's per regimental DZ is impossible. One coded light, or a different type light, appears to be more satisfactory. The size of the pathfinder defensive group does not have to be as large as that of NEPTUNE. A few automatic weapons and a bazooka can hold off most any German force that will operate at night.

10. Airborne SOP.--The SHAEF Airborne SOP in general appears to be satisfactory. It must be closely adhered to, particularly in regard to the 20-minute warning, the 4-minute warning, and the green light. It is of the utmost importance in a combat operation that the speed of the troop-carrying aircraft not be excessive. With the extremely heavy load carried by most jumpers, serious physical injury results, equipment is lost, and frequently the parachute malfunctions in jumping from a high-speed plane.

11. Weather Conditions.--It is interesting to note in Operation NEPTUNE that weather conditions were almost ideal until shortly after crossing the West coast of the peninsula. There a dense fog was encountered that lasted almost up to the MERDERET River. This caused considerable dispersion and error in the drop of the 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments, with the error generally being that of dropping well beyond the DZ where the fog first cleared. Unfortunately, this put most of the equipment in the MERDERET River or the swamps or tributaries of that river. The 505th Parachute Infantry, jumping East of the MERDERET River, landed with most of its men in the DZ area,

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and promptly undertook to accomplish its mission. The 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry, with equal promptness, moved to accomplish what was considered the next most important mission, and that was the seizure of crossings over the MERDERET River. Due to the wide dispersion of these units, this took a bit more time than was anticipated.

12. Training.--Our present training policies are sound. Night reorganization and assembly exercises must be held at least twice weekly. Full combat loads carried whenever possible. Prompt aggressive action by each individual is imperative immediately upon landing, regardless of enemy interference and must be insisted upon in training. An individual or small unit that "holes up" and does nothing is ultimately isolated and destroyed. An airborne unit has the initiative upon landing, it must retain it. This is the essence of successful reorganization and accomplishment of a mission.

A number of airborne commanders present recommended that it be suggested to Troop Carrier unit commanders that they conduct unit proficiency tests similar to those conducted in this Division. Each unit to be given a mission and be required to execute it under simulated combat conditions. Exact numerical ratings to be given based upon marshalling, briefing, order, flight, timing and accuracy of drop and these ratings then be made known to the entire command. The troops and unit commanders of this Division are willing and anxious to assist in any way possible in the conduct of this type training.

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June 6 - July 8, 1944

Report of the Eighty-Second Airborn Division, "Operation Neptune," at Normandy

The Eighty Second

AIRBORNE DIVISION



AIRBORNE



Operation "Neptune"



CLASSIFICATION
CANCELLED
BY AUTHORITY OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
DOWNGRADING COMMITTEE

NORMANDY

6 JUNE - 8 JULY 1944

R E S T R I C T E D

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
ACTION IN NORMANDY, FRANCE

IN FOUR SECTIONS

- I -- PREFACE
- II -- NARRATIVE
- III -- DISTRIBUTION
- IV -- ANNEXES

* * * * *

... 35 Days of action without relief, without replacements.
Every mission accomplished. No ground gained ever relinquished.
(Report of Major General RIDGWAY.)


* * * * *

COMBAT EFFICIENCY: Excellent, short 60% Infantry, 90% Artillery.
(From G-3 report as of 062400 June 1944.)

* * * * *

MAPS: GSGS 4347, FRANCE, 1/25,000, Sheets 31/20 SE, 31/18 NE, SE,
SW, NW

GSGS 4249, FRANCE, 1/100,000, Sheets 5E, 6E, 5F, 6F.



R E S T R I C T E D

82D AIRBORNE DIVISION
ACTION IN NORMANDY, FRANCE
JUNE - JULY 1944
SECTION II -- NARRATIVE

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

SECTION II - NARRATIVE

By 26 May 1944 all plans and preparations were completed for the Division to carry out the mission assigned it by First United States Army. Field and administrative orders had been published and distributed. In a series of map maneuvers on a special 1/5,000 map regimental and battalion commanders had outlined their plans in order that all commanders might be briefed thoroughly on the prospective Division operations. Divisional airborne echelons already had departed for the marshalling yards and were assembled in camps scattered along the Welsh and southern English coasts. The Division mission was to be as follows:

"Land by parachute and glider before and after dawn of D-Day west of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE: seize, clear and secure the general area ST. JACQUES DE NINOU (136985) - BESNEVILLE (157928) (both inclusive) - ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE (exclusive) - ELANDAMOUR (167982) (Inclusive), and reorganize; seize and destroy the crossings of the PRAIRIES MARCAGEUSES north of LA SANGSURIERE (188998), at ST. SAUVEUR DE PIERRE FORT (145890); destroy the crossings of the OLLOMONDE River in the vicinity of ST. LO D'OURVILLE (090994) and block crossroads vicinity LE CHEMIN (102902); prevent enemy forces moving north between ST. LO D'OURVILLE and junction of DOUVE River with PRAIRIE MARCAGEUSES (228921); and protect the south flank of VII Corps north of the same line."

The mission, however, was changed by the First Army Commander on 26 May due to confirmed intelligence reports the enemy had strengthened his forces on the COTENIN, (CHERBOURG) Peninsula with the addition of the 91st Infantry Division in the general area of ST. SAUVEUR LE VICOMTE. The revised mission of the 82d Airborne Division was to be:

"Land by parachute and glider before and after dawn of D-Day astride the MERDERET River, seize, clear and secure the general area: OR (261938) - OR (263958) - OR (269975) - RJ (274982) - RJ (283992) - Bridge (309987) - NEUVILLE AU PLAIN (340985) - BANDIENVILLE (360987) within its zone; capture ST. MERE EULISE (340965); seize and secure the crossings of the MERDERET River at (315957) and (321930), and a bridgehead covering them, with HLR along the general line: OR (261938) - OR (269953) - OR (269975) - RJ (274982) - RJ (283992); seize and destroy the crossings of the DOUVE River at BEUZEVILLE LA BASTILLE (309911) and ETISEVILLE (also known as PONT L'ABBE) (269927); protect the northwest flank of VII Corps within the Division zone; and be prepared to advance west on Corps order to the line of the DOUVE north of its junction with the PRAIRIES MARCAGEUSES."

New orders and other administrative details made necessary by the new mission were worked out quickly and disseminated within four days. The change did not effect the basic plan for movement in three echelons which had been worked out as follows:

Force "A" - commanded by Brigadier General JAMES M. GAVIN, assistant Division Commander, to be committed by parachute before dawn of D-Day and to include

Planes

Det Hq & Hq Co, 82d Abn Div

4

- 2 -

R E S T R I C T E D



R E S T R I C T E D

Pathfinders	9
Det Hq 82d Div Arty	2
Det 82d Abn Sig Co	3
Det 456 Prcht FA Bn (atchd 505 Prcht Inf)	
Air Support Party (atchd Hq 82d Abn Div)	
505 Prcht Inf	117
507 Prcht Inf	117
508 Prcht Inf	117
Co B, 307 Abn Engr Bn	9
Naval Shore Fire Control Party (atchd 505 Prcht Inf)	
TOTAL 378	

Force "B" - Commanded by Major General MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, Division Commander, to be committed by glider before and after dawn of D-Day and to include.

	<u>Glider</u>
Hq & Hq Co 82 Abn Div (-)	22
Hq & Hq Btry, 82d Abn Div Arty (-)	11
82d Abn Sig Co (-)	13
325 Gli Inf	172
319 Gli FA Bn	40
320 Gli FA Bn	54
Btrys A, B & C, 80 Abn AA Bn (AT)	57
Co A, 307 Abn Engr Bn	10
307 Abn Med Co (-)	20
82d Abn Rcn Plat (-)	13
Air Support Party	4
Command vehicles - Prcht Regts	12
TOTAL 428	

Force "C" - Commanded by Brigadier General GEORGE P. HOWELL, Commanding General of 2d Airborne Infantry Brigade, to be committed by sea, to land between D plus 2 and D plus 7 and to include.

456 FA Bn (-)	87 Armd FA Bn, atchd
80 Abn AA Bn (-)	899 TD Bn, atchd
307 Abn Engr Bn (-)	Tr B, 4 Cav Sqdn, atchd
782 Abn Ord Maint Co	Co C, 746 Tk Bn (M), atchd
407 Abn QM Co	3809 QM Trk Co, atchd
82 Abn MP Plat	3810 QM Trk Co, atchd
Corps Med Dets	1st Plat, 603 QM (GR) Co, atchd

Seaborne elements of units in Forces

"A" and "B"

Under the plan Force "A" in its entirety was to approach the CHERBOURG (CO-TENTIN) Peninsula from the west and to drop between 0100 and 0315 hours on the night of D-1/D-Day on three drop zones. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment and its attachments were to land east of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards northwest of STE. MERE EGLISE (3397). The 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment was to land west of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards north of AMFREVILLE (3098). The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment and Force "A" Headquarters were to land west of the MERDERET River about 1,000 yards north of PICAUVILLE (2995).

Fifty-two gliders of Force "B" were to approach the CHERBOURG Peninsula from the west prior to H-Hour and land on the 505th drop zone. The remainder of Force

"B" was to approach the peninsula from the east and was to land late on D-Day and early on D plus one on landing zones astride the STE. MERE EGLISE - BLOS-VILLE Road (3694). In a last-minute change of plan General RIDGEMAN parachuted with Force "A".

Aerial resupply missions were scheduled automatically for the morning of D plus one and on call thereafter if needed. The automatic mission was the only parachute mission ultimately flown but a small amount of equipment and supplies were received later by glider.

All airborne elements of the Division had closed and were sealed in special camps at the take-off fields by 24 hours before the scheduled take-off time. Parachute elements were located at seven airfields in the GRAVEHAM - COTTESMORE - LINGAR area of the British Midlands, and glider elements were at seven airfields in the LDERMASTON - RAMSBURY - MERRYFIELD area. (See Annex No. 3 A)

All men were briefed thoroughly on their missions, a recheck was made of all equipment and personnel, and planes and gliders were loaded with equipment. The Allied D-Day was postponed 24 hours because of weather conditions, and the first planes of Force "A" took off at 052315 June 1944.

The main flight was preceded by the three regimental pathfinder teams which dropped one-half hour prior to the first group. The pathfinders sustained many casualties and had difficulty in using lights, but they accomplished their mission and set up beacons to guide the incoming planes to the three designated drop zones.

The flight over the English Channel was in good formation and without incident, but between the west coast and the drop zones a heavy fog bank tended to break up the formation of the planes. Flak and some enemy night fighters activity caused some of the troop carrier planes to take up evasive action, and by the time the drop zones were reached many planes were scattered, and were flying at excessive speeds and at altitudes higher than those ideal for jumping.

The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed generally in the vicinity of its drop zone. The 507th Parachute Infantry was scattered, one element dropping in the vicinity of MONTBOURG, another south of CARSTAN and the remainder astride the MERDERET River east of the drop zone. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was likewise scattered widely, the bulk of its parachutists dropping east of the Drop Zone and some personnel landing as far away as nine kilometers south of CHERBOURG.

The 52 gliders containing batteries of the 80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion and detachments and forward parties of artillery, signal and Division Headquarters groups followed the main body of paratroopers and began landing at 0404 hours. The gliders also encountered fog and flak. They too were scattered, and many of them were damaged upon crashing into the small fields and high hedges.

Enemy reaction to the landing of the 82d Airborne Division in the NORMANDY area was prompt and severe, but from the time the first man landed until 77 days later, when the Division was finally relieved, every mission was accomplished and no ground gained was ever relinquished.

A day-by-day account of the Division's activities follows:

D-DAY, 6 JUNE 1944 (See Annexes 5 and 6)

The first element of the main body of the Division jumped at 0151 hours, having been preceded 30 minutes by the Pathfinder teams. By 0312 hours all paratroopers had landed, and at 0404 hours the first of 52 gliders in the initial glider serial crash landed. Both parachutists and gliders were scattered.

Small groups and some units attacked to secure the Division zone. Groups



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of men and individuals who had been scattered in the landings rejoined their units throughout the day, and by nightfall approximately 30 per cent of the Division's forces were under control.

At 2100 hours 100 gliders landed with artillery, engineers, and special troops. Seaborne elements set sail at 0645 from BRISTOL except for a task force consisting of Company C, 746th Tank Battalion; the 1st Platoon, Troop B, 4th Cavalry Squadron; and elements of Company F, 3d Battalion (originally 2d Battalion, 401st Glider Infantry), 325th Glider Infantry. This task force landed on Utah Red Beach at 1400 hours and proceeded inland with the mission of contacting the Division near STE. MERE EGLISE.

At the close of the day, the Division was in the midst of severe fighting. It had captured STE. MERE EGLISE and held a general line along the MERDERET River from LA FIERE (319963) south to include the eastern end of the causeway over the MERDERET River at 321930.

Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 82d Airborne Division

Parachute elements, part of Force "A", dropped at 0214 hours near the west bank of the MERDERET River, and glider elements, leading echelon of Force "B", landed at 0204 hours. The Force "A" Command Post was set up initially at 305965, west of the MERDERET River, but at 0730 the group waded across the River to the east bank and assembled at LA FIERE (319963). A new Force "A" Command Post was established at a railroad crossing at 326944.

The Division Commander, who jumped with the 505th Parachute Infantry, established his Command Post in a hedgerow west of STE. MERE EGLISE at 332965. Elements of Headquarters and of the Defense Platoon moved south to secure the bridge west of CHEF DU FONT (321930) where it encountered severe enemy fire. This group returned to the Command Post at 1700, but part of the Defense Platoon moved to a new Force "A" Command Post at a railroad pass at 323960.

The Division Headquarters initial glider ariel, which landed in the dark at approximately 0415 hours, was scattered, and the G-2 and G-3 did not reach the command post until late afternoon. The Chief of Staff was injured in a glider crash and later evacuated. The G-1 did not reach the command post for two days.

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The first element, the 2d Battalion, dropped at 0151 hours and the entire regiment landed by 0202 hours. Most of the troops landed on or near the drop zone, but a few were widely dispersed over the countryside. Assembly was rapid, and the battalions moved off toward their objectives. The 3d Battalion entered STE. MERE EGLISE at 0400 hours, and the town was securely held and outposted within an hour. The American Flag was raised over STE. MERE EGLISE, the first French town to be liberated by the Allies. After assembling the 2d Battalion started to move out to take NEUVILLE AU PLAIN, but orders were received from the regiment to stand by. At 0600 hours the 2d Battalion moved into position north of STE. MERE EGLISE and assisted the 3d Battalion in holding the town. The 1st Battalion moved toward its objective, the bridge over the MERDERET River (314956) at LA FIERE at 0630 hours and by 0830 held the eastern end of this bridge against heavy enemy fire from the western approaches.

507th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The first element, the 1st Battalion, jumped at 0232 hours, and by 0312 hours the entire regiment was on the ground generally east of the MERDERET River and was fairly dispersed. Small groups assembled to form small task forces until such time as the regiment could assemble completely. One such force on the west bank of the MERDERET River attacked AMPREVILLE but was forced back by overwhelming superiority in enemy strength to FLAUX (303955). A patrol was sent to the western

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end of LA FIERE Bridge and contact was made with elements of the 505th Parachute Infantry on the eastern end at 1430 hours. The enemy recaptured FLAUX and drove this patrol from the western end of the LA FIERE Bridge. Another force of the regiment joined with Force "A" Headquarters and at 1130 attacked to secure the CHEF DU PONT Bridge (321930), meeting extremely severe resistance. The eastern end of the bridge was finally secured by nightfall. Leaving one company to hold the bridge, the remainder of this second force moved to an assembly area at 1715 hours in the vicinity of the railroad overpass at 323960. Still another group, led by the regimental commander, landed on or near the scheduled drop zone but had no contact with other elements of the Division during the day.

508th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The 3d Battalion jumped at 0208 hours and the entire regiment was on the ground by 0220 hours. Four separate groups were assembled. One group was in the vicinity of LA FIERE, fought along the railway and attacked the LA FIERE Bridge. This group was later relieved by the 1st Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry and moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of the railroad overpass (323960) to organize a defensive position. Two other groups joined forces west of the MERDERET River in the vicinity of PICAUVILLE after taking part in heavy fighting around GUETTEVILLE (300948) and north of PICAUVILLE. An officer of this group shot and killed the commanding general of the German 91st Division. The combined group then seized the high ground west of the MERDERET River south of GUETTEVILLE at 310940 during the night of June 6-7. A fourth group dropped in the vicinity of STE. MERE EGLISE, fought with the 507th Parachute Infantry to take the CHEF DU PONT Bridge (321930) and later organized a defensive position covering this bridge.

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

Company F, 3d Battalion, supporting Company C, 746th Tank Battalion, landed on Utah Red Beach at 1400, de-waterproofed vehicles and moved inland at 1600 to make contact with the Division. Heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire held up this task force at crossroads 363933. Two tanks were knocked out. The remainder of the regiment prepared to take off from airports in England.

82d Airborne Division Artillery

Parachute elements jumped at 0210 hours, joined a group from the 508th Parachute Infantry and assisted in the attack on the LA FIERE Bridge. At 1330 hours this element joined the glider element at the Division CP at 332965. Glider elements landed at 0500 hours and moved directly to the Division CP. At 2305 hours Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of Division Artillery, the 319th Glider Field Artillery Battalion and the 320th Glider Field Artillery Battalion glided into NORMANDY and encountered severe enemy small arms and mortar fire. Reorganization commenced immediately but was handicapped by intense enemy fire. The section of the 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion attached to 505th Parachute Infantry jumped with the 3d Battalion, but was able to assemble only one of the two 75mm pack howitzers which had been dropped.

80th Airborne Antiaircraft Battalion (AT)

Batteries A and B landed by glider at 0405 hours. Six 57mm antitank guns had been recovered and were in position by 1730 hours. Battery C glided into the area at 2100 hours and began assembly and reorganization. The remainder of the Battalion sailed from BRISTOL, ENGLAND, at 0645 hours.

307th Airborne Engineer Battalion

Company B (less one platoon attached to the 505th Parachute Infantry)



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jumped with the 508th Parachute Infantry at 0210 hours. Some Engineer personnel took up defensive positions at LA FIERE in support of one group of the 508th, and other personnel joined the 508th group west of the MERDERET River. One "stick", which included the Battalion Commander, was dropped over ST. SAUVIEUR LE VICOMTE, and only a few escaped. Part of Headquarters and Company A landed by glider at 2300 hours and started to assemble under heavy enemy artillery and small arms fire. The remainder of the battalion prepared to take off from air-ports in ENGLAND.

307th Airborne Medical Company

Elements of the company landed by glider about 2100 and immediately began assembly, recovering by use of life rafts much equipment from gliders that had landed in shallow water near the banks of the MERDERET River. A clearing station was set up at a crossroad north of BLOSVILLE.

82d Airborne Signal Company

Parachute and glider elements of the company which landed prior to H-Hour were scattered and assembled with difficulty. Much equipment was lost. Only one of the three SCR 193 radios landed during D-Day was operative, and it was not until the night of June 6-7 that radio contact was established with the 4th Infantry Division and with the Division base in ENGLAND.

D PLUS 1, 7 JUNE 1944

The Division continued to assemble, reorganize, and secure its area against extremely severe enemy resistance which included armor. Enemy troops, identified as the 91st Infantry Division, were held along the MERDERET River to the west and were driven back to the north and northwest. Contact was established with the 4th Infantry Division during the day, and the VII Corps Commander visited the Division Command Post late in the day. The 325th Glider Infantry arrived by glider during the morning. Additional personnel which had been scattered in the original landings continued to report back to their units.

During the afternoon garbled radio messages signed "OO 507" were received at the Division Command Post, and it was finally determined that they originated with the Regimental Commander who was isolated with a group of about 300 men west of MEFREVILLE.

325th Glider Infantry Regiment

The first glider elements began landing at 0700 hours about 2,500 yards southeast of STE. MERE EGLISE. There were many crash landings, and casualties totalled approximately 7.5 per cent. Assembly was rapid, however, and by 1015 hours all battalions were reported. The 3d Battalion moved out toward CARQUEBUT at 1415 hours and reached LE PORT (328918) without encountering opposition. The remainder of the regiment proceeded to move into an assembly area northeast of CHEF DU PONT. At 1600 hours the 2d Battalion was ordered to move into an assembly area east of LA FIERE in the vicinity of 325962 and later was attached to the 505th Parachute Infantry at 2100 hours. The 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to move into and to outpost the regimental assembly area. Company F, 3d Battalion in support of Company G, 746th Tank Battalion, and the 1st Platoon, Troop B, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, assisted the 8th Infantry in its attack towards STE. MERE EGLISE from the west at 0630 hours and made contact with gliderborne elements of the 325th by 0900. The 325th's regimental strength at the close of the day was approximately 85 per cent.

505th Parachute Infantry Regiment

The 2d and 3d Battalions continued to hold STE. MERE EGLISE against severe

June 1944

After Action Report, 115th Infantry

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AFTER ACTION REPORT FOR MONTH OF JUNE 1944

I Summary of Operations

A. Phase #1

1. Landing Operations 6 June 1944

The 115th Infantry landed at 1025 hours, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast on FOX GREEN beach, about 1000 yards east of that part of the beach on which it was intended to land. The 2nd Battalion on the right crossed the beach and started up the cliff, making slow progress due to mines. The progress of the 1st Battalion on the left was faster. It pushed inland to the south of ST. LAURENT, reaching there about dark. This battalion was subjected to heavy fire from snipers and mortar fire throughout the night. Lt. Col. Richard C. Blatt became fatally wounded by mortar fire. The 2nd Battalion attempted to capture ST. LAURENT, but was unsuccessful. It then moved to the south of the town, into the woods, about one-half mile to the west. Regimental Headquarters landed with the leading battalions, and remained on the beach under artillery fire until 1600 hours. At 1630 hours, the headquarters moved the CP inland to a trail east of ST. LAURENT.

2. Advance inland from Beach to Inundated Area.

During the night 6-7 June the 3rd Battalion moved to the outskirts of ST. LAURENT. At daybreak they attacked the town and by mid-morning had secured it. They then pushed toward LOUVIERES. The 2nd Battalion was held in the woods all through the day. The 1st Battalion moved to the woods about 1200 yards to the west of ST. LAURENT. During the morning the CP moved into ST. LAURENT amidst severe sniper fire. In the afternoon it was moved further forward, to the rear of the 2nd Battalion. The 3rd Battalion was held up in front of LOUVIERES. In the later afternoon, although the battalions were widely separated, the attack was continued in the direction of LONGUEVILLE. The 2nd Battalion was the only battalion that succeeded in moving forward. The attack continued until 0300 hours. The 2nd Battalion was in the stream valley northwest of MONTIGNY and the attack was halted there daylight. The attack was then resumed, with the 1st and 2nd Battalions generally abreast. LONGUEVILLE was captured at 0900 hours by the 2nd Battalion, which assumed a defensive position west of the town. The 1st Battalion moved forward and assumed the defensive to the east of the town because TREVIERES had not been captured. Early in the morning, the 3rd Battalion had begun moving to a defensive position west of FORMIGNY to protect the left flank of the Division. Later, they were moved to a defensive position west of DEAUX-JUMEAUX, arriving there at 1800 hours. The Regimental CP, which had followed the 2nd Battalion, was established in LONGUEVILLE.

B. Phase #2

1. Crossing Inundated Area.

During the night 8-9 June, the 3rd Battalion, followed by the 2nd Battalion, moved to the vicinity of CANCHY, and started across the inundated area. The crossing was completed with the assistance of the Engineers. The 2nd Battalion moved to the vicinity of BOIS de CALETTE, the 3rd Battalion to the vicinity of COLOMBIERES, and the 1st Battalion to the vicinity of BRICQUEVILLE.

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Paragraph I, B, 1. (continued)

At noon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were ordered to continue their movement to the south. The 3rd Battalion moved against little enemy resistance, except for snipers. In the early afternoon, the 2nd Battalion encountered stubborn resistance at VESULLE. Late in the afternoon, this resistance was overcome and the battalion continued to move southward. The movement continued until dark, when the battalion assumed a defensive position about a mile southwest of LA FOIE. During the night 9-10 June, the 2nd Battalion was attacked by the Germans and suffered considerable losses, and was disorganized. Throughout the period 8-9 June, the 1st Battalion remained in a defensive position at ERICQUEVILLE, where it suffered almost continuous attack from the Germans from the vicinity of TREVIENES. As the other two battalions had moved miles south of the Germans at TREVIENES, the 1st battalion had the mission of protecting the left rear of the regiment.

2. 2nd Battalion Incident

At approximately 0245 hours, 10 June 1944, a closing force of German Armor and Infantry which had been by-passed and cut off to our rear and was attempting to retreat to its own lines stumbled on the rear of 2nd Battalion column to the surprise of both units. Opening fire with their MG's, mortars and 88's a heavy and confused action occurred in the dark with severe losses on both sides. Two enemy tanks were knocked out, plus a 150mm field piece. The 2nd Battalion was left in a dispersed and disorganized state and control was not regained until after daylight. Battalion C.O., Lt. Col. William E. Warfield was found dead, believed to have been killed at approximately 0300 hours. Replacements were received and the remainder of battalion were reorganized under command of Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe.

C. Phase #3

1. Elbe River Crossing

The regiment remained in defensive positions, and patrolled across the Elbe River. During the day, 12 June 44, the patrols could not cross the river because of heavy fire from the banks. In the afternoon, the regiment was warned that it would be required to attack across the river the next morning.

At 0245 hours, orders were received for an attack at 0500 hours 12 June 44. The 1st and 3rd Battalions attacked the river line abreast and the 1st Battalion on the right. During the preparatory fires German artillery fired into the troops forming the line of departure causing several casualties. This delayed the attack. At 0800 hours, the attack jumped off. The 1st Battalion was unsuccessful in crossing and moved south to the vicinity of LES FRESNES, where it was surrounded by the Germans. They fought in position until they were almost out of ammunition, at which time elements fought their way out and returned to a position north of the river. During the afternoon the relief of the 3rd Battalion was attempted by sending a detachment of tanks across the river at le MOULIN L'EVEQUE. While a platoon from Company G and a detachment of Engineers from Company A, 121st Engineers successfully removed the minefields from the bridge, the attack was repulsed by German SP guns on the south of the river. Late in the afternoon, after a heavy artillery preparation, the 1st Battalion renewed its attack, which was again repulsed. The 116th Infantry, at dark, forced a crossing.

2. Advance from Elbe River to defensive position.

At 0600 hours, 13 June 1944, 3rd Battalion recrossed the Elbe River against light opposition consisting mostly of artillery and mortar fire. They advanced to position northwest of GONVALES and were attached to the 116th Infantry. The 1st Battalion remained in a defensive position and the 2nd Battalion moved to the defensive line north of river previously held by 3rd Battalion. The Regiment less the 3rd Battalion went into division reserve. This position was maintained until the afternoon of 16 June 44 when the 2nd Battalion moved against a strong point of enemy resistance 300 yards north of

Paragraph I, C, 2 (continued)

HINET and west of ST. CLAIR. It cleared out this resistance and remained there in a position (defensive) overnight. The 3rd Battalion reverted to Regimental control and remained in position. During night the 1st Battalion moved north through ST. CLAIR toward LES FOULONS against slight resistance and occupied a position 200 yards east of LES FOULONS. It remained here in position until next morning. The Regimental CP followed behind the 1st Battalion to a position 700 yards northeast of LES FOULONS where it closed in at 180400Z. The next morning the 2nd Battalion was moved southeast to COUVAINS and attached to the 116th Infantry. The next afternoon the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved southeast towards COUVAINS and then west to BOIS de BRETEL. The Regimental CP followed to BOIS de BRETEL. The 1st Battalion was committed south of woods during the afternoon, and encountered heavy resistance. The 3rd Battalion was also committed to left of 1st Battalion and it did not advance against heavy resistance. The 1st and 3rd Battalions remained there overnight in defensive positions. The 2nd Battalion 115th Infantry was detached from the 116th Infantry, and under Regimental control, relieved the 2nd Battalion, 116th Infantry on the morning of 19 June 44, taking over positions north of La FOSSARDIERE. Early that morning the 3rd Battalion moved to defensive position in vicinity of SEBUEVILLE. The 1st Battalion set up defensive positions at BOIS de BRETEL. The Regimental CP, originally at BOIS de BRETEL, moved to rear of 2nd Battalion, and then to 657682.

D. Phase #4

1. Active defense north of ST. LO.

From the 20th to 30th of June the 115th Infantry was in active defense. There was effected a consolidation of our forces during which time replacements came to the 115th Infantry. There was active night patrolling, and considerable information of value was obtained concerning strength and disposition of enemy forces north of ST. LO.

2. 3rd Armored attack through our positions.

Infantry and tank elements of 3rd Armored Division attacked through our positions at 0900, 29 June 44, to seize high ground running east and west about 400 yards south of LA FORCE. Battalions remained in position and were subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. The following day the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 115th Infantry moved into positions of the 36th Infantry of the 3rd Armored Division, who withdrew through our lines.



II Forces Engaged

A. Phase #1

The Regiment started to engage the enemy immediately behind the beach line defenses and identified units of the 726th Infantry Regiment of the 716th Infantry Division and members of the #17 Pioneer Battalion fighting as infantry. Also, members of the #7 Company 915th Infantry Regiment of the 352nd Infantry Division and the labor battalion (Russian and Italian) attached to the 352nd Infantry were identified.

From beach defenses to the Inundated Area the enemy action consisted mainly of small delaying groups and snipers from the 1714th Artillery Battalion, #17 Pioneer Battalion, 12 Battery #IV Battalion, 352nd Infantry Division Artillery

Phase #2

Crossing of inundated area was strongly opposed by German defense at eastern end, at COLOMBIERES and at BOIS de CALET at south of causeway by units of 914th, 915th and 916th Grenadier Regiments. Snipers and small delaying units were identified as Schnelle Brigade #30.

2nd Battalion was attacked at Le CARRETOUR by units of the 352nd Division Artillery.

Phase #3

The approach to, and the crossing of the Elbe River was opposed by units of three (3) battalions of the Schnelle Brigade #30, units of the 352nd Grenadier Division and an unknown SP gun unit. Documents indicated that parts of the 5th Paratroop Regiment were in these defensive positions.

Phase #4

The following units were identified from the Elbe River to July 1st 1944.

914 Gr. Regts, 915 Gr. Regts and 916 Gr. Regts of the 352nd Infantry Division.
 II Bn 943 Gr Regt 353 Inf Div
 Eng Bn 353 of 353 Inf Div
 9th Regt of 3rd Parachute Div
 513, 517, 518 Bns of Schnelle Brigade #30
 353 Fu Bn

B. Number of Casualties

Number of Prisoners of War evacuated to July 1st

Enlisted Men	- 191
Officers	- 2
Total	- 193

Total number of enemy dead buried to July 1st
 Approximately- 100

It is assumed that at least an equal number were evacuated by the enemy due to relatively slowness of advance until the middle of July the evacuation of enemy wounded and dead by the enemy was excellent.

Important Captures - None

The highest ranking captive taken by this unit was the rank of Captain.

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III Battle Casualties for June 1944

Infantry

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	22	3	0	24	0	26	0	3	78	3	81
Men	<u>212</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>235</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>426</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>1032</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>1067</u>
Totals	234	27	0	259	3	452	32	103	1110	38	1148

Medical Detachment

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Men	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>28</u>
Totals	2	1	0	8	2	11	0	4	28	1	29

115th Casualties - All Branches

	KIA	DOW	DOI	SWA	SIA	LWA	LIA	MIA	TOTAL	DTY	TOTAL
Officers	23	3	0	24	0	26	0	3	79	3	82
Men	<u>213</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>243</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>437</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>104</u>	<u>1059</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>1095</u>
Totals	236	28	0	267	5	463	32	107	1138	39	1177

Field Grade Officers

Blatt, Richard C., Lt. Col., Commanding 1st Bn, 019277, SWA, 6 June 1944

Warfield, William E., Lt. Col., Commanding 2nd Bn, 0258123, KIA 10 June 1944



IV Awards and Decorations

1. Number of awards by type for action during June:

Silver Star Medals - 3
Bronze Star Medals - 12
Purple Heart Medals - 61

2. Special mention of outstanding incidents in each type.

Silver Star Medal

First Lieutenant Roger E. Watson, 0466065, Medical Corps, United States Army, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. During the entire period 6 June 1944 to 15 June 1944, First Lieutenant Watson's untiring efforts with his unit in immediate contact with the enemy exhibited outstanding judgment as a soldier and a surgeon. It was largely because of his excellent supervision and instructions to others in tactical situations while under enemy fire that he could leave our own forces three times to render medical aid to wounded French civilians. On one occasion eight Germans surrounded the house in which First Lieutenant Watson was attending a wounded French child. Because of his coolness and dignity of bearing, the enemy withdrew and permitted him to complete his work and return to our lines. His courage, skill, and ability reflect great credit upon himself and the Military Service. Entered Military Service from Pennsylvania.

Second Lieutenant Arthur C. Chadwick, Jr., 01300274, Infantry, United States Army, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. On 12 June 1944, Second Lieutenant Chadwick's platoon was attacking a strongly fortified enemy position. The resistance was such that it became necessary to withdraw. During this action, Second Lieutenant Chadwick was wounded, and refusing to be evacuated he participated in another attack on the same strongpoint. Although his group was held up by machine gun fire. After receiving orders to withdraw, he remained until all the wounded were carried to safety. However, upon reorganization he learned that one casualty was not accounted for, and without hesitation, he returned to the exposed area and evacuated the remaining men. Second Lieutenant Chadwick's unselfish actions show a deep regard for his men, and reflect great credit upon himself and the military service. Entered Military Service from New Hampshire.

Private First Class Robert M Moore, 20340558, Infantry, United States, for gallantry in action in Normandy, France. On 10 June 1944, Private First Class Moore saw a German tank escorting several American prisoners to the enemy lines. Boldly confronting the tank, with complete disregard for his own safety, he directed the prisoners to disperse, and fired an antitank grenade at the tank. The tank returned the fire, but was compelled to withdraw when friendly support arrived. The courage displayed by Private First Class Moore, in the face of overwhelming odds, reflects great credit upon himself and the Military Service. Entered Military Service from Maryland.

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V Changes in Regimental Staff and Battalion C.O.s

Colonel Eugene N. Slappey, 05136 relieved as Regimental C.O., 1540 hours, 13 June 1944 and replaced by Colonel Godwin Ordway Jr., 016208

Captain George M. Nevius, 0406384, relieved as Regimental S-3, 1600 hours, 14 June 1944 and replaced by Captain Albert G. Warfield, 0409305

Lt. Col. Richard C. Blatt, 019277 - SWA on 6 June 1944. Major James S. Morris, 0309173 took over command until 0800 hours, 14 June 1944 at which time he was relieved and replaced by Major Glover S. Johns Jr., 0307139, as C.O. 1st Battalion 115th Infantry.

Lt. Col. William E. Warfield, 0258123, C.O. 2nd Battalion, 115th Infantry, KIA, 0300 hours, 10 June 1944 and was replaced by Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe, 0256110 who was relieved by Major Maurice G. Clift, 0354335 at 1400 hours, 23 June 1944.

Major Victor P. Gillespie, 02456110, C.O. 3rd Battalion, 115th Infantry relieved 1830 hours, 9 June 1944 by Captain Gert B. Hankins, 0407499 who was relieved (upon his own request) at 0030 hours, 17 June 1944 by Major Charles A. Custer, 0277290 who was relieved at 1500 hours, 23 June 1944 by Lt. Col. Arthur T. Sheppe, 0256110.

ALFRED V. EDNIE
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

319.1 1st Ind
HEADQUARTERS, 29TH INFANTRY DIVISION, A.P.O. 29, U. S. ARMY, 23 July 1944

TO: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, 25, D.C.

THRU: Commanding General, XIX Corps, A.P.O. 270, U. S. Army

Forwarded in compliance with letter, Headquarters, First United States Army, file 319.1, subject: "Action Against Enemy, Reports after/ After Action Reports, dated 13 July 1944, and letter, Headquarters, XIX Corps, same subject and file, dated 19 July 1944

For the Commanding General:

ROBERT H. ARCHER, JR.,
Lt Col., A.G.D.,
Adjutant General

CONFIDENTIAL

July 21, 1944

After Action Report, Headquarters, 22nd Infantry

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HEADQUARTERS, 22ND INFANTRY
APO 4, U. S. ARMY

R-85
21 July 1944

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report

TO : The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

THRU : Channels

On 6 June 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Force landed on the coast of France. The 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, landed on Utah Beach starting at H plus 75 minutes. The Third Battalion, 22nd Infantry, initially attached to the 8th Infantry, landed in small craft with the mission of crossing the beach seawall, turning to the northwest, and reducing the fortified positions along the coast. The First and Second Battalions landed in LCI's, crossed the beach and inundated area, with the mission of attacking to the northwest, reducing the strong points at Crisbecq and Azeville, and then securing the high ground west and southwest of Quineville. The landing was made approximately 1500 yards south of the proposed beach. By nightfall, the Regiment was short of the initial objective, but had reached the general line Utah Beach-Foucarville.

On the morning 7 June, the Regiment continued the attack. The Third Battalion continued the attack on the beach strong points; the Second Battalion moved forward and launched an attack on the strong point northeast of Azeville; the First Battalion moved through Ravenoville, St Marcouf, and attacked the strong point near Crisbecq. Later in the afternoon the First and Second Battalions received counterattacks in some force and were driven back about 600 yards. During the night the First Battalion received another counterattack at about 0040 and repulsed this action without casualties.

On 8 June the First and Second Battalions attacked the strong points at Azeville and Crisbecq but were unsuccessful. The Third Battalion continued its mission of reducing the beach strong points until late in the afternoon at which time they reverted in place to the Regimental reserve with the mission of blocking an expected enemy attempt to break through the First Battalion to the beach.

A task force commanded by Brig. Gen. Henry A. Barber was formed on 9 June. The decision was made to contain the enemy at Crisbecq with "C" Company, 22nd Infantry and one company of the 899th T.D. Battalion; the remainder of the Regiment was to attack in column of Battalions in order Third, Second, First; after the Third Battalion had seized the town of Azeville and the strong point to the northeast of Azeville. The attack jumped off at approximately 1800 and was met with strong enemy defensive fires.

On 10 June, the Third Battalion moved toward the strong point at Ozeville with the Second Battalion containing the enemy at Chau de Fontenay. The First Battalion attacked the town of Fontenay Sur Mer to relieve the pressure on the Third Battalion, which was receiving flanking fire from that point.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

(Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report, Hq 22nd Inf, 21 July 44
cont'd)

The 11th of June found the Third Battalion preparing to assault the Ozeville strong point with the Second Battalion still containing the enemy at Chau de Fontenay. The First Battalion continued the attack on Fontenay Sur Mer.

On the following day the Third Battalion reduced the Ozeville strong point and by nightfall had almost completed the mopping up operation.

On 13 June, the Third Battalion seized the town of Ozeville and moved toward the high ground west of Quineville. The Second Battalion made a wide flanking movement through the 12th Infantry area to attack west along the ridge toward Quineville, and met stiff resistance the entire day. The First Battalion moved from its position near Fontenay Sur Mer to a position to the left of the Third Battalion in preparation for a coordinated Regimental attack on the following morning.

The Regiment attacked with all three battalions on the morning of 14 June, seized the high ground west of Quineville, and organized the position for defense. During the period 15-17 June the 22nd Infantry reorganized and re-equipped without other enemy interference than sporadic artillery fire. The First and Second Battalions remained in the front lines and the Third Battalion moved to the rear with Company "I" held in Division mobile reserve. Late 17 June, the Third Battalion moved to an assembly area southeast of Montebourg and began preparations for an attack on that town.

On the following morning, the Third Battalion was established in its assembly area; the First Battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry; and the Second Battalion was in mobile reserve.

On 19 June, the Third Battalion attacked and seized Montebourg and the Regiment assembled northeast of that town preparatory to an attack to seize the high ground in the vicinity of Le Theil.

Throughout 20 June the Regiment moved rapidly with little or no resistance covering some eight miles and securing the high ground near Le Theil. The enemy had withdrawn to the prepared defenses in and around Cherbourg.

The Regiment attacked early on the morning of the 21st and attained some success although resistance was much heavier. The enemy began infiltrating behind the front lines, making it necessary to supply the assault battalions by tank convey.

When the attack was resumed on 22 June, the Second Battalion attacked across the rear of the Third Battalion to clean out pockets of resistance. The First and Third Battalions made more progress toward the strong point on the high ground north of Le Theil.

On 23 June the First and Third Battalions mopped up the Regimental objective. The Second Battalion, assisted by Company "C", 4th Engineers, mopped up an abandoned village north of Hau Cauchon.

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
(Action Against Enemy, Reports After/After Action Report, Hq 22nd Inf, 21 July 1944 cont'd)

The following day the Second Battalion was attached to the 12th Infantry; the First Battalion held the high ground, patrolling vigorously; and the Third Battalion attacked south on another mopping up mission in an effort to drive the infiltrating enemy troops away from the main supply route.

On 25 June, the Second Battalion rejoined the Regiment, attacked to the north, and reached the coast. The Third Battalion seized Bretteville and the First Battalion continued to hold the high ground astride the St Pierre Eglise-Cherbourg road.

On 26 June the Regiment changed its direction of advance from west to east with the mission of destroying the enemy garrison holding the northeastern part of the Cotentin peninsula. On this and the following day (27 June) the Regiment met with some success although the enemy was a determined defender. Late on the 27th, the airport north of Gonneville fell and negotiations for the surrender of the garrison manning the coastal defenses were begun. The negotiations were completed early on the morning of the 28th and the surrender of 990 German officers and men was effected by 1330, 28 June, ending the fighting in the northeastern part of the Cotentin peninsula.

The Regiment moved to an assembly area for a short rest period prior to further operations.



C. T. LATHAM
Colonel, 22nd Infantry
Commanding

C O N F I D E N T I A L

**Debriefing Conference on D-Day, 82d Airborne Division Report,
Aug 1944**

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DEBRIEFING CONFERENCE - OPERATION NEPTUNE

On the evening of Thursday, 13 August 1944, a debriefing conference was held at the Glebe Mount House, LEICESTER. During the course of the conference each commander present who had commanded a unit the size of a battalion or larger of the 82d Airborne Division in Operation NEPTUNE, was permitted to talk for not to exceed ten minutes. Instructions were that each officer was to speak freely, without restraint, regarding any aspect of the operation during its airborne phase and to offer any criticism he saw fit in the interests of improving our operational technique in future combat. Commanders spoke in the order in which it was planned that they would land. Their statements were taken down verbatim as far as possible. At the conclusion of the conference, considerable free-for-all discussion took place of which no record was kept. However, it did have a bearing on the conclusions attached to this report.

Unclassified
REGRADING BY AUTHORITY
OF OSD Memo, May 3, 1972
BY Sonners ON February 8, 1977

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Lt Col VANDERVOORT, 2d Bn., 505th Pzcht Inf:

I feel that I have very little for posterity at the moment. The flight until we hit the French coast was quite uneventful for my Battalion. We reached FRANCE intact and in formation. As we came in across the coast we saw a little ack-ack from the ground and I thought that there were some planes from the 101st Division shot down. As we approached our DZ the pilot informed me that he could see our T. The pathfinder group had been dropped essentially where they should have been, a little further inland, and they only displayed two T's. One was lighted when we dropped. The pilot I had was extremely reluctant to come down to the correct jumping altitude. We came in at 1400 feet, and our speed was excessive. I talked to the crew chief and asked him to slow down. We went through a bit of scud as we came in and it caused the formation to break slightly. At the time I thought the Germans had smoked the area. I lost two platoons from Company "B". The green light was turned on about 45 seconds before we reached the LOUVE River. I told them to turn it off. We dropped pretty well on our DZ. I, myself, was a quarter of a mile from the DZ, and I had a little hard luck on the landing and banged up my foot. I watched the battalion come in and they were well spread out, the ships being too high and too fast. Within fifteen minutes after I got on the ground I started putting up some green flares that worked out well. We encountered no resistance from the enemy at night, only some fire from ack-ack around our DZ. Some members of the battalion were dropped in ST. MERE EGLISE and were engaged in a fire fight at once. There was movement of vehicles on the road, one of the first things I heard being vehicles moving on a road to the South. I went North to the nearest hedgerow. I think it was about 0410 in the morning when I felt I completed the assembly sufficiently so that I could move out on our mission and take the town of NEUVILLE au PLAIN. In the meantime, the regiment had told me to stand by. The news from ST. MERE EGLISE was so vague to the Regimental commander that he had me stand by. General RIDGWAY happened to be in my CP during that period and he also directed me not to move without consulting him. It was not until daylight that I received orders to move. We actually started moving at 0600. Later my mission was changed to ST. MERE EGLISE, and from there on it was essentially a ground operation. The 2d Battalion met no resistance as we went into the town. A small group of Germans attacked our left flank, but one platoon from "D" Company was enough to drive them off, and as I said, it was a ground operation thereafter. It was 0141 when I landed.

- Q. Apparently it was 0730 when you were ready to move out?
- A. We started moving at 0600. Reorganization was only partially completed, but when I reached the town I had a battalion less two platoons. In the meantime, I picked up quite a few people from the 101st Division, and some men from other regiments which I carried along for several days and then returned them to their organization.
- Q. Do you think that your lighted T was a great factor in your getting to your destination?
- A. It meant a great deal to us. I saw planes coming in from various directions, from 40 degrees to 90 degrees off course. They came in close to the T, and dropped their personnel. I think some planes from the 101st circled and dropped their people there.
- Q. Did you attempt to use your green assembly lights at all?
- A. None of my lights worked; anticipating that, I had a flashlight I had fixed up with green facing and I flashed that.
- Q. None of your lights worked. Why?
- A. I don't know, I had no opportunity to inspect them. I hid them, but later couldn't find them.

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Q. You say you had orders at 0410 to tell where you were. How did you get those orders?

A. We had radio contact with the regiment very early. Regimental S-3, after daylight, came by my CP, and as I remember, the Regimental Commander was also there at one time.

Q. What did you think of the challenging system?

A. Right at the moment, sir, I would make no essential changes. I would like to impress upon the Air Corps the necessity for coming down to the proper altitude, and flying at the proper speed. We have stories at the battalion from men who spoke to pilots later on, quoting pilots as follows: "—and the last time I looked at the air speed indicator we were going at 190 miles per hour." It was the hardest opening I ever had. I have jumped at 130 and 140 miles per hour, but this was the roughest I ever had. It tore off some of my equipment.

I made a positive identification of where I was by sending an S-2 patrol to the nearest house. The Frenchman there gave us much valuable information of the enemy.

I believe that the greatest single contribution to the assembly of the 505 was the superior job done by our pathfinder teams, Air Corps and parachute.

Lt. Col. Krause, 3rd Bn., 505th Inf:

I, too, experienced the same as Col. Vandervoort. The trip was very uneventful on the way over. As we crossed the coast of FRANCE, I talked to my pilot on the interphone, and said, "It looks like a good deal". I looked back and saw my ships behind me. Just about that time we hit the soup, (fog or cloud), and we started to see fires on the ground, a little ack-ack and we had some fighters come in on us and fire at us. An element of three ships was directly under us and not more than thirty feet below. One came up from under and passed miraculously between my ship and the left wing ship. I would say that in the next three minutes I came as close to being crashed in the air as I ever hope to. We tried to keep our formation, but ships constantly over ran each other. The pilot called for evasive action and we split up. Some went high, some went lower, others right and left. This split our formation and we were well spread. Just about two or three minutes before drop time we saw this green T. It was a Godsend and I felt that I had found the Holy Grail. I would say that I dropped from over 2,000 feet. It was the longest ride I have had in over fifty jumps, and while descending, four ships passed under me and I really sweated that out. Just after I landed, a mine bundle hit about 80 yards away from me without a parachute and exploded. We tried to orient ourselves very quickly, and ran upon a conical shaped field, which I remembered as the conical shaped field that we had studied during our preinvasion briefing. Northeast of this should be the Battalion DZ Command Post which was to be in a wooded area on the Southeast end of the DZ. Further investigation proved this to be true and then I knew exactly where we were, or thought I knew where we were, and I told the people all around me. Because we were so split up, we did not have too much organization of the units. We even had some men from the other Divisions contacting us. I composed two groups, one under Captain DeLong and the other under Lt. Isaacs and we began to form, but not too rapidly. I sent out patrols to guide in assembling groups and about that time we saw the green flares. I could not find my original signal which I was supposed to use and likewise alternate signals were gone. We had absolutely no visual signals to assemble on. Our method of assembly was to roll up on our sticks. Our sticks formed up in good shape. The next problem was that of people running through our area wanting to know where they were. Major McGinity asked where we were and I told him whereupon he put his map away and headed for the bridge with Captain Dolan and most of Company A. We were starting to get close to 200 men in about an hour and a half of assembling. One of my officers landed in the town of STE MERE Eglise. On his way out he saw a group of Germans and witnessed several chutists taken prisoner and others killed, so he headed Northeast to join us.

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On his way he picked up a slightly inebriated Frenchman, who stated that this was STE. MERE EGLISE, and we knew then exactly where we were. It was just before four when I made the decision to move out to STE. MERE EGLISE. We moved in from the Northwest on the road that the man had said the troops had departed from. It was mostly transportation and service units that had remained in the town when the bulk of the forces moved into field bivouac several days prior to D-Day because of the bombing. Captain DeLong and I went in toward the Northwest section of town. The civilian in a white coat was carrying an American mine while guiding the way. We made him go out first so that he would not lead us into any gun position. We met no opposition, but we did meet some members of the other units, and they were all heading for their missions. I would say that we arrived in town just before light and had no opposition at all, mainly due to the covered route the civilian took us by, but in the center of the town there were spasmodic shots that became ever increasing. My instructions to my men were not to fight with any other unit but to fight with me in the town. This proved worthy because all my men concentrated on getting to the town and the bulk of my Battalion was with me by mid-morning. The remaining enemy troops in the town were apparently scared out of the town. The force which we had was just a jumbled group and in order to secure the town as quickly as possible we endeavored to establish road blocks around the town as hastily as possible, which we did. One important thing we were going to do was to cut the communication lines. We thought we found it, and severed the main cable from the town. As more troops came in we put up road blocks around the whole town. We had about one fourth of the force we expected at about five O'clock. A message was sent to the Regimental CP. This message was dispatched at about five O'clock.

Q. About how many men did you have in the town?

A. We had 120 men and groups of 40 and 60 came in rapidly throughout the morning. At about 10 O'clock 350 men of the Second Battalion came in.

Q. What happened to your two artillery pieces?

A. One we never found, sir, and one was in action before noon.

Q. Did you have color assembly lights to use?

A. Yes sir. I think in the next operation for assembly we should try to get weather balloons, and stick the light up on that.

Colonel Ekman, Commanding Officer, 505th Parachute Infantry:

I have nothing much to add about the ride over, except the 1st Battalion Commander, Major Kellum, not being here, being KIA, I can give his story. Regimental Headquarters and the 1st Bn. got in the planes, and just about five or six minutes prior to taking off a huge explosion occurred. Someone had set off a Cammon Grenade which in turn set off all the ammunition. I was initiated into combat that way. I saw a lot of dead bodies lying around after the explosion. Our ride over was uneventful except for the ack-ack which came pretty close to our planes. Jumping out after going through the clouds, I baled out at about 0204 hrs. according to my watch. I had a very hard opening, because we were going at least 150 miles per hour. I do not remember the landing because I was pretty dazed. I was in the midst of a field of cattle when I landed. No other personnel was around me. It took me about ten minutes to get out of my chute. I found out later that I had landed just a few hundred yards South of FRESVILLE, which is well Northwest of STE. MERE EGLISE. I started out and the first man I met was Major Thomas of the 508th, and he was treating a few men who were injured. I wandered around still dazed for about two hours. Just before four o'clock I ran across Major Norton, and we debated about where we were. About that time we found a Frenchman and from him we got the direction to the town and found that there were a number of Germans there. We started out to our area and on the way we ran into the

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1st Bn. under Major Kellum, heading toward the bridge and his area. "A" Company had very speedily organized and was already engaging the enemy just East of the bridge near STE MERE EGLISE. Rest of the 1st Bn. continued on their mission to get on to the assembly area, they being the Regtl. Reserve. We went further towards the CP and ran into the 2nd Bn. At that time, the situation being a little obscure, we told Lt. Col Vandervoort to stand fast until further orders. At the location of the CP was Gen. Ridgway, and we speedily established the CP. It was a little after seven o'clock when I heard that the 3rd Bn. was in STE MERE EGLISE, that the 2nd Bn. was moving toward their objective, and that the 1st Bn. was well down toward the bridge. The situation was well in hand. Later on the 2nd Bn. fell back into STE MERE EGLISE and with the 3rd Bn. organized for the defense of the town against superior enemy forces which were attacking from the North, Northwest and South. When action in STE MERE EGLISE ended, these two units were all mixed up due to the speed with which they had to move to meet enemy threats.

- Q. Would you recommend any changes if you were to do it over again?
- A. I see no reason to change the assembly plan except to get the assembly lights where they can be seen. I also came in from a higher altitude and a greater speed than I should have, and believe the Air Corps should receive more training in dropping our units.
- Q. In your area you had two lighted T's, is that correct?
- A. Yes, sir. The only comment I have on the operation is about the speed, the altitude of the planes and the assembly lights. One plane load returned to the base because of some trouble. The men joined us about a week later in a C-47. When I was on the field I was sure our plane had not come in from the proper direction. I noticed planes coming in from all directions and all altitudes. The assembly lights did not work in this case. I saw some flares which I believed Col. Vandervoort put up.
- Q. How long were you in the fog?
- A. Right after crossing the coast and, I would say, maybe three miles from ST. SAUVIER we hit a heavy cloud bank and it was then that we lost control of the formation. Just a little ways this side of the MERDERET my plane came down under the clouds, but I could see few of the planes.
- Q. What do you think of the use of flares?
- A. I like the use of flares only in the event the assembly lights won't work. The flares, if not shot straight up, that is, if shot at an angle, will give the impression that they are two or three hundred yards from the actual assembly point. The "T" lights are not feasible to use for assembly except in case of extreme emergency as they cast off so much light. (Col. Vandervoort) - In regard to the flares try to pick a place where the enemy is not, then the flares will work. In regard to radios, you need 12 radios to do it right. Tie in everybody with 536 radios, we dropped our 300's in bundles, but through 536's we tied in very quickly and were able to locate men right away.

Colonel Ekman continues--I think it is better to use BAR's in leg packs in place of machine guns during the actual drop. You can move out with BAR's in place of machine guns and come back later for the guns which would be dropped in bundles. "A" Company was delayed in moving out as they couldn't find their bundles immediately. The weapons section we had contained machine guns in the squad, we jumped with some BAR'S, but would like to replace the machine guns with BAR'S, because looking for the machine guns holds us back at first.

- Q. Do you want two BAR's in every squad and one machine gun?
- A. In the machine gun section we would like to have for the drop two BAR's. A searching party to find the machine gun bundle and bring up guns later. Each rifle squad to have two BAR's. "A" Company could have been able to secure the bridge if they had had their bundles. We lost quite a bit of equipment. Someone can always use the BAR'S after the machine guns are found.

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C. How did you identify your bundles?

A. (Col. Vandervoort) - We didn't use any bundle lights. We daisy-chained all six bundles tied together. I lost one 60mm Mortar; I had the bulk of my machine guns. I had more radios than the rest of the Regiment put together. Tie your bundles together - it helps. We used a system of luminous paint to separate the bundles. I believe that bundles should be painted lighter colors to be seen easier. We used no vitrolite on our bundles, but we later used it for marking roads, etc. The system of challenges and responses was OK. One thing in combat people have no scruples about whose equipment they have as long as they get it. Another thing, my men were reluctant to get everything. It is important that the men are trained to get everything they have. Jumping with an M-1 mine on the individual proved beneficial.

Lt. Col. Mendz, 3rd Bn., 508th Pchth. Inf:

I was in command of the 3rd Bn. at the outset. I didn't see my Bn. for five days. We ran into a lot of trouble as soon as we hit land. The flak was terrific. We jumped from about 2100 feet, the entire serial, and were going rather fast. 2100 feet is too much of a ride, I checked my field bag and found 3 bullet holes in it. Lt. Daly was subsequently killed. I landed about 0230 in the morning and didn't see anybody for five days, with the possible exception of my messenger. I batted 1000 with my pistol, I got three Heines with three shots; two Heines with a carbine and one Heine with a hand grenade. The Germans had a very good means of communication. We seemed to run into antiparatroop groups of about 60 men and we shot back and forth. We drew the conclusion that these groups called other groups who were waiting for us. Altogether I had three men, one officer and my messenger. The most outstanding thing I learned was the accurate intelligence of the Germans. They used full name, even nicknames to confuse my company commanders. My company commanders stated that they received messages in my full name and even my nickname. It is essential that the challenging system must be known to the Air Corps as well, in case they end up on the ground. The reply to the challenge must be given very quickly or it will be too bad. Selection of words is very important. We landed about 3/4 or a mile from the DZ, Southeast. I was on the North side of the DOUVE River. In the five days that I was separated from the Bn. I walked 90 miles. I was looking for the Second Battalion and all I found was ack-ack. We never saw a T, we jumped on the green light. The pilot did not see the T light either. It would be helpful to have earphones from the jump master and the crew chief and the pilot. As a matter of fact "G" Company was dropped in the ocean and several men were drowned. Recommend the short method of challenging, bundles be daisy-chained, one light per plane load of bundles.

Lt. Col. Warren, Bn. Executive, 1st Bn., 508th Pchth. Inf:

I came in as Executive Officer, 1st Bn., Col. Batcheller, commanding. Shortly after the drop he was KIA. The mission of the 508th was to go into Force "A" reserve in the vicinity of Hill 30, West of the MERDERET River. Our flight across the channel was very uneventful, it was routine. As we hit the coast we got some flak. I checked and noted that all the planes were back there. But then we hit the clouds and it spread us a little. I could still see the leading V even in the fog. We passed over ST. SAUVEUR le VICOMTE, and got a lot of flak which spread the formation. Then we went over ETIENVILLE and got a hell of a lot of flak there. Then I looked around and there were no ships around my plane. I jumped on the green light, and just after coming out of the plane I turned around and looked over my shoulder and saw the DOUVE River behind me very close. I landed about half way between PICAUVILLE and the DOUVE. I landed in an orchard. We got a great deal of flak practically all along the entire route between SAN SAUVEUR le VICOMTE and ETIENVILLE. After coming down I only saw one plane which was towing a glider and kept on going, and another C-47 which was shot down in flames. I did have a light

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but I didn't put it up, because it was obvious it would not be seen. I toured the area in ever widening circles trying to collect as many men as I could. Daylight came approximately 0430 or 0445 in the morning and I collected some 20 odd men and ran into Captain McRoberts who had the entire 508 radar outfit. They put up no lights because their lights were lost. The hedges were high, and the orchards were practically all over the place near PICAUVILLE. I collected between 40 and 50 men and headed for GOUTEVILLE just north of Hill 30. I got up to GOUTEVILLE and found part of D and E Company and a platoon of the 505 under Lt. Medaugh. We were on the verge of attacking GOUTEVILLE with 100 men, but we had no supporting weapons - just rifles and carbines. Since there was an estimated German Battalion in GOUTEVILLE we just stayed on the hill and shot at them. About 15 truck loads of Germans went by, going in the direction of LA FIERRE. After shooting at them all afternoon I got in contact with Col. Shanley and joined forces and moved west about 500 yards of my position near Hill 30 and stayed there for five days. No lights were used in the area south of PICAUVILLE because the area was too dense. Hedges were high and orchards were all over the place.

Colonel LINDQUIST, 508th Parachute Infantry

I went out about 1200 feet near AMFREVILLE. It was a good opening and a soft landing in about 2½ feet of water. The light went up within ten minutes after hitting the ground. The area was open and marshy, and the assembly light could be seen for about 600 yards. The assembly light worked well for about twenty minutes and then went out because of water soaking into the batteries. When the light went I stayed there 30 minutes before we moved out. There was no light on the embankment, the light was in the center of the drop of Regimental Headquarters. The challenging worked fine. There was very little challenging around the lighted area at first as the men came in. The challenging system was o.k., the verbal system should be used so long as it is consistent. I would make no changes in regards to what was planned before the operation. All of our equipment went into the water and went out of sight. We stumbled upon two bundles, but it was nothing that we could use. I think we should continue using radio communication and one light per battalion for assembling. I think flares would work well. Anything in regard to light should be used to get the unit together. As time goes on I would take a greater chance in regard to lights to get my units together.

Lt. Col. OSTBERG, 1st Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

We were scheduled to drop north of AMFREVILLE. We ran into a fog. I saw my flight and it was all there for about the first three minutes. We ran into a lot of flak. Pebbles kept hitting, which I didn't have enough sense to realize what was going on. We had no T to guide on, and only one radar set of the six we dropped was set up. Don't sell the home-made lights short. They are not so bright for a great distance but do allow for good identification. We had no automatic weapons until two o'clock the next morning. Phone communication should be in the plane. Second-hand information is no good, but you can't tell the pilot what his job is. We dropped from a low altitude. I landed in a very flat field, but it was inundated. I would endorse the home-made light on the bundle. The method of assembly lights should be kept as simple as possible. A lot depends on the terrain. We had no flares. If we were to do it again I would have flares, because I consider them well worth while. It would be a good idea to have a flare to spare.

Lt. Col. KUHN, 3rd Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

Our mission was to establish a defensive position just west of AMFREVILLE. The Air Corps sold us a snow job for they changed the SOP. I was in the lead ship of my Bn. Telephonic communication should be established between crew chief and jumpmaster. We had a very uneventful trip

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until we hit the mainland, and then things popped. There was no communication with the pilot whatsoever. I never had such a hard opening in my life. I think that the flash and thunder system is best for challenging. We dropped about 0240 in the morning. We landed about one mile southeast of FRESVILLE. "H" Company recovered a good deal of their equipment, but they used their home-made lights which was one flashlight bulb and two batteries. We used no luminous tape. "G" and "I" Companies landed up about the railroad tracks, closer to the DZ than where we landed. The issue Air Corps light was not worth a damn. Short challenging is the better way of identification.

Q. What's wrong with the Air Corps issue lighting?

A. The Air Corps light breaks. A good solid jar will knock it out. The Air Corps light did not burn long enough, and you can't tell one light from another.

Lt. Col. TILMES, 2nd Bn., 507th Prcht Inf

I was in the group flown by Col. Mitchell. We got below a lot of haze and we flew at about 550 feet above the ground. We did not go too fast, and our landing was very good. We jumped at 0230, and we did not see any lights on the ground. I had a lot of difficulty in assembling. We had the mission of taking AMFREVILLE. I never did get with the Battalion until about the fifth day. As to lights, it would be a mistake to sell them short. The Executive Officer had a light, and the Regimental Commander had a light, and the Radar Section also had a light. Our flares were wet and did not work. I assembled small groups not far from the LA FIERE bridge. Most of the bundles went into the swamp. We used the knot system and lights on our bundles, but we only retrieved a few. The mistake we made was that we used wooden container lights and most of them wouldn't work. The radios were jumped right on the radio men. The radio would come in handy but we had no radio. It was tragic not to have a radio for the first five days. The challenging system of using two words is excellent. The men were getting out of the planes too slowly and this caused dispersion. Also teach the men to get out of their equipment and chutes. Men should be taught more about that. After Captain Swartzwalder came in we were going to make a night attack on the bridge at AMFREVILLE, but we didn't because the artillery fire was falling on us.

We tied our bundles together and I think it is a good practice in using the knot system. We used no luminous lights, but if we were to do it again we would use bundle lights. We would use anything to help identify the bundles. We had to send out real strong patrols to recover the bundles. I would have liked to have talked to the pilot if there was an inter-phone. (Col. Mendez: One light per daizy chain for the bundles is recommended.)

Lt. Col. Shanley, 2d Bn., 508th Prcht Inf

My original mission was to capture the town of ETIENVILLE and blow the bridge there and also the bridge at BOUZVILLE LA BASTILLE. On the flight to the drop my Bn. did not experience a great deal of flak. However, we experienced heavier flak than has just been described. A lot of jumpmasters said the planes took evasive action, and that may be the reason for the dispersion on the jump. The planes started taking evasive action due to the flak. I threw an A-4 radio bundle out, the chute on it failed, its contents were smashed; my battalion assembly light in it was also smashed. S-3 was supposed to have a light, but I did not see it. I used flashlights up in the trees when I landed. On the ground there was considerable fire which was all around us. A lot of the men who came into the assembly area had already killed a German or two. We landed just north of PICAUVILLE, and there were quite a few Germans around there. I sent several patrols out in different directions to get more men. I had only about 35 men with me at dawn. At that time I sent more patrols out and started encountering fairly heavy resistance. At approximately noon we were very heavily engaged on three sides, and I pulled out after I found that another group, larger than mine, was

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east of us. I left behind in that place about ten men, most of whom were jump casualties. Shortly after leaving the location north of PICAUVILLE I collected approximately 200 men and officers, lost members of the 508th and from all Battalions who had gotten together there, and I set up in that location, which was 1000 yards east of PICAUVILLE. With 200 men, I had two machine guns, no mortars and no other automatic weapons. We didn't have much success in getting the bundles on the ground. I did have SCR 300 radios however. By radio I got in touch with another group which was commanded by Lt. Col. Warren. Several different groups of Frenchmen informed me that there were about 500 Germans in PICAUVILLE and more than that in ETIENVILLE. Having almost no heavy weapons and with so many Germans between my group and the objective I selected the one mission that the Regiment had that I felt I could accomplish--seizing a crossing of the MERDERET River. Lt. Col. Warren's group joined mine and we set up a defensive position on Hill 30, West of the MERDERET. Eventually the remainder of the regiment joined us on the West of the MERDERET River. I wish I had had flares to use for assembly after the jump; lights were useless in that terrain. A Frenchman told us that PICAUVILLE was a German bivouac area.

Q. Would you want to use flares there?

A. If I didn't use them there, I could have moved elsewhere and used them.

Q. Didn't you have flares?

A. No sir. I thought the Germans would have them and our men would be walking into the Germans. Flares, however, are the only feasible system of assembly in that hedgerow country. We used vitrolite tubing on our bundles. All the bundles I found contained ammunition. I did not find any heavy weapons.

Q. Did you succeed in rounding up your own stick?

A. No sir. I found many bundles, but found no one around the bundle. Eventually I ran into some men, but found none from my own stick for quite awhile. The men worked the challenging system very well. I recommend that we have one system of challenging to use throughout training and combat, and not change it later on, because that causes difficulty. Changing over confuses the men. In regard to assembly lights, we couldn't get them up high enough to be seen any distance.

Q. Would you have used a light that would flash up for one-thirtieth of a second every five or six seconds, and that would light up approximately a distance of six (6) miles (Krypton light).

A. Yes, I would use a light like that if I had to, to assemble my battalion.

Lt. Col. Royd, 1st Bn., 325th Glider Inf:

We came in at D plus 1 at about 0730 in the morning. The men who flew the planes on D minus 1 scared the hell out of us by painting a bad picture. The 437 at Ramsbury was in quite a state of excitement. The landing zone was changed on us. The trip was uneventful. We were supposed to land in the Southwest part of STE MERE EGLISE, but the order was changed. We landed in the Southeast corner of STE MARIE du MONT. We came in too close together. The speed was 170 miles per hour and we were eight feet above the ground when we hit the trees. The first aid man saw us hit and they got to us immediately. The gliders should be strung out a little more to avoid collision. We had our 300 radio and all the companies checked in except "A" Company and we proceeded to the assembly area. We landed at seven o'clock in the morning. Our medical detachment came in about two PM and they took care of some casualties. Out of seven hundred men we had 600 ready to operate at 2 PM. We should have the glider pilots earlier for instruction. The Air Corps started dropping tow ropes all over us, which was wrong. Some even went over our troops. These ropes are an item of

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critical issue and should be taken home instead of being dropped in the area in FRANCE. We had no flak and plenty of air protection. We flew in column of fours, but would like to fly in a column of twos. A single column double tow, should be satisfactory, but would like to have some practice before taking it up. We were cut out at about 200 feet which was entirely too low.

Lt. Col. T. H. Sanford, Exec. 1st Bn., 325th Glider Inf:

The gliders, as a whole, came in too low. Cutting the gliders loose at 200 feet, traveling 120 miles per hour, in an area with such small fields and tall trees doesn't give the glider pilot any opportunity at all to select the field or to make the proper approach for a landing. Tug pilots had been instructed to go up to 700 feet after crossing the beach and very few, if any, of them increased their altitude. Many of the crashes of the gliders were a direct result of the failure of the tug pilots to give the glider pilot altitude enough to make a proper landing. In training it had been demonstrated that gliders can be landed safely in very small fields if the glider pilot has altitude enough to make a proper approach and come in slow. Under the conditions under which our pilots landed in NORMANDY they had no opportunity for selection of the field, or to turn to make any approach to it. It was just cut loose and land, which put a great many of our gliders into the trees and resulted in rather high casualties. Most all of this was due to the failure of the tug pilots to follow instructions and to give the glider pilots an altitude of 700 feet.

Colonel March, Division Artillery:

We use the system of tying our equipment together and we had no trouble. We got one gun going at STE MERE EGLISE. It would be a good idea to have a Battalion of parachute field artillery go with every regiment. We can get the individual guns in but to get them to work and assembled has not been very successful. This was sometimes due to landing. The landing zones of the gliders was SNAFU. LZ's were changed and the Air Corps was not informed of it. Some fire was delivered on D-Day, and much more on D plus 1, and it was built up as it went along. (At this point Col. March was interrupted and the following incident of artillery support related):

"Col. Shanley who was on the West bank of the MERDERET, Hill 30, had an SCR 300 which was in contact with the Regimental CP on the East bank of the river at CHEF du PONT. At the Regimental CP an artillery liaison party had set up the radio and wire net and was in a position to fire in direct support but did not have contact with Col. Shanley direct. Col. Shanley was being pressed by German infantry and requested through the SCR 300 artillery support, and an infantry officer adjusted fire through this medium with superior results".

Colonel March continued: If you are in a jam talk to somebody and try to get some artillery.

The gliders were coming in two and four at a time. I don't know whether I agree with that or not. Personally, I don't know how much they are briefed, but they usually go for the first field they see, particularly if someone is shooting at them. The best thing is to have a zone marked for a group.

In regard to parachute artillery, it is practical from the point of view of artillery. It will land and will be able to shoot. To get four guns together is quite difficult. In SICILY they got three together and did a nice job. (Statement made by an Infantry battalion commander present-- "Artillery coming in by parachute is good even if you can get one gun out of four".)

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Lt. Col. Singleton, 80th AT Bn:

We landed at 0420 in the morning at STE MARIE DuPONT. Everything went well until we got just between the islands of JERSEY and GUERNSEY, and then there was heavy flak. We came in a column of fours, and it was a nice formation, and we ran into a cloud bank, milky in texture, we could see very little. There was a lot of flak, small arms fire, machine gun fire and snipers. The glider pilots did a fine job. We came in 1½ hours after the last paratrooper landed. Anti-tank guns were scattered all over the area. It seems that we landed when all the Germans were awake. We landed at about four o'clock and we cut loose and glided about ten miles before landing. We landed very smoothly. We took in 16 guns in the dark and the next day we had about five out of those 16 within the Division area. Ten men are needed by a squad. The CG4s had one gun, a little ammunition and two men, or, two men and a jeep which should have a machine gun on it to protect the men. With CG-13 we could probably get guns and more personnel. The guns were OK but we did not have enough personnel.

Brig. Gen. James M. Gavin (CG task force "A"):

(This statement was dictated on August 16th at Hos., 82d A/B Division)

To begin with, the serial after leaving ENGLAND was in good shape--tight formation--all ships apparently present. The flight, as well as it could be observed from the lead plane, was excellent. Some flak came up from the channel islands--tracers were seen falling short. Shortly after crossing the West coast, the first check point was seen which I had figured would be BRICOUABEC. We then entered dense clouds. Ships which had been flying within a matter of feet of each other could not be seen anywhere. The red light went on, indicating four minutes before the drop. Then it was almost time for the green light we emerged from the clouds. There were no ships in sight. A river appeared in the distance turning to the West, which I estimated to be either the DOUVE or the upper reaches of the MERDERET. The green light went on at about the instance several of the ships appeared out of the fog, closing in on us. After about a 3 second dealy we went out. Small arms fire was coming up from the ground when the chute opened--just general shooting all over the area. Off to the right of the line of flight there was considerable apparent gunfire and flak. I figured that it probably was in the vicinity of ETIENVILLE, where there was supposed to be located the only known heavy AA installations in the area. A lot of firing was seen straight in the line of flight--tracers going into the air--several miles away. I landed in an orchard, joined my aide who landed nearby (LT OLSON) and proceeded to "roll up the stick" as per plan, arriving on the edge of a wide swamp where I found the remaining men of my stick who were endeavoring to retrieve equipment bundles from the deep mud and marsh. At this time parachutists were seen descending, landing in the swamp and on the banks. After collecting my stick, I found that several men had been injured during the landing, and two hit during descent. About 20 minutes after reaching the marsh, a red assembly light showed on the far bank. A few minutes thereafter a blue assembly light showed to the South of the red light several hundred yards. I sent Lt. OLSON at once to direct all the men that he could contact to report to me in my location. As it happened, the blue light was the 508 light--the red one of the 507 lights. Close-in security was posted. The Germans took no aggressive action, despite the fact that they were obviously in the area since there had been considerable firing during the descent. The river bank was well dug with slit trenches and prepared gun positions. Men from the 507 began arriving. Within two hours, about 150 men were assembled--all 507 except my own stick, and about one plane load of 508. Lt. OLSON reported that there was a railroad embankment on the far side of the swamp, and that it was passable for foot troops. We decided that we were on the MERDERET River since it was the only river with marshes and with a railroad running North and South alongside of it. Prior to this point, I had estimat-

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ed that we must be on the DOUVE because of the depth and width of the water. Our pre-operational photo interpretation had rather clearly established the fact that the MERDERET was a narrow stream, about 20 yards wide and several feet deep. The value of the MERDERET River as an anti-tank obstacle had been carefully studied. The river bank was surrounded by marsh land, covered with grass which on the fringes was used for grazing. Actually, it developed that the grass was swamp grass several feet long, which showed above the water and concealed the wide expanse of flooded area from the photo interpreter. Heavy firing was seen in the direction of what was thought to be STE MERE EGLISE. At about 0430, Colonel MALONEY and Colonel OSTBERG, of the 507th, with about 150 men, had reported to me, and I decided to move as soon as possible to seize the West end of the LA FIERRE bridge. I considered it necessary to accomplish this before daylight because of the impracticability of fighting through the swamps, of which there were several, in the face of any German automatic weapons. Steps were taken to get the force organized for movement, but in a few minutes two gliders landed about 400 yards West of our position. By this time I had definitely decided that we were on the West bank of the MERDERET River several miles North of LA FIERRE. It had been reported to me that Colonel LINDQUIST had moved down the railroad with about 100 men towards LA FIERRE. Some individuals were still coming in. Everyone who was not on security was working at retrieving bundles from the swamp. I managed to get one bazooka and a few rounds of ammunition. All other heavy equipment and radios were then in the swamp water or impossible to get to. The glider landings appeared most fortuitous, and steps were taken to get the equipment out of them. With luck it would be a 57mm AT gun, which would come in very handy. At this time gliders were going overhead moving in the direction of STE MERE EGLISE. All indications tended to more clearly establish our estimated location as being correct. In order to retrieve the contents of the gliders, the move South was temporarily delayed while patrols were sent to the gliders. Lt. GRAHAM was placed in charge of these patrols. Lt. GRAHAM returned in about a half hour stating that he needed at least 30 men. One glider contained a "57", and one a jeep. They had landed in a marsh and it was very difficult to extricate the gun and vehicle. Some German small arms fire was being received in the vicinity of the gliders at this time. Lt. Col. MALONEY was instructed to make the men available to Lt. GRAHAM. About a half hour later Lt. GRAHAM returned and stated that he couldn't get the men, couldn't get out the equipment with the men he had, and that the German fire was increasing. I accompanied him to the hedge along the field containing the gliders where the fire was building up with considerable intensity. With some difficulty additional men were obtained and finally either the gun or jeep, I forget which now, was removed only to become impossibly bogged in the swampy bottom. At my direction Lt. GRAHAM destroyed the jeep and removed part of the breach mechanism of the "57"mm. It was just barely possible to do this, since the German Force was becoming increasingly aggressive. It was now broad daylight. It was about 6 or 6:30 AM. The degree of enemy build-up and his attitude made the possibility of moving down the West bank at this time appear impracticable, and I decided to move to the railroad embankment and move in the direction of LA FIERRE, and there pick up all who could be found from the 508, contact the 505, and attack the bridge from the East side. Orders were issued, and the movement started across the marsh. The movement started and contact was established with the 1st Battalion, 505th, under the command of Major KELLAMs at LA FIERRE. His battalion had landed as per plan, and was carrying out its prescribed mission. His point was then engaged at the LA FIERRE bridge.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Challenging.--Without exception, all agreed that the system of challenging employed was the best; that is, one word for a challenge, and one word for a response -- no further conversation being necessary. This

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further substantiates the findings as a result of the SICILIAN operation. It is important that the same challenging system be employed in training as in combat.

2. Assembly.--The assembly plan employed appeared sound and took the following steps. Each stick rolls up on the bundles. After securing the equipment, sticks join each other by sight or patrol contact, or rendezvous at a previously agreed upon terrain feature, or by radio contact. The assembly lights, one per battalion, were used and proved to be very valuable when placed in operation. Except for not being high enough, were most satisfactory for their purpose. Prior to this operation orders were issued as follows: "Each battalion commander, or one of his designated battalion staff officers, would take with him a flare which he should employ if all other assembly aids failed". It is unfortunate that this order was not carried out by all participants. It is noteworthy, however, that the flare when used, served its purpose well. It is believed that the present practice of limiting the use of flares to a battalion commander or one of his designated staff officers is sound. Too many flares create an impossible situation. One light per battalion is all that is permissible. However, the lights must be raised 40 to 50 feet above the ground. (Experiments are now being conducted in this Division with a view to the employment of large balloons capable of raising an assembly light to the proper altitude.) It is believed that the assembly could be facilitated by having more radios jumped on the individuals, and it is believed that for this purpose more radios, in addition to the present authorized number, must be obtained.

3. Equipment.--All unit commanders are in agreement that bundles must be tied together. There appears to be some disagreement as to the extent of bundle identification. As has happened in the past, if a unit uses a bundle light and they manage to recover their equipment without being shot up, it is felt that this is unquestionably the proper method, whereas a unit using lights and getting badly shot up finds it impossible to recover its equipment and feels that the use of a light is a serious mistake. All things considered, the soundest plan appears to be: First, to tie all bundles together, so arranging the jumpmaster's trip switch so they will be released simultaneously; next, identify separate bundles with vitrolite or similar luminous markings and, in addition, use the rope knot system; further, it must be emphasized in training that every weapon and round of ammunition and piece of equipment must be recovered from the DZ without delay, and that units must recover their own equipment. If a unit is unable to carry off all of its loads, then a recover detail must be put to work and a dump established. Bundles must be jettisoned in the stick and not before.

4. Individual Equipment.--The parachute must be equipped with a quick release device. Individuals whose load permits must jump with an M-1 Mine. A caliber .45 pistol should be worn by each jumper during descent so as to be available immediately upon landing. The use of the M-1 Rifle Container is not imperative. Individuals must be trained to carry their full and complete combat load, wearing all of their equipment in some training exercises and, in addition, each individual load must be checked with a view to his prompt and expeditious clearance through the door. Several serious delays occurred because individuals could not get out promptly. This was caused by faulty wearing of equipment, improper carrying of arms, etc., and must be eliminated by proper inspection and training.

5. Arms.--Because of the nature of the fighting in NORMANDY, the BAR was most desirable, being of a high rate of fire, long range, high penetrative power, light, and highly mobile. As a result of this operation, all unit commanders feel that they would like to have two BAR's jumped in every squad. This will permit a unit to engage promptly in a heavy fire fight immediately upon landing. However, LMG's must also be dropped by bundle. There is no substitute for them on many missions. Obviously, more weapons will be on the ground than parachute units can properly employ. This will necessitate the use of a salvage crew.

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Steps are being taken to jump the bazooka with a round of ammunition on an individual in future operations. The Gammon Grenade with two fragmentation grenades per man was very satisfactory.

6. Artillery.--All commanders were highly enthusiastic in their praise of the artillery support received. They also, without exception, would like to see more work done with a view to developing and perfecting the use of parachute field artillery. Even with the present small percentage of recovery of weapons, they feel that the support available to them from the weapons recovered more than justifies the loss incurred in the drop.

7. Enemy Reaction.--The enemy appeared to engage with all means at his disposal all airborne troops during their descent. It was most significant, however, that the Germans remained holed up after the parachutists landed, and attempted little aggressive action for some long time. The gliders seemed to attract particular attention, and were very vulnerable immediately upon landing.

8. Our Own Troops.--The conclusions drawn from the past operations appear after study of NEPTUNE to be sound. Every stick must assemble on its own equipment promptly upon landing, regardless of the situation at hand and the amount of fire. From there the assembly must proceed as fast as circumstances permit. All enemy communications must be destroyed immediately. All roads must be mined. Troops must stay off the roads. Use the roads to ambush the enemy. Move across country. Move promptly with all equipment, arms, and ammunition that it is possible to get without too great a delay. A unit will never assemble all of its men, so that every commander will be faced with a decision as to when to move with the strength at hand. Only he can make this decision on the spot. It is most important, however, that the hours of darkness be used for the seizure of key points and objectives. The enemy reaction becomes increasingly violent with daylight.

It is most important that every officer participating in the exercise, regardless of grade, be briefed on the mission of the Division as a whole, and understand in a general way the priority of importance of the Division's objectives, and how the subordinate units of the Division are going to seize these objectives. It is clear from both the Sicilian Campaign and the NORMANDY Campaign that this common understanding on the part of all participating officers is of the utmost importance.

9. Pathfinder Aids.--In country as heavily held as NORMANDY, setting up and operating three lighted T's per regimental DZ is impossible. One coded light, or a different type light, appears to be more satisfactory. The size of the pathfinder defensive group does not have to be as large as that of NEPTUNE. A few automatic weapons and a bazooka can hold off most any German force that will operate at night.

10. Airborne SOP.--The SHAEF Airborne SOP in general appears to be satisfactory. It must be closely adhered to, particularly in regard to the 20-minute warning, the 4-minute warning, and the green light. It is of the utmost importance in a combat operation that the speed of the troop-carrying aircraft not be excessive. With the extremely heavy load carried by most jumpers, serious physical injury results, equipment is lost, and frequently the parachute malfunctions in jumping from a high-speed plane.

11. Weather Conditions.--It is interesting to note in Operation NEPTUNE that weather conditions were almost ideal until shortly after crossing the West coast of the peninsula. There a dense fog was encountered that lasted almost up to the MERDERET River. This caused considerable dispersion and error in the drop of the 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry Regiments, with the error generally being that of dropping well beyond the DZ where the fog first cleared. Unfortunately, this put most of the equipment in the MERDERET River or the swamps or tributaries of that river. The 505th Parachute Infantry, jumping East of the MERDERET River, landed with most of its men in the DZ area,

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and promptly undertook to accomplish its mission. The 507th and 508th Parachute Infantry, with equal promptness, moved to accomplish what was considered the next most important mission, and that was the seizure of crossings over the MERDERET River. Due to the wide dispersion of these units, this took a bit more time than was anticipated.

12. Training.--Our present training policies are sound. Night reorganization and assembly exercises must be held at least twice weekly. Full combat loads carried whenever possible. Prompt aggressive action by each individual is imperative immediately upon landing, regardless of enemy interference and must be insisted upon in training. An individual or small unit that "holes up" and does nothing is ultimately isolated and destroyed. An airborne unit has the initiative upon landing, it must retain it. This is the essence of successful reorganization and accomplishment of a mission.

A number of airborne commanders present recommended that it be suggested to Troop Carrier unit commanders that they conduct unit proficiency tests similar to those conducted in this Division. Each unit to be given a mission and be required to execute it under simulated combat conditions. Exact numerical ratings to be given based upon marshalling, briefing, order, flight, timing and accuracy of drop and these ratings then be made known to the entire command. The troops and unit commanders of this Division are willing and anxious to assist in any way possible in the conduct of this type training.

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